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PREFACE
This dissertation closes what has become for me a
rather sobering period of years. It is a period that began
sometime back in the late 1960s when, as a college student,
I, like a number of others in my generation, decided to
become a lawyer who would use the law for reform purposes.
I made this decision to become a reform lawyer with a great
deal of enthusiasm and optimism about what a future in reform
work would accomplish. Later, while in law school, my high
hopes remained undiminished.
My optimism began to dampen, however, several years
into my first efforts.as a licensed lawyer. These efforts
took place in the South and Southwest where I was litigating
minimum wage, worker safety, and various kinds of discrimi-
nation suits for the United States Department of Labor. And
by the time five years at this work had elapsed I had come
full circle to the point where feelings of disillusionment,
and not enthusiasm, were predominant insofar as my view of
law reform work was concerned.
A number of factors contributed to this disillusion-
ment. The biases of some judges, for example, made law reform
work seem hopeless. And so did the disparity between the
scant legal resources that reformers bring to court and the
vi
abundant legal resources upon which the powerful can rely.
(In one of the first cases I argued I represented one party
on my own while the other party, a large and wealthy organ-
ization, was represented by a handful of lawyers.) But if
judicial bias and the unequal resources that parties bring
to a lawsuit were the caus.e for some disillusionment, even
more disillusioning was the nagging and increasingly likely
possibility that law reform lawyers through their reform
efforts unintentionally cause as much harm as good. Weighed
down by this possibility, I eventually headed back to school
intent on trying to answer two questions: (1) how did I
reach the point where I was not only a lawyer but one who
started out with such high hopes for law reform?; and
(2) does the problem of unintended consequences make high
hopes for law reform a quite unrealistic view? This dis-
sertation presents my initial and, as I have already inti-
mated, sobering findings to these questions.
In undertaking my studies I have received assistance
from many staff and faculty in M.I.T.'s Department of Urban
Studies and Planning and Department of Political Science.
My thanks to all. I am particularly grateful to the mem-
bers of my dissertation committee, each of whom I respect
as individuals as well as teachers. The committee included:
Dr. Suzann Buckle; Dr. Leonard Buckle; Dr. Louis Menand; and
Dr. Gary Marx. Dr. Menand and the Buckles have been sup-
portive of my efforts. Professor Marx served as Dissertation
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Chairman and has been very kind and helpful in innumer-
able ways.
My thanks also to my parents--Mr. George Joseph
Weber and Mrs. Dorothy Henry Weber--who taught me to pursue
and value knowledge. I also appreciate and here acknowledge
the encouragement I have received from by beloved brothers:
Robert W. Weber; James P. Weber; and Thomas M. Weber.
Finally, my thanks to my true friend Andrea L. Anderson
who typed the dissertation and made many useful suggestions.
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This dissertation is
dedicated to my late sister Eileen
whose gentleness and unhesitating generosity
will be. remembered always.
INTRODUCTION
Recently it has been reported that after over a
decade of litigation the famed Boston school desegregation
suit is having "the opposite effect of the one . .
intended. Whites continue to flee the system, enforcing
the vicious cycle--more and more segregated buses, fewer
and fewer integrated classrooms." 1 Similarly, there have
been recent reports that higher local telephone rates
apparently are an unintended effect of a consent order
issued in the thirteen year old antitrust litigation
against AT&T.2 And, in a small Massachusetts town, a
recent suit that is intended to make sure that police
officers arrest drunk drivers allegedly may actually be
encouraging police officers to look the other way when they
encounter such drivers. 3 Furthermore, not only have there
been numerous recent claims that litigation is producing
unintended effects. There also have been recent reports
that legislative activity is producing similar results.
In New York City, legislation intended to improve the
l3oston Globe, 9 January 1985, p. 12.
2 New York Times, 28 February 1982, p. 38.
3 Boston Globe, 19 March 1983, p. 1.
1
2safety of building facades is allegedly having the unin-
tended outcome of encouraging building owners to shear
off cornices and other ornate additions to the facades
thereby destroying beautiful and historically important
parts of facades. 4 Meanwhile, recent legislation deregu-
lating federal control of airlines has spurred the growth
of so many new airline companies that there are not enough
experienced pilots to go around and thus some new airlines
are forced to employ inexperienced pilots. As a result,
there have been recent claims that an unintended -effect
of the airline deregulation legislation is that passenger
safety may be suffering due to the use of inexperienced
pilots.5
The type of law-related unintended consequences
referred to above is the subject of this dissertation.
Such consequences are studied in connection with law
reform movements, particularly the law reform movement
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The law reform move-
ment of the 1960s and early 1970s is, for the present
author, among the more useful and intriguing contexts in
which to look for and study the problem of law-related
unintended consequences, a problem we define.in more
4 New York Times, 18 January 1983, p. C11.
53oston Globe, 15 February 1985.
3detail at a later point, but which may be generally under-
stood to refer to the usually unexpected and the unintended
effects that sometimes follow legal action. It is espe-
cially instructive and interesting to examine law-related
unintended consequences in the context of the 1960s-1970s
law reform movement because perhaps in no other undertaking
in recent history has the law been used with such clear
social change purposes or intentions and, as we shall see,
it is advantageous to investigate the problem of unintended
consequences when initial purposes or intentions are clear.
In stating that the 1960s-1970s law reform movement is an
excellent context in which to try to detect and observe
law-related unintended consequences, I do not mean to imply
that there was a great deal of discussion'of the issue of
unintended consequences in that movement. In fact, as we,
in chapter one of this dissertation, develop the context
of our study by reviewing various features of the 1960s-
1970s law reform movement, we find that these features
tended to disregard the issue of unintended consequences.
Among the features of the 1960s-1970s law reform
movement at which we take a careful look in chapter one and
which apparently disregarded the matter of unintended conse-
quences is the movement's voluminous literature. In disre-
garding or at least deemphasizing the difficulties for law
reform presented by the issue of unintended consequences,
4the literature of the 1960s-1970s law reform movement per-
mitted some inflated and overconfident views of law reform
to develop and flourish. This dissertation seeks to temper
the effect of the sometimes grandiloquent writings of the
literature of the law reform movement by calling attention
to the limitations placed on law reform by the phenomenon
of unintended consequences.
We also look carefully in chapter one at other
features of the 1960s-1970s law reform movement that, like
the literature of the movement, gave but scant regard to
the problem of unintended consequences. We argue that
these other features of the movement, together with its
literature, helped attract or call young people to the
movement. Moreover, we contend that the attraction issued
by these features was somewhat deceptive because, as we
have said, the features failed to fully acknowledge the
problems presented for law reform by the matter of unin-
tended consequences.
Demonstrating that the literature and various other
features of the 1960s-1970s law reform movement were inatten-
tive to the problems for reform raised by the issue of unin-
tended consequences enables us, however, to argue more than
that such inattention made the literature overconfident and
made the movement as a whole deceptively attractive to young
people with reform interests. It also enables us to contend
that because of such inattention to the problem of unintended
5consequences the law reform efforts of the young people
who actually joined the movement may have at times had
seriously negative repercussions for poor people and other
clients of the movement. In particular, we argue, as will
be seen, that inattention to the problem of unintended
consequences may sometimes have led to the situation where
law reform efforts by young activists have in fact aggravated
rather than bettered the condition of poor people and other
clients on whose behalf reform efforts have been made.
We analyze the problem of'unintended consequences in
relation to the law reform movement of the 1960s and early
1970s in order to make another point, one concerning the
manner in which scholarly accountings or evaluations of that
movement should be made. The point is this: any such
accountings or evaluations must include an attempt to assess
unintended consequences. Accountings or evaluations that
fail to consider the unintended consequences of law reform
efforts of the past two decades will, it is submitted, be
incomplete and inaccurate tallies of the true impact of
such reform efforts. Of course, incorporating the concept
of unintended consequences into accountings or evaluations
of the 1960s-1970s law reform efforts is not a simple mat-
ter for, as we discuss in the next chapter, use of the
concept entails a number of definitional and measurement
problems.
6The bulk of our observations regarding what the
problem of unintended consequences may mean for the 1960s-
1970s law reform movement and for efforts to evaluate that
movement are made in chapter one and in chapter five. In
chapters two, three, and four, we are concerned with unin-
tended consequences of legal action on a more general level.
Acknowledging the measurement and definitional problems, and
the somewhat fragmentary and suggestive character of the evi-
dence adduced, this dissertation makes, in these middle
chapters and in part of chapter five, the general argument
that a wide variety of law reform efforts of the modern era,
and not just those associated with the 1960s-1970s law
reform movement, have at times apparently been seriously
undercut by the problem of unintended consequences. To
support this overall argument that the problem of unintended
consequences presents trouble both for law reform efforts
related to the movement that gained momentum in the 1960s
and early 1970s and for other similar efforts of recent
years, this dissertation extensively reviews different types
of unintended consequences that have been triggered by legal
action in the form of legislation and litigation. The dis-
sertation also examines the features of successful legal
action and discusses how the absence of such features in
any particular legal action may be linked to the appearance
of unintended consequences in that action. Still further,
7this dissertation considers questions for future research
regarding law-related unintended consequences.
We have outlined above most of the key issues this
dissertation discusses and most of the major arguments it
makes. The remaining, and less central, issues and argu-
ments raised in the dissertation are best introduced by
contrasting them with arguments that the dissertation does
not make. For example, the dissertation does not argue
that the problem of unintended consequences inhibits the
law from achieving only overblown reform goals such as-
those that, as we shall see, were set for it in the law
reform movement of the 1960s and 1970.s. Rather, the dis-
sertation argues that because of unintended consequences
law and lawyering can at times have difficulty meeting
moderate and even simple reform goals. And, relatedly,
it should not be misunderstood that we are contending that
unintended consequences arise only in regard to reform
actions (as distinct from reform goals) that take place
on a large scale such as class action reform lawsuits or
sweeping reform legislation. Instead, it is contended
that even the smallest, most unambitious and narrowly
drawn lawsuits and legislation can precipitate unintended
consequences.
There are additional potential misconceptions that
should be dispolled at the outset. Though it is about law
8and lawsuits that go awry in the sense that they exhibit
unintended consequences and side effects, this dissertation
is not aimed at suggesting that law can never be an instri,-
ment of reform. Nor, as we discuss more fully in chapter
two, should there be any mistaken impression that it is
maintained in this dissertation that unintended consequences
that arise following legal action are necessarily bad or
negative. Legal actions can also produce unexpected and
unintended results that are positive or good from the
viewpoint of those who initiate the actions or that are
good from some other viewpoint. These caveats aside, the
dissertation does conclude, nevertheless, that in looking
at the overall situation the problem of unintended conse-
quences may well be a fundamental flaw in schemes designed
to use law as an instrument of reform. To put it another
way, if, as is often said, legislation, litigation, and
other types of legal action are vehicles for reform, then
the problem of unintended consequences ices the road to
reform sometimes causing those vehicles to spin their
wheels and other times to slide off the path entirely.
PART ONE
THE OPTIMISTIC LAW REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1960s AND 1970s
CHAPTER I
LAW, LAWYERING, AND YOUNG ACTIVISTS: THEIR CALL TO
REFORM AND THE ISSUE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
In Shakespeare's King Henry the Sixth, a group
of "commons" arm themselves for rebellion and as they
begin their revolution one among their number, named Dick
the Butcher, cries to his comrades "the first thing we do,
let's kill all the lawyers."1 From his desire to promptly
extinguish the lives of all lawyers, it is apparent that
Dick viewed the legal profession as a key group among those
who structured and operated what he and his collaborators
believed was an oppressive society. This perception by
Dick the Butcher of lawyers as archvillains serves as a
neat counterpoint to the more respected place the legal
profession seems to have been assigned in our own most
recent experience with social upheaval in the so-called
"turbulent 1960s." True, as Jerold Auerbach has reported
in his social history of the legal profession, some seg-
ments of the profession were exposed in the tumultuous
1960s as participating in the perpetuation of a system of
justice that, among other inequities, discriminated between
lWilliam Shakespeare, The Histories of Shakespeare,
Henry the Sixth, Part II (New York: The Modern Library,
n.d.), p. 561.
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blacks and whites and between rich and poor. 2 But, in
apparent disregard of the abuses fostered by some elements
of the legal profession, the rebellious young of the 1960s
looked upon the profession in general with such favor that
they designated it as offering one of the most attractive
vocational choices available. Hence, as numerous authors
have noted, many idealistic young men and women entered the
practice of law in the 1960s and early 1970s 3 and they did
so with what seemingly was a hope of using law as a means
to bring about social change. 4 Berman and Cahn, for example,
were describing this trend when they wrote that:
Deeply aware of the legal profession's inadequate
commitment of time and resources to the solution
of social problems, many law students have decided
to become full time advocates for the unrepresented:
poor people, racial minorities, unorganized consumers. 5
2 Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and
Social Change in Modern America (London: Oxford University
Press, 1976), Chapter 9.
3 The phrase "1960s and early 1970s" is used repeat-
edly in this chapter. In using the phrase, I am in general
referring to the period 1964 to 1974.
4 J. Berman and Edgar S. Cahn, "Bargaining for Jus-
tice: The Law Students' Challenge to Law Firms," Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 5 (1970): 16; Eric
E. Van Loon, "The Law School Response: How to Sharpen Stu-
dents' Minds by Making Them Narrow," in With Justice for
Some, eds. B. Wasserstein and M. Green (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1970), p. 334; Auerbach, p. 278; Jack Katz, Poor Peo-
ple's Lawyers in Transition (New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, forthcoming), pp. 107-110.
5Berman and Cahn, Ibid.
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Auerbach described the situation this way:
During the 1960s observers detected 'a new generation
of law students and recent graduates more conscious
of the urgency of social reform than any past genera-
tion of lawyers. . . .' Young lawyers in significant
numbers repudiated private gain for public service and
. . . searched for opportunities to combine social
professionalism with social activism in -the public
interest.6
There is some doubt regarding just how many of these young
lawyers entering reform-oriented work during the 1960s and
early 1970s actually had prior activist views and experience,
but some clearly did.7 It is also clear that the total num-
ber of lawyers engaging in reform work was greater than in
previous years if only because the number of available
reform positions, with such organizations as legal services
,programs and public interest firms, was, as we shall see,
itself expanding greatly. Thus while Shakespeare's ficti-
tious rebel Dick the Butcher would dispose of all lawyers
in order to attack oppression in his society, ironically
some of the rebels of the 1960s wanted not to dispose of
the legal profession but to enlist in its ranks even though
6 Auerbach, Chap. 9.
7 See the data in H. S. Erlanger, "Lawyers and Neigh-
borhood Legal Services: Social Background and the Impetus
for Reform," Law and Society Review 12 (1978): 253, who,
writing in regard to just the Legal Services Program, main-
tains that the number of activists who entered the program
is not as great as often thought. See also Katz, Poor
People's Lawyers, p. 107, who argues that some of the fig-
ures cited by Erlanger ". . . greatly underrepresent moral
activism in the perspectives of early Legal Services
lawyers."
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the profession had been shown to be a key contributor to
the racial and economic injustices that the 1960s rebels
found reprehensible. Once in the profession, these rebels
joined forces with various disenchanted young lawyers who
had no prior activist experience and together these two
groups undertook what was, as we shall also see, a much bal-
lyhooed campaign of law reform often considered to be in
the vanguard of all social change efforts of the 1960s-1970s
period.
The Call to Reform.in the 1960s and early 1970s
The young people with activist inclinations who
began moving into the legal profession in the 1960s and
early 1970s were-apparently heeding a call tha.t was resound-
ing throughout America. It was a call to use law and law-
yering as a means for reform. Many voices contributed to
the call including those of politicians, practicing lawyers,
and scholars. By their speeches, writings, and other actions
these politicians, lawyers, and scholars made a collective
call to "use the system," especially the legal system, "to
change the system," and furthermore, their activities
created a kind of ambience in which law was made out to
be something of a panacea particularly to those unschooled
in the details of the law's workings and its idiosyncracies.
14
The weaknesses, limits, and paradoxes of the law, such as
the problem of unintended consequences, were downplayed,
if not ignored.
In what follows below we consider in detail the
various aspects of the call to law reform in the 1960s and
early 1970s. Our purpose is to show how the call drew
young activist oriented individuals into the legal profes-
sion and to also show, what is more important for this
dissertation, how the call neglected a particular short-
coming of law-related action, namely the problem -of unin-
tended consequences, thereby, incidentally, making the
attraction of these young people into the profession all
the more possible. Ultimately we argue that the call to
reform was overstated and misleading partially in its own
right and partially because of its failure to fully assess
the constraints on reform action that arise from the problem
of unintended consequences.
roliticians, Legislation, and Reform
As indicated above, politicians contributed to the
call in the 1960s and early 1970s to use law as a tool of
reform. During this time, they called for the use of law,
and in fact did use law, to attack nearly every major pro-
blem that was confronting the country. In reviewing below
some of the legislative actions politicians called for and
15
took in this period, it is apparent that these politicians
had a high degree of faith in the reform power of law for
they literally set out to use the law to transform America.
It was a faith in law among politicians that, it is sub-
mitted, may have spilled over onto the young people of the
times inspiring such young people to try their hands at
law-related work. Furthermore, from the heavy reliance of
politicians on law, it is also apparent that these politi-
cians were not much troubled by the idea that laws might
unexpectedly and unintentionally exacerbate rather than
ameliorate a particular problem. As previously suggested
and as we shall eventually see, however, there was little
in the scholarly literature on law reforming that could
have alerted politicians of the period to the problem of
unexpected or unintended consequences.
Among the many issue areas in which politicians of
the 1960s and early 1970s legislated were race relations,
the environment, consumer problems, and discrimination
against women and older individuals. We look first at race
relations legislation which many felt was urgently needed
during these times in light of race-related sit-ins, marches
on Washington, and riots. In our look at race relations
legislation we can clearly see the above referred to deep
confidence of politicians in the reform power of law. This
16
confidence is evident in the race relations enactments
of the period because those enactments attempted no
less than to legislate reform in the racial practices
and attitudes of a large segment of the white popula-
tion. 8 Though an act was passed in 1960,9 the really
significant reform legislation in the race relations
area began with the Civil Rights Act of 196410 which
has recently been called ". . . the most significant
civil rights legislation since the post Civil War
period."11  The 1964 Act, under Title II, bars dis-
crimination in public accommodations. Title VI of
its provisions bars discrimination in any program
receiving federal assistance and Title VII made it
unlawful to discriminate against any individual in
regard to employment because of such individual's race.
Another piece of significant race relations legislation
immediately followed in the form of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.12 Professor Schwartz has written that the Act
8 See Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute, revised ed.
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967).
974 Stat. 86 (1960).
1078 Stat. 241 (1964).
llBernard Schwartz, ed., Statutory History of the
United States: Civil Rights, 2 vols. (New York: Chelsea
House Publishers, 1970), 2:1017.
1279 Stat. 437 (1965).
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". . . is, in many ways, the most drastic civil rights
statute ever enacted by Congress. . . ."13 In brief, the
1965 Act contains provisions permitting Federal voting
examiners to be appointed thereby supplanting the authority
of local registrars whose notoriously discriminatory prac-
tices in the South had been artificially reducing the num-
ber of registered black voters. Other provisions of the
Voting Rights Act outlawed discriminatory voting tests
regarding qualifications to vote. The Act has often been
acclaimed for its success in prompting new voter registra-
tions. 1 4 Attack on the race problem continued in the 1960s
with passage of still another noteworthy civil rights act in
1968. The provisions of the 1968 act outlawed, in phases,
various aspects of housing discrimination.1 5
As previously suggested, it is not only the above
described race.relations enactments that evince the strong
belief in the reform power of law that was held by politi-
cians in the 1960s and early 1970s and that may have affected
young people of the times causing them to be moved to under-
take law-related work. A similarly strong belief in law also
is evident in the calls of politicians to use law, and again
1 3 Schwartz, p. 1469.
1 4 See Berger, p. 51; H. R. Rodgers and C. S. Bullock,
Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Conse-
quences (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1972), p. 30.
1582 Stat. 73 (1968).
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in their willingness to in fact use it, to battle a whole
host of other social ills. Thus, in regard to environmental
problems, politicians of the period took action in the form
of the Clean Air Act1 6 and the National Environmental Policy
Act. 17 Consumer problems, meanwhile, were attacked as in,
for example, the Consumer Credit Protection Act.18 Further,
to combat discrimination in employment against women and
older workers the Equal Pay Act of 196319 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 196720 were passed,
respectively. These various legislative actions by our
elected leaders, as well as many other similar legisla-
tive actions taken in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the
publicity surrounding the actions, helped create an aura
about the competence of law as a technique for solving
social problems. It seems unlikely that the young people
of the times could have avoided being aroused by this
enormous respect for law and belief in its power that was
so evident among our political officials, a respect and
belief that seemed to disavow or overlook the thought that
1677 Stat. 392 (1963); 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
1783 Stat. 852 (1969).
1882 Stat. 146 (1968).
1977 Stat. 56 (1963).
2077 Stat. 602 (1967).
19
law could unexpectedly cause harm as much as it might
help. Some young individuals of the period reacted to
ubiquitous respect for the law and belief in its power
by attempting to undermine and flout the law while
others no doubt saw the possibility to turn the law's
might to their own reformist goals. For those who
chose the latter path a logical first step was to become
a lawyer. As is well known, it is lawyers who are often
most instrumental in the passage of legislation whether
they be the lawyers who draft the legislation or the
lawyers who typically make up more than a majority of
most legislatures.
Lawyers and Reform
Lawyers, as well as politicians, contributed
to the call in the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s
to use law.as a means of reform. Acting primarily in
their capacities as independent professionals and not
as politicians and legislators, lawyers contributed to
the call to reform by creating a set of circumstances that
fueled the call and gave it strength and purpose. First
of all, as is discussed more fully below, lawyers were
pressing for, and with the help of federal and foundation
funding, were successful in greatly expanding the number
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and the size of law reform related organizations and
institutions and in expanding, in particular, the number
of law reform jobs available in such organizations and
institutions. An increased supply of reform institutions
and of reform-oriented jobs contributed to the call to
reform in the sense that it gave the call the chance to
become something more than an empty cry. Institutions
and jobs could be used by those making and heeding the
call to turn its promises into concrete results. Second,
as is also discussed below, lawyers were developing new
theories and strategies of law reform, or dusting off
and adapting old ones. These theories and strategies
gave direction and intellectual substance to the call
to reform. Third, lawyers, by their writings and speeches,
were widely spreading an extraordinary confidence and
belief in the reform power of law, a belief not unlike
that exhibited by politicians in legislating many ambitious
new laws. In order to show the full measure, at the time,
of the legal profession's belief in the power of law for
reform I will eventually detail one example of its expres-
sion by means of a case study of the comments made regard-
ing the Legal Services Program. This belief in the law's-
reform power was the very foundation of the call to reform.
Without such a belief it is unlikely that any individual
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would have been moved to call for the use of law for
reform purposes and, in turn, without individuals being
so moved, there would have been no collective call to
reform in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Each of the three circumstances that lawyers
helped create--expanded law reform job opportunities,
newly available theories of law reform action, and a
spreading and powerful belief in the reform competence
of law and lawyering--can be viewed not only, as argued
above, as contributions to the call to reform but also
as enticements that helped draw young activist oriented
individuals to the practice of law. The way in which
each of these three circumstances helped attract such
young people to -the legal profession is discussed at
length below but, for purposes of giving the reader an
overview, is also briefly stated here. To begin with,
the increased law reform job opportunities created by
lawyers probably were seductive to young activists
contemplating a legal career. These reform jobs osten-
sibly offered a means to express, and to financially
support, one's activism. Next, the new and apparently
appealing theories and strategies of law reform action
being formulated by lawyers at the time, such as that
developed by Ralph Nader, may well have attracted activist
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inclined young people to legal practice in that it was
through legal practice that such young people would have
the opportunity to deploy one of these law reform theories
and strategies. Finally, the powerful belief in the
reform competence of law and lawyering that lawyers were
propagating at the time may have influenced young people
with a reformist bent attracting them to a career as a
law reformer.
The expanding number of reform oriented jobs,
the developing new theories and strategies of law reform
action, and the spreading belief in the reform power of
law, all of which we outlined above, are three circum-
stances that are also discussed or reflected in the lit-
erature on law and reform of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Hence, our attempt below to more fully consider these
circumstances and the ways in which each induced young
people into the legal profession will enable us to also
review in some detail the law and reform literature in
which our three circumstances are discussed or reflected
and to point out, as has been mentioned on several
occasions, how that literature downplays the law's
limitations such as the problem of unintended consequences.
Increased Opportunities for Law Reform Practice
It was suggested above that young activists of the
1960s were called to the legal profession partially by the
23
lure of increased opportunities to practice reform law.
Before detailing these increased reform opportunities
that were arising in the 1960s, however, it should be
noted by way of contrast that, in the years prior to
the 1960s-1970s law reform movement, the history of the
legal profession cannot be characterized as one in which
reformist or progressive activities were encouraged.
The evidence in this regard has recently'been reviewed
by Professor Auerbach and seems to be conclusive. 21
Alexis De Tocqueville's remarks made about 150 years ago
probably describe with accuracy what in actuality is the
history of lawyers in America rather than merely their-
role in society at the time of his visit. Tocqueville
told us that:
I do not, then, assert that all members of the legal
profession are at all times the friends of order, and
the opponents of innovation, but merely that most of
them are usually so. (awyers ar) . . . eminently
conservative and anti-democratic Cmn . . . are
attached to public order beyond every other consider-
ation.2 2
However tempted to use Tocqueville's remarks as a general
description of the history of lawyers in the United States,
it must be admitted that there have been some periods, in
21 Auerbach, Uneaual Justice.
2 2Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America,
2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 1:274-275.
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addition to the 1960s and 1970s, during which lawyers
have been influential in reform movements and even in
revolution. For example, members of the legal profes-
sion participated in the revolution that brought our
nation into being: more than half of the signatures on
the Declaration of Independence are those of lawyers. 23
And, in regard to reform movements, lawyer, and later
Supreme Court judge, Felix Frankfurter and his proteges
are often said to have had considerable influence in
New Deal era reform efforts. 2 4 Thus when lawyers began
turning to reform in the 1960s and 1970s it was an
unusual move if one thinks in terms of the legal pro-
fession's entire history but yet it was not a move
wholly without historical precedent.
I have remarked that the involvement of lawyers
in reform in the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by a
tremendous explosion in the number and size of law reform
related institutions and, thus, in the number of available
law reform oriented jobs. Naturally enough, there was
2 3U.S. Department of the Interior, Signers of
the Declaration, revised ed., by Robert G. Ferris, series
ed., The National Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings,
vol. 18 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1975), p. 150.
2 4 Auerbach, Chap. 7.
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also a concomitant explosion in law reform litigation.
As one observer of the general time period has written:
. . . Only from the late 1950s on has the use
of litigation as an instrument of social reform
become so widespread that it can be called a
movement.25
To some extent this growth in reform litigation mirrored
a pattern evident in society in general. For example,
writing of litigation brought by society through its
government, Charles Black could say as early as 1960
that:
In our society, government works in great part,
and public policy is implemented in great part
by the2 ringing of law suits--criminal and
civil.2 o
But, perhaps because of the visibility that came with
the publicity in which law reform law suits were often
enveloped, the increase in such reform suits in the 1960s
and early 1970s seemed to outstrip similar increases in
government and non-reform related private suits. In
addition to the reform suits themselves, institutions
bringing reform suits also became highly visible to the
2 5Joel F. Handler, Social Movements and the Legal
System, A Theory of Law Reform and Social Change (New York:
Academic Press, 1978), p. 1.
2 6 Charles L. Black, The People and The Court (New
York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 18.
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public eye in this period and statistics indicating the
proliferation of these institutions demonstrate that their
increased visibility was real and definitely not merely
a matter of publicity. As an example of the proliferation
of reform institutions during these times, consider the
growth in the number of reform-oriented legal aid offices
which..was clearly a growth unparalled at any point in
history. We will now detail the explosive growth of such
legal aid organizations, and of similar reform organiza-
tions, in order to show the increased law reform opportuni-
ties that were available in the 1960s and early 1970s and
that may have called or attracted young people of that
period to the legal profession.
Legal aid organizations have long been a part of
the American scene. The very first legal aid organization
was incorporated in 1876 in New York City by a group of
merchants and other citizens concerned with the welfare of
certain immigrants.27 In its initial year of operation,
the organization (which later became known as the New York
Legal Aid Society) provided legal aid in 212 cases. 2 8 By
2 7 Reginald Heber Smith, Justice and the Poor
(New York: Carnegie Foundation, 1919), pp. 134-135.
28 Ibid., p. 135.
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1914 there were twenty-eight legal aid societies in the
United States 2 9 and in the 1960s the number jumped to
236.30 In the mid and late 1960s, however, during whicl-
time the federal government began funding various local
legal aid programs, the expansion was at a highly acceler-
ated rate. .In 1965, just prior to federal funding, the
total budget for all traditional legal aid societies was
just over $5 million dollars and there were about 400 full
time legal aid lawyers. 31 By June 1968, federal funding
by the Office of Economic Opportunity added $40 million
more dollars and 2,000 new lawyers to the totals.3 2 Further,
and more important for our purposes than the growth itself
in the total number of legal aid positions, is the fact that
the new positions funded by federal monies were created
expressly, as we shall see more fully at a later point, to
provide opportunities for lawyers to pursue reform litiga-
tion, including large scale class suits, while traditional
legal aid programs usually emphasized service to individual
clients without regard to reform issues.
2 9Ibid., p. 147.
30Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform, The
Formative Years of the OEO Legal Service Program (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1974), p. 9.
31Ibid., p. 188.
32Ibid.
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Young activist oriented individuals were probably
drawn to the legal profession in the 1960s and early 1970s
not only by the opportunity to obtain one of the above men-
tioned newly created reform positions available in federally
funded legal aid programs but also by the opportunity to
secure one of the new positions which other reform organiza-
tions had to fill as a result of their own growth during
this period. For example, the NAACP and ACLU experienced
marked growth during these times and thus had jobs to offer.
The NAACP, formed in 1909, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF), which became a separate entity in 1939, had long been
involved in reform litigation most notably under the brilliant
leadership of Charles Houston and later Thurgood Marshall.3 3
Though initially a small office, by the 1960s the LDF had
expanded to the point where it had to keep some thirty staff
attorney positions filled. 3 4 The LDF also offered an oppor-
tunity to participate in a network of cooperating attorneys
that was created for the purpose of providing aid to LDF
staff attorneys in local jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the
33 The history of the NAACP is told in C.F. Kellogg,
NAACP: A History of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1967) and in the very readable work of R. Kluger,
Simple Justice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).
34 Robert L. Rabin, "Lawyers for Social Change:
Perspectives on Public Interest Law," Stanford Law Review
28 (1976) :216-217.
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American Civil Liberties Union presented young activists
considering a legal career with similarly expanded oppor-
tunities, should such activists become lawyers, to engage
in reform-type practice. 3 5 Originally the ACLU carried out
its litigation on a voluntary basis but by 1974 it offered
the opportunity to be one of 34 full time lawyers employed
in its 19 local offices or one of 18 lawyers employed in the
ACLU headquarters. 36 In addition, at that time the ACLU
also offered the opportunity to join some five thousand fel-
low attorneys willing to voluntarily aid the ACLU cause. 37
Young people contemplating entering the legal pro-
fession to do reform work could also look to the prospect
of landing one of the reform law positions available in the
multiplying public interest law firms of the times. These
firms were a mixed bag but some typical features can be
described. They generally received operating funds from one
or a combination of the following sources: private founda-
tions, private donations, and paying clients. 38 They
3 5 For a history of the American Civil Liberties
Union see Charles Markham, The Noblest Cry: A History of
the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965).
3 6Rabin, p. 212.
3 7Ibid.
38 For~a discussion of the alternative modes for pub-
lic interest lawyering see Comment, "The New Public Interest
Lawyers," Yale'Law Journal 79 (1970): 1069; E. Berlin,
A. Roisman, and G. Kessler, "Public Interest Law," George
Washington Law Review 38 (1970): 675; Rabin, pp. 227-228.
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sometimes liked to be identified with particular movements,
such as the environmental or consumer movement, and, to
accomplish such, they would focus their litigation on their
chosen area. Other public interest firms, however, litigated
in many areas.3 9
Beyond legal aid, the ACLU, the NAACP, and the pub-
lic interest firms, another possibility for law reform prac-
tice. in the 1960s and early 1970s was the opportunity to
join one of a small number of law communes that popped up
around the country. Typically devoted to representing mili-
tants, these communes tried to survive by combining free
work for the militants with other work for a collection of
paying clients. Besides the psychological rewards of help-
ing keep radicals out of jail and on the streets, these law
communes also offered a counterculture lifestyle. There
are reports that communes attempted such innovations as
disbursing remuneration according to need and not according
to performance demonstrated or fees collected and there are
further reports that, as the term commune implies, efforts
were made at living as well as practicing together.40
Considered as a whole, the various organizations
described above were offering expanded, and in some cases,
39 Comment, "The New Public Interest Lawyers," Yale
Law Journal, p. 1096; Rabin, pp. 228-229.
40Robert Lefcourt, ed., "The First Law Commune," in
Law Against People (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 310.
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refreshingly innovative opportunities to try law reform
to those young people of the period who were mulling over
the possibility of a legal career.
Theories and Strategies for Law Reform
In addition to the increased reform related job oppor-
tunities, that.we have just reviewed, a second circumstance
that may have attracted young activist oriented individuals to
the legal profession in the ,1960s and early 1970s was the
chance to implement one of the exciting, and apparently prom-
ising, new theories and strategies of law reform.(or remod-
elled old ones) that lawyers, such as Ralph Nader, were
developing during these times. Young activists pondering the
idea of beginning a legal career probably envisioned that, by
participating in the implementation of these theories and
strategies, they would be joining those on the cutting edge
of the law reform movement. Unfortunately, as intimated ear-
lier and as will be apparent from a review of their terms,
these theories and strategies tended to soft-pedal the pro-
blem of unintended consequences and thus they may have caused
young people who reviewed and relied on them to conjure up
unduly optimistic images of what it means to use law and
lawyering for reform purposes.
The theories and strategies that were afoot in the
law reform movement of the 1960s and early 1970s have been
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discussed at length many times in the literature. 4 1 I will
not repeat here such lengthy discussions but rather will
briefly present several of the significant theories and
strategies of the times that may have had some allure for
those young activists thinking about becoming lawyers. One
such theory of reform was articulated in an important arti-
cle by Jean and Edgar Cahn. 4 2 The theory or strategy
espoused by the Cahns had four basic tenets. First, they
stated that many of the problems of the poor were legal in
nature. Second, they urged reform lawyers to become spokes-
men for the poor especially in relation to public officials
who should be aiding the poor. Thus, for example, these
lawyers were to articulate and advocate the perspectives
and policy positions of the civilians (i.e. the poor) who
were the intended beneficiaries of the War on Poverty being
waged by bureaucrats. Third, the spokesmen/lawyers would
be located in and become a part of the neighborhood and
community they represented. Fourth, not only as spokesmen
for the poor in legal forums but also through other activi-
ties associated with law practice (i.e. negotiation, drafting
41 For example, see Comment, "The New Public Interest
Lawyers," Yale Law Journal.
42 Edgar S. Cahn and Jean C. Cahn, "The War on Poverty:
A Civilian Perspective," Yale Law Journal 73 (1964):1317.
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of documents, business formation, and consultation), these
lawyers would help ameliorate the conditions of poverty
in which their clients were traped.
Besides the Cahns' strategy, there were other major
strategies that may have appeared sufficiently promising
to the rebellious young of the 1960s and early 1970s to
help draw them to the legal profession. A second strategy
of the times that the young may have responded to in this
way revolved around the idea of test or impact cases and
Edward Sparer is often said to have been a leading advocate
of this approach to law reform. 4 3 In essence this second
theory or strategy required careful, even scholarly, analy-
sis of the legal status of a particular problem area (e.g.
welfare rights) to uncover appropriate points for challenge.
Then a series of test cases were designed and brought in the
courts in the hope of eventually transforming the law in
that area. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund is generally said
to have used such a strategy in carefully dismantling the
legal underpinnings of the "separate but equal" doctrine
prior to its ultimate destruction in Brown v. Board of
Education.44
43 Earl Johnson, Jr., p. 23 describes Sparer's
initial strategies and activities.
44347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Still a third strategy or theory of the period may
have seemed promising to young activists considering a
legal career. This third strategy or theory centered on,
somewhat like the Cahns' theory, the concept of accounta-
bility and the notion of access. It is a strategy or theory,
one identifiable in the work of public interest lawyers,
that saw reform as giving voice to the public interest in
forums which previously had been closed to the public or in
which the general public did not usually appear equipped
with the law and lawyers. 4 5 Further, this strategy for law
reform apparently accepted the idea that the actions of
interest groups determine the contours of our political
struggles and the ultimate distribution of costs and bene-
fits by the political system. Accordingly, the reformers
involved in the implementation of this strategy, including
Ralph Nader and others, sought, and in some instances con-
tinue to this day, to represent the public interest in
various rule making administrative forums (e.g. FTC, FDA,
etc.) which they felt were unresponsive to the general
public though sensitively attuned, so the argument went,
4 5 See C. R. Halpern and J. M. Cunningham, "Reflec-
tions on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice
at the Center for Law and Social Policy," Georgetown Law
Journal 59 (1971):1095; Rabin, p. 230; Comment, "The New
Public Interest Lawyers," Yale Law Journal, pp. 1098-1099.
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to the needs of powerful interest groups usually those the
administrative body was supposed to regulate not coddle.
Though these public interest reformers of the period believed
in a strategic lawsuit here and there, litigation was not,
unlike in the Cahns' theory and in the test case theory, a
key to the overall public interest strategy. Rather public
interest reformers placed their faith in advocacy before
administrative rule making bodies.
A fourth strategy, the final one we review here,
was allegedly adopted by the Legal Services Program and it
involved the decision to employ a mix of devices to achieve
reform. 4 6 According to this strategy, the reformers would
attempt reform by stretching their resources to cover a
variety of techniques including test cases, routine cases
generated in neighborhood law offices, group representation,
and legislative advocacy.
It should be readily seen that to any young 1960s-
1970s activist ruminating over the prospect of a legal
career, the foregoing four strategies or theories for
law reform, which along with their proponents were highly
publicized, gave such young people ample reason to believe
that pursuit of a reformist legal career would not be
without theoretical and strategic guidance.
4 6Earl.Johnson, Jr., pp. 130-132.
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Belief in the Reform Power of Law and Lawyering
Besides having theories and strategies, such as
those discussed above, to guide their reform actions and
having expanded opportunities to actually obtain a reform-
oriented job, a third factor or circumstance--widespread
belief in the reform power of law and lawyering--may have
also attracted or called the young to the legal profession
in the 1960s and early 1970s. Though typically not in a
form that reached the level of a theory or a strategy,
many lawyers and legal commentators, as we shall see imme-
diately below, expressed this belief in the reform power
of law and lawyering. In fact, I think a firm belief in
the reform competence of law and lawyering characterized
the legal profession in general during this period, but to
substantiate the point it would be necessary to closely
examine here most, or a good portion, of all the public
statements and writings that bar officials, legal scholars,
and practitioners made in regard to law reform in this era.
Such an effort is beyond the scope of the present work. As
an alternative, I have chosen to just generally review much
of the law reform literature of the times while keenly look-
ing at an important and representative segment, that being,
the literature and statements surrounding the Legal Services
Program. An intense review, or case study if you will, of
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the statements and writings relating to the Legal Services
Program will permit me to show, in several of its forms
and in all its grandeur, the extraordinary beli,.f in the
reform power of law and lawyering that was common among
a wide assortment of lawyers in the 1960s and 1970s. Our
study of the writings that discussed the Legal Services
Program will- also permit me to hint at in this chapter and
flesh out in later chapters the stark contrast between
the picture of law reforming that is developed in some of
these Legal Services writings and the picture of law
reforming that develops when one includes the concept of
unintended consequences.
Belief in the Power of Law and Lawyering: The Case of
the Legal Services Program
From its origins in a War on Poverty program oper-
ated by the now defunct Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
to its 1974 incorporation as the supposedly politically
independent Legal Services Corporation, the tempestuous
early political history of the federally funded Legal Ser-
vices Program has been much chronicled.47 In its more
recent past, the program has grown in size, but some of
47 Comment, "Legal Services Corporation: Curtail-
ing Political Interference," Yale Law Journal 81 (1971):
231; Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform; W. E. George,
"Development of the Legal Services Corporation," Cornell
Law Review 61 (1976):715; P. J. Hannon, "From Politics to
Reality: An Historical Perspective of the Legal Services
Corporation," Emory Law Journal 25 (1976):639.
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its key activities (e.g. class action suits and appeals)
have continued to come under political attack.48 And cur-
rently, as President Reagan cuts back Great Society programs,
the Legal Services Program is again the subject of political
controversy and will either lose financial support or may
even perish entirely. Much of the turbulent history of
the Legal Services Program can be explained and understood
in terms of what I submit has been the underlying and deeply
held belief by the relevant actors in this history that law
and lawyering are extremely potent reform tools which Legal
Services lawyers might use, or misuse depending on the
perspective you take, to alter social and economic struc-
tures in America. Such a strong belief in the reform power
of law and lawyering is, as we shall see below, apparent
in the goals the Legal Services Program set for itself, in
the laudatory statements observers of the program made about
the capabilities of lawyers and about the early accomplish-
ments of the program, and in the caustic criticisms of the
program's opponents which were laden with fear about the
enormous changes in society that were imminent if the pro-
gram were allowed to continue to function unbridled.
48M. R. Buck, "Legal Services Corporation: Finally
Separate But Not Quite Equal," Syracuse Law Review 27 (1976):
611.
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The goals of the Legal Services Program. Among
the various features of the Legal Services Program, the
goals set for the program in the 1960s most clearly reflect
the strong belief in the reform power of law that influ-
enced young activists and attracted them to legal careers.
Though the literature of the period indicates that
antipoverty lawyers in the Legal Services Program, 49 and in
related efforts, had a series of subordinate goals, the pri-
mary goal was no less than to help banish poverty forever.
The head of OEO, Sargent Shriver, himself a lawyer, set
the standard in 1965:
. . . There is a new appreciation of the con-
tribution legal services can make, not simply to
get poor people out of a particular jam, but to get
them out of poverty once and for all. 50
Taking this cue, E. Clinton Bamberger, appointed by Shriver
as the first director of the CEO Legal Services Program,
wrote that:
The OEO program marshals the forces of law and the
power of lawyers in the War on Poverty to defeat the
causes and effects of poverty.51
4 91n using the general term "the literature of the
Legal Services Program" I usually mean to include not only
the literature that deals specifically with the Legal Ser-
vices Program but also the small amount of literature that
considers related antipoverty lawyering efforts such as
those undertaken by the Mobilization For Youth.
50 R. Sargent Shriver, "The OEO and Legal Services,"
American Bar Association Journal 51 (1965):1064.
5 1 E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., "The Legal Services
Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity," Notre Dame
Lawyer 41 (1966):852.
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On another occasion Bamberger said:
Our responsibility is to marshal the forces of law
and the strength of lawyers to combat the causes and
effects of poverty. Lawyers must uncover the legal
causes of poverty, remodel the systems which generate
the cycle of poverty and design new social, legal and
political tools and vehicles to move poor people from
deprivation, depreggion, and despair to opportunity,
hope and ambition.
Moreover, the goal of helping wipe out poverty forever was
not mere rhetoric, it was a goal that was apparently taken
very seriously. For example, Bamberger stated, "I ask myself
each day--how will lawyers representing poor people defeat
the cycle of poverty?" 5 3 And Jack Katz reports that origi-.
nally the Legal Services Program had to annually report to
OEO on "the year's progress in reducing poverty . . . ."54
To implement the overriding goal of first reducing
and then finally eradicating poverty, antipoverty lawyers
of the times had a set of sub-goals. First among these
sub-goals was a new emphasis on reform activities having
far-reaching impact. As previously mentioned, traditional
(i.e. the pre-federally funded) legal aid societies had
allegedly underscored the importance of individual service. 55
52A. K. Pye and R. F. Garraty, Jr., "The Involve-
ment of the Bar in the War Against Poverty," Notre Dame
Lawyer 41 (1966): 870.
53M. Cappelletti and J. Gordley, "Legal Aid: Modern
Themes and Variations," Stanford Law Review 24 (1972): 410.
54 Katz, p. 266.
55See, e.g. J. F. Handler, E. J. Hollingsworth, and
S. Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights
(New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 19.
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The 1960s antipoverty lawyers in the federally funded Legal
Services Program, however, realized the importance of indi-
vidual service but also had other ambitions as well. Direc-
tor Bamberger wrote in this regard:
Certainly the individual client's case and his needs
must always be the focal point of the lawyer's work.
Legal ,service in the context of the War on Poverty,
however, must mean something more . . . . I speak of
results with long range significance for large num-
bers of people, not just individual service of limited
impact.5b
Thus, the leadership of the Legal Services Program urged
the offices it funded to ferret out opportunities to pursue
reform litigation or reform-oriented legislative advocacy
of major impact. 5 7
Either through such reform activities or through a
gradual wearing down by the filing of hundreds of similar
individual cases, antipoverty lawyers hoped to achieve a
second sub-goal: the transformation of individual institu-
tions from adversaries to benefactors of the poor. For
example, the leading article, to which many antipoverty
lawyers no doubt looked for guidance and goals, written by
the Cahns argued that "sometimes effectuating legal and con-
stitutional mandates can prompt institutional innovation."5 8
And I think it is fair to say that institutional change is
56 E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., pp. 848-849.
57Earl Johnson, Jr., p. 132 and Chapter 7.
5 8 Cahn and Cahn, p. 1338.
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what Bamberger had in mind when he stated, in the message
quoted at length above, that among the responsibilities of
antipoverty lawyers is the duty to ". . . remodeI the sys-
tems which generate the cycle of poverty."5 9 Rothwax mean-
while argued that such institutional change, if it comes at
all, would be brought about not by the reform oriented
advocacy Bamberger favored but by what Rothwax called "the
power of the case-load"--the attrition accompanying a crush
of similar cases. 60
Besides the goal of changing existing institutions,
other subordinate yet nonetheless ambitious goals that, from
the relevant literature, it appears antipoverty lawyers of
the period set for themselves included the desire to aid in
the construction of wholly new institutions, especially ones
devoted to economic development of the ghetto. 61 According
to the requirements of this goal, lawyers would help form
businesses, credit unions and the like for the poor just as,
historically, lawyers have often handled incorporations and
other organizational matters for the rich. The issue of
5 9A. K. Pye and R. F. Garraty, Jr., p. 870.
60 Harold J. Rothwax, "The Law as an Instrument of
Social Change," in Justice and the Law in the Mobilization
For Youth Experience, ed. H. H. Weisman (New York: Associa-
tion Press, 1969), p. 137.
61 Cahn and Cahn, pp. 1338-1339; Earl Johnson, Jr.,
pp. 128-130. .
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resources to give life to these organizations for the poor
was somewhat glossed over. A fourth and related subordinate
goal--in addition to em-'hiasizing reform activities, trans-
forming existing institutions, and incorporating new
ones--had lawyers setting out to politically organize the
poor. Thus Stephen Wexler bluntly stated: ". . . the
object of practicing poverty law must be to organize poor
people . . 62 The importance of political organizing
work by poverty lawyers is an idea also discernible in the
comments of others including Bellow, Edelman, and Clark. 63
A final subordinate goal of the 1960s and early
1970s antipoverty lawyers was to play a part in relieving,
and perhaps overtaking, the sense of despair that afflicts
many poor people. By showing a poor person that he or she
had legal rights that could be vindicated, poverty lawyers
hoped to aid in the conversion of a depressed and despair-
ing individual into one who would take control of his or
her destiny and thus thrust off the shackles of poverty.
This goal of overcoming despair is implicit, for example,
62Stephen Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People,"
Yale Law Journal 79 (1970):1053.
6 3For the views of Bellow and Edelman see Comment,
"The New Public Interest Lawyers," Yale Law Journal, pp.
1077, 1081; for Clark's views see Leroy D. Clark, "The
Lawyer in the Civil Rights Movement--Catalytic Agent or
Counter-Revolutionary," Kansas Law Review 19 (1971):459.
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in the comments of Edward Sparer, an early supporter of
poverty lawyering. Sparer spoke approvingly of how an anti-
poverty case "affects the quality and independence of life
for the human being involved. It makes real . . . the
knowledge that he or she is not simply an object to be
manipulated or forgotten." 6 4 And the Cahns' hope of using
lawyers in the battle against despair is also evident. The
Cahns contended that a lawsuit ". . . might help a community
or an individual to shake off a paralyzing sense of despair
and helplessness.n 6 5 Similarly, the Cahns wrote:
Action, even in a limited context, can be a sig-
nificant antidote to despair and apathy. . . . The
assertion of a legal right holds the potential not
only for lessening one's sense of alienation from
.society but also for affecting one's self-image
and aspirations. 6 6  .
Before the thread of our argument begins to unwind,
we should pull some loose ends together. We have seen
that Legal Services had enterprising and ennobling sub-
goals ranging, to mention two, from attempts to relieve
despair to efforts to transform institutions. We have also
noted that these sub-goals were techniques for ultimately
6 4 Quoted in Geoffrey C. Hazard, "Social Justice
Through Civil Justice," University of Chicago Law Review
36 (1969):712, footnote 22.
6 5 Cahn and Cahn, p. 1346.
6 6 Cahn and Cahn, p. 1340.
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achieving the overriding or primary goal of helping eli-
minate poverty which, of course, is itself no mean task.
Our purpose in reviewing the goals of Legal Services in
detail was to try to show how they reflect the strong
belief in the reform power of lawyering that attracted
young activists to the legal profession in the 1960s.
And, indeed, in suggesting lofty goals that seemingly
disregard problems like unintended consequences, anti-
poverty lawyers and their supporters clearly indicated an
immense belief in the reform power of law and lawyering.
We go on below to describe other aspects of
Legal Services that reflect the strong belief in law and
lawyering that drew the young to the legal profession.
Before going on, however, it should first be mentioned
that there was an additional, and as yet undiscussed,
goal of Legal Services that I think also proved most
fetching to young activists thinking of becoming lawyers.
It was a largely unarticulated yet very real goal. Per-
haps it is better characterized initially as an unspoken
assumption rather than as a goal. The assumption was
that antipoverty lawyering in the Legal Services Program
and elsewhere was aligned with the so-called "Movement."
And, in accordance with that assumption, the underlying
goal was to somehow merge the efforts of poverty lawyers
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with the other diverse efforts of the Movement (e.g. anti-
war and women's rights activities) to transform America
though the details of the America that would emerge from
such efforts were vague, and more often, non-existent.
A number of writers seem to have detected this
kinship between Legal Services type work and the Movement.
For example, I believe Johnson may have been speaking of
the close relationship between the two when he reports that
the most attractive element of the OEO Legal Services Pro-
gram for young lawyers was its "activist image" 67 and per-
haps recognition of the connection between Legal Services
work and the Movement underlies his comment (with Caplan)
that: "It (i.e. Legal Services) provides an alternative to
manning the barricades, to violence in the streets, to pas-
sive resistance outside the law."68 Regardless what Johnson,
or Johnson and Caplan, may have meant to be the precise import
of the above quoted statements, Jack Katz has unmistakenly
recognized the relationship between poverty lawyering and the
activities that made up the Movement. Katz has written:
Many young, recent law graduates . . . were drawn to
Legal Services by its perceived affinity to war resis-
tance, the civil rights movement, the Peace Corps, the
6 7 Earl Johnson, Jr., p. 189.
68G. M. Caplan and Earl Johnson, Jr., "Professional
Comment, Neighborhood Lawyer Programs: An Experiment in
Social Change,". University of Miami Law Review 20 (1965):191.
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counterculture, university student rebellion,
anti-"mac 1ne" politics, and religious social
activism.
Optimism regarding achievement of Legal Services'
Goals. The high regard in the legal profession for the
reform power of law that helped attract young activists
to the profession in the 1960s is apparent not only in
the inflated antipoverty and Novement-related goals of
the Legal Services Program. The same high regard for the
reform competence of law also is apparent in: 1) the
optimistic, even narcissistic, assessments made concerning
the power and abilities that poverty lawyers brought to
the task of trying to actually reach the high goals they
set; and in 2) the 'informal assessments made of the initial
impact of their antipoverty efforts.
In the 1960s and early 1970s poverty law litera-
ture there is a good deal of narcissistic talk about the
capabilities of lawyers. Furthermore, quite a variety of
lawyers indulged themselves in this professional vanity.
Writing of the skills that lawyers brought to the War on
Poverty, Legal Services Director Bamberger said that
". . . we are engaged in giving arms, not alms, to the
poor." 7 0 Similarly, a firm faith in the abilities of
6 9 Katz, p. 132.
7 0E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., p. 848.
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lawyers seems to be one of the notions that is at the
bottom of a statement by the second director of the Legal
Services Program, Earl Johnson, Jr., who said: ". . . law-
yers are in the best position to deal with social discon-
tent." 71 Law professor A. K. Pye and lawyer R. F. Garraty
also showed their extremely high estimation of the powers
and abilities of lawyers by pointing out, not unapprovingly,
that in legal services programs lawyers would be "asked to
serve as the architects of a social revolution."72 Pye and
Garraty also apparently felt that lawyers would be the key
contributors to the War on poverty in that they wrote:
".* . . lawyers must be involved if the war Con poverty) is
to end in victory." 7 3 The Attorney General of the United
States, Robert Kennedy, also conveyed, though in a more
tame manner, his belief in the importance of legal skills
in the effort against poverty: "In the final analysis,
poverty is a condition of helplessness. . . . It is time to
recognize that lawyers have a very special role to play in
dealing with this helplessness."7 4 Even Justice Brennan-
7 1 Earl Johnson, Jr., "An Analysis of the OEO Legal
Services Program," Mississippi Law Journal 38 (1967):421.
72 A. K. Pye and R. F. Garraty, Jr., p. 871.
73A. K. Pye and R. F. Garraty, Jr., pp. 860-861.
7 4 Quoted in Cahn and Cahn, p. 1336, footnote 27.
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felt compelled during this period to pen some flattering
remarks about his own profession in regard to the same
general context. Writing in 1968, Justice Brennan contended
that "today, the lawyer is still the indispensable middle-
man of our social progress." 7 5
Statements such as those by Justice Brennan and the
others quoted above show that members of the legal profes-
sion had not a little optimism when it came to assessing
the abilities that lawyers qua lawyers could call upon in
efforts to achieve reform goals including the goals of the
poverty law movement. Surely their quoted comments seem
light years away from the idea that law and lawyering are
sometimes uncertain tools that can unexpectedly produce
negative results. As suggested earlier, a similar faith
in law reforming is also evident in some informal assess-
ments of the actual efforts (as distinguished from the
inherent capabilities) of poverty lawyers. For example,
Senator Pearson of Kansas, himself a lawyer, assessed in
1971 the accomplishments of the lawyers in the Legal Ser-
vices Program as follows:
These benefits are clearly measurable by the sizeable
increased wages, food stamp and welfare payments Cno
exact figures given) that successful suits have brought
7 5William J. Brennan, "The Responsibilities of the
Legal Profession," American Bar Association Journal 54
(1968):121.
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to the indigent. But of even greater value in myjudgment, have been both the continuing protection
from consumer frauds and housing inequities and the
landmark legal decisions that benefitted millions of
poor American eople. Furthermore, Legal Services
lawyers engage . . . in the daily tasks of resolving
unhappy family situations, preventing evictions, and
alleviating wage garnishments. . *"76
As we shall see, the problem of unintended consequences
makes lawyering in behalf of the poor a much more mixed
blessing than Senator Pearson's statement implies. The
Senator's statement has been quoted at length here, however,
in order to show the kind of casual assessments of the work
of Legal Services lawyers that apparently indicate a firm
belief in the power of lawyers to undertake reform. The
optimism of such early assessments of what Legal Services
was achieving, and the earlier discussed general optimism
about the inherent capabilities of lawyers as reform agents,
both demonstrate a faith in law as a tool for reform that
must have seemed promising to anyone thinking through the
benefits of a legal career.
Fear laden criticisms of the reform potential of
the Legal Services Program. There is one remaining aspect
of the Legal Services story that I think also mirrors the
legal profession's high evaluation during this period of
7 6Senator J. B. Pearson, "To Protect the Rights of
the Poor: The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1971,"
Kansas Law Review 19 (1971):642-643. 
.
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the reform power of law and lawyers. This last aspect
is the sharp criticisms of the program by some prominent
members of the bar which seem to have been founded on the
ground that Legal Services lawyers, because they have the
tools of law and lawyering at their disposal, might be
able to drastically revamp the society in which the critics
had achieved prominence. Further, these'criticisms seem
paranoid in retrospect if one accepts the idea--that is
argued in this dissertation-- that the weapons for change
that reformers in Legal Services could call upon, namely,
law and lawyering, are not always smoothly functioning and
effective weapons but rather are weapons that sometimes
recoil against their users and against the users' purposes.
The comments of a previously exalted member of the
bar, Spiro T. Agnew, illustrate the harsh, and fearful in
tone, criticisms that were levelled at Legal Services in the
1960s and early 1970s period with which we are concerned.
Agnew wrote that the Legal Services Program was ". . . manned
by ideological vigilantes," 7 7 though ironically that descrip-
tion apparently proved to a more apt characterization of the
Nixon Administration of which he was a part than it was of
77 Spiro T. Agnew, "What's Wrong with the Legal
Services Program," American Bar Association Journal 58
(1972):931.
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Legal Services. These alleged vigilantes had, according
to Agnew:
. . gone way beyond the idea of a governmentally
funded program to make legal remedies available to
the indigent. . . . We are dealing, in large part,
with a systematic effort to redistribute societal
advantages and disadvantages, penalties and rewards,
rights and resources.78
Agnew added that Legal Services lawyers are ". . . heavily
involved in every social issue of the day" and are appar-
ently engaged in "social engineering on a grand scale. . . ."79
Agnew was not the only person during these times
characterizing Legal Services lawyers as immersed in efforts
to radically change society. For example, one congressman
was quoted as calling California Legal Services lawyers
"self-styled. revolutionaries." 80 Such political attacks,
among other events, caused governors to veto refunding of
legal services programs in California, Florida, Connecticut,
Arizona, and Missouri. 8 1
While Agnew and others were apprehensive of the
changes Legal Services lawyers were attempting in society
78 Agnew, p. 930.
79 Agnew, pp. 931-932.
8 0 Quoted in F. J. Hiestand, "The Politics of Toverty,"
in With Justice For Some, eds. B. Wasserstein and M. Green,
p. 187.
8 1Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform, p. 193.
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at large, still other critics made foreboding and vitriolic
comments about the impact of the Legal Services Program on
the legal profession itself. For example, writing in 1965,
the President and Executive Secretary of the Tennessee Bar
Association described Legal Services: ". . . as a program
which encompasses within its very being the destruction of
the free, vital and independent protector of human rights
. . . the legal profession." 8 2 Other local bar organiza-
tions and officials reviled Legal Services as well. Earl
Johnson, Jr., reports that the North Carolina bar threatened
to disbar any lawyer who joined the staff of the newly
organized Winston-Salem or Charlotte Legal Services offices. 8 3
The strident verbal assaults, the threats of disbar-
ment, and the attempts to veto funding which we have briefly
noted above were all to some degree prompted by the over-
stated claims by the proponents of Legal Services regarding
the goals of the program. By proposing sweeping changes,
Legal Services lawyers invited attack from those who sup-
ported the status quo. But the various actions taken
against Legal Services by Agnew and other critics in the
bar also exemplify the belief among members of the legal
profession that the law and lawyering are mighty tools
8 2Bethel and Walker, "Et Tu Brute!" Tennessee
S.B.A.J. 1 (1965):11.
8 3Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform, p. 95.
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which if put in a few wrong hands--in this case the hands
of the small number of antipoverty attorneys--could wreck
ha.!oc on the nation.
We have.now completed our detailed examination of
various statements and writings concerning the Legal Ser-
vices Program though we will have occasion to refer below
to additional aspects of the program and its literature
from time to time. We undertook our perusal of various
statements and writings regarding Legal Services in order
to illustrate the widespread and deeply held belief in the
reform power of law and lawyering that, together with other
circumstances created by lawyers in the 1960s, may have
attracted young activists to the legal profession. And,
indeed, we have seen that -just such a strong belief in the
reform power of law and lawyering is evident in: the
hyperbolic goals that were set for Legal Services; the
confident statements about the capabilities of its lawyers;
the optimistic early assessments of the actual efforts of
its lawyers; and the fearful criticisms regarding the great
changes its lawyers would make. Moreover, along the way
we have had occasion to note that the foregoing aspects of
the Legal Services Program and of its literature presented
an image of law and lawyering as extremely powerful tools
which may have entranced young people considering a legal
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career but which is an image of law and lawyering that seems
at odds with a concept of reform-oriented legal action that
accounts for the limitations that derive from the problem
of unintended consequences.
By reviewing the comments of a wide variety of law-
yers including both opponents and proponents of the program,
I have tried in our look at Legal Services to demonstrate
that a strong belief in the reform power of law and lawyers
was not uncommon in all segments of the legal profession in
the 1960s and early 1970s. The same point--that such a
strong belief was not uncommon--could be made by inspecting
the statements and writings regarding reform efforts other
than the Legal Services movement. As was stated earlier,
an extended review of these additional reform efforts is
beyond the boundaries of this work and therefore we will
have to settle for a quick glance at such other reform
movements. From our quick glance, however, it becomes
apparent that those involved in these other reform movements
also adhered to a deep belief in the reform capacities of
law and lawyers. It was a belief, like that of antipoverty
lawyers, that may have attracted young activists to the
legal profession. And, again similar to their counterparts
in the poverty law movement, these reformers in other move-
ments also, as we shall see, projected a belief in law and
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lawyering that generally gives but short shrift to the
problem of unintended consequences.
Among the other reform movements that, in addi'ion
to the Legal Services movement, seems to have been caught
up in a powerful belief in the reform potency of law is the
public interest law movement. For example, a forceful
belief in the reform power of law is evident in an article
Halpern and Cunningham, leaders of the public interest law
movement, wrote expressly to ". . . be useful to that con-
siderable number of young lawyers who contemplate embarking
on public interest practice themselves."8 4 Not unlike the
hyperbolic goals of the Legal Services Program, Halpern and
Cunningham in their 1971 article set for public interest
lawyering ambitious goals that display the authors' underly-
ing strong belief in the reform power of law. Regarding
their goals they wrote that: "Public interest law shares
with its forebears a common goal of fundamental legal and
social reform. . . ."85 Again like the literature regarding
Legal Services, Halpern and Cunningham have an unmistakable
confidence in the abilities of lawyers when it comes to
reform. In discussing public interest lawyers representing
consumer and environmental action organizations, the authors
8 4Halpern and Cunningham, p. 1096.
8 5Halpern and Cunningham, p. 1116.
57
claim that the potential of such lawyers ". . . in contri-
buting to social change is clear. . . ."86 Later in the
article the authors once againI demonstrate their strong
faith in the abilities of lawyers when they add, writing of
themselves and others engaged in similar pursuits, that:
"Public interest lawyers believe they have discovered a
promising path for social reform through legal action."?8 7
And, also like the Legal Services literature, public inter-
est lawyers Halpern and Cunningham make optimistic early
assessments of public interest lawyering: "Public interest
litigation appears already to have played a significant
role in bringing about institutional change."8 8
The faith which public interest lawyers such as
Halpern and Cunningham and antipoverty lawyers had in the
reform power of law is noteworthy and somewhat unexpected
because of the unusually high degree to which their faith
was apparently held. It would not be surprising for public
interest and antipoverty lawyers to have a minimal or even
reasonable amount of such faith in that law and reform is
what antipoverty and public interest lawyering is really
8 6Halpern and Cunningham, p. 1102.
8 7 Halpern and Cunningham, p. 1116.
8 8Halpern and Cunningham, p. 1118.
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all about. On the other hand, for a public interest or
antipoverty lawyer to wholly doubt the reform potential
of law and legal institutions would again be unexpected in
that in essence it would mean that such a lawyer was doubt-
ing his or her chosen work, and to do so would be to doubt
his or her very self insofar as one's identity is wrapped
up in one's work. We cannot, however, make the same obser-
vations about radical lawyers. We would expect radical
lawyers, by definition, to be interested in the uses of
law for more than incremental reform and we would expect
them to doubt the value of lawyering and any other activity
that takes place within existing, and by their account,
corrupt institutions. Yet, in apparent tribute to the
faith in the power of lawyering which was so pervasive in
the 1960s and early 1970s, we find even an occasional
individual in the radical law movement having good things
to say about lawyering. Thus radical lawyer Gerald Lefcourt
could write ". . . the skills of an attorney are a valuable
asset to a movement in struggle. . . .,89 And observers
of radicals issued reports that may have helped spread the
faith in the power of lawyering. Hakman, for example,
8 9 Gerald B. Lefcourt, "The Radical Lawyer Under
Attack," in Law Against People, ed. Robert Lefcourt (New
York: Random House, 1971), p. 262.
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reported that ". . . resourceful radicals, their attor-
neys, and their sympathizers have developed imaginative
and productive ways of using litigation to advance the
revolutionary cause."90
The remarks we have reviewed that were made by
lawyers in regard to the public interest, radical, and
especially the antipoverty law movements all suggest
that a strong belief in the reform power of law and
lawyering was not rare among members of the legal pro-
fession in the 1960s and early 1970s (though there were,
as we shall see, some skeptics). A firm belief in the
reform competence of law and lawyering even reached into
the halls of some prestigious private law firms who
initiated reform projects of their own including, for
example, the opening of free legal clinics in ghettoes
or the establishment of office policies that permitted
members of the firms to devote part of their time to
pro bono work.91 Berman and Cahn cite an internal memo-
randum of one prominent firm that suggest this strong
9 0 Nathan Hakman, "Old and New Left Activity in
the Legal Order: An Interpretation," Journal of Social
Issues 27 (1971):111.
9 1 Comment, "The New Public Interest Lawyers,"
Yale Law Journal, pp. 1106-1109.
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faith of some firms of the private bar in the reform power
of lawyering. The memo, written in 1969 in the Washington,
D.C. firm of Hogan and Hartson, refers to the events of
those days "on the campuses and in the ghettos" and states
that: "As lawyers, we have a unique opportunity to amelio-
rate some of the evils which prevail in our society."9 2
Whatever the case may have been in the private bar, it is
enough, however, to have shown that such a strong belief
in law and lawyering was common in at least the reform-
oriented segments of the bar for it is in those segments
that guidance would have been sought by young activists of
the 1960s whom we have contended may have been induced by
the belief, among other factors, to enter the legal pro-
fession.
We may at this point bring to a close that part of
chapter one that has discussed the factors or circumstances
created by lawyers that may have attracted young activist
oriented individuals to the legal profession in the 1960s
and early 1970s. No one knows for sure why these young
individuals entered the legal profession but we have argued
that it seems not unlikely that such young people were at
least partially moved to enter the profession by three
9 2 Berman and Cahn, pp. 23-24.
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particular circumstances for which lawyers were primar-
ily responsible: increased opportunities to practice
law reform; the availability of new theories and strate-
gies of law reform action; and a widespread belief in
the reform power of law and lawyering. Specifically,.
we have contended that the newly expanded job opportu-
nities of the times in legal aid, the NAACP and else-
where must have seemed inviting to young activists thus
causing them to seriously consider a legal career.
Secondly, we contended that activists were probably
also drawn to a legal career by the chance to play a
part in carrying out one of the new theories or strate-
gies of law reform action that were receiving attention
in this period. Thirdly, we have argued that the belief
in the reform power of law and lawyering that was so
easily seen in our study of Legal Services and of other
reform movements may have been a belief that was so
widespread and so powerful that it influenced young activ-
ists causing them to gravitate to the legal profession.
Finally, we have had the occasion to note that lack of
attention to the problem of unintended consequences,
which is discussed more fully at a later point, may have
made the law reform job opportunities, the new theories
of law reform action, and the spreading belief in the
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reform power of law seem more promising to young activ-
ists considering careers as law reformers than should
have been the case.
Skepticism in Nirvana
Efforts at scholarship require, of course, that
one resist the temptation to make a point by distorting
the evidence. We have extensively reviewed the anti-
poverty and other law reform writings that reflect a
powerful belief in the capacity of law to effectuate
reform. But obviously not all writers of the period
thought they lived in a nirvana where law and lawyering
were always effective antidotes to the poisonous pro-
blems that sometimes infect society. To balance the
description we have sketched thus far, we should, there-
fore, also take an equally extensive look at that portion
of the antipoverty and other reform literature of the
period which, by comparison to the pro-reform portion,
is more skeptical of the power of law and which perhaps
should have tempered enthusiasm for the law among young
activists. Moreover, our struggle for a balanced per-
spective demands that we also briefly glance at two
other parts of the law-related literature, one part
dealing with what I call, for lack of a better name,
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the limits of the law and the other part dealing with
the impact of legal decisions. These two additional
bodieE of literature also in part exhibit a note of
skepticism about law and thus perhaps should likewise
have dampened enthusiasm among the young in the 1960s
for activist legal careers.
Besides the desire to make a balanced presenta-
tion, there is another and equally important reason for
carefully reviewing the skeptical segments of the law
reform literature. Such a review is also crucial because
we eventually compare the skeptical portion of the reform
literature with the more optimistic portion and reach
this conclusion: that insofar as such a generalization
is possible, and notwithstanding the numerous problems
noted by skeptics, the law reform literature of the 1960s
and early 1970s paints a fairly rosy picture of law and
lawyering as tools for reform. Moreover as we shall see
this conclusion about the rosy picture of law reforming
drawn in the literature is itself the starting off point
for one of our primary arguments in this chapter: that
the picture of law reforming was made even rosier by
the literature's practice, mentioned before and seen
more fully below, of generally blotting out the problem
of unintended consequences.
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Before beginning our review of the skeptical seg-
ments of the law reform literature, we should first be
careful to distinguish the skeptics who authored such
skeptical segments from the various critics of law reform,
like Agnew, at whose works we have already glanced. Gener-
ally, the critics and their comments seem not to doubt the
power of law and lawyers to achieve reform, but rather to
doubt the value of the goals toward which the reform is
directed. The skeptics meanwhile often indicate approval
of the reform goals at hand but perceive some obstacle that
rests in the path to achievement of those goals. It should
also be noted that I use the characterization as a "skeptic"
rather loosely; it does not mean that a writer classified
as a skeptic did not occasionally include in his or her
work some remark that reflects an underlying hope that
reformers would actually achieve their goals despite the
obstacles that must be overcome. In fact, there is often
a hopeful remark or two about law reform embedded in the
works of the skeptics.
Just as skeptics at times are hopeful so too opti-
mists are occasionally skeptical. We find, therefore, that
even the most eloquent and forceful proponents of law
reform in the 1960s and early 1970s had moments of restraint
and sometimes of skepticism. In regard to the poverty law
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reform movement, for example, take the Cahns' first article
which overall spoke glowingly of the use of law and lawyer-
ing in the War on Poverty: it also contains the side note
that legal representation is ". . . limited in the changes
it can effect, and particularly in the redistribution of
resources and the increased resources which it can bring
about." 9 3 Furthermore, the Cahns' subsequent articles are
much more restrained in tone than their first though even
in these subsequent articles there are hopeful references
to the reform power of lawyering. Thus in one of these
later articles, for example, a careful remark underscoring
that they do not believe that neighborhood antipoverty
firms are a "panacea" is juxtaposed with a more encouraging
note about "the significant contribution that . . . neigh-
borhood law firms have begun to make and will continue to
make. . .9"94
Like the Cahns, Edward Sparer was, as we have men-
tioned, an early and leading supporter of law reform in the
1960s. However, as Samuel Krislov has noted, Sparer appar-
ently became, even more so than the Cahns, increasingly
9 3 Cahn and Cahn, p. 1344.
9 4Edgar S. Cahn and Jean C. Cahn, "Vhat Price Jus-
tice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited," Notre Dame
Lawyer 41 (1966) :929, 947.
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disillusioned with reform through lawyering.9 5 In a
statement that expresses his disillusionment, Sparer
wrote that in regard to being a lawyer who represents
welfare recipients such a lawyer is:
No more a significant participant in grand
change, he appears reduced to what the revo-
lutionist has often accused the lawyer of
being--a technical aid who smooths the func-
tioning of an inadeq 4te system and thereby
helps perpetuate it.J
The kind of profound disillusionment, even despair,
that is evident in Sparer's remark quoted above is generally
absent in that part of the law reform literature of the
1960s and early 1970s which is nevertheless sufficiently
incredulous of the power of law reforming to be classified
as "skeptical" for our purposes. Rather, the extent of the
skepticism in most cases is mild and usually is rooted in
a particular problem that the author determined the law
reform movement would be likely to encounter. In the pov-
erty law literature, for example, a number of problems were
detailed that reflected some skepticism about the poverty
law reform movement. In order to show the nature of such
skepticism, we now begin a painstaking review of the
9 5 Samuel Krislov, "The CEO Lawyers Fail to Consti-
tutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses and
Limits of the Judicial Process," Minnesota Law Review 58
(1973.):211.
96Ibid., p. 241.
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specific problems that were discussed--problems that per-
haps should have cuased young people of the times to have
second thoughts abou. pursuing futures as antipoverty
lawyers. Thus, Silver 97 and Clark,98 in separate articles,
saw the antipoverty efforts of the Legal Services Program
as seriously hampered by the enormous caseloads that its
attorneys had to shoulder. Typically, those concerned with
the effects of such caseloads pointed out that they pre-
vented clients from receiving careful and thorough service
or that such caseloads did not leave Legal Services attorneys
with sufficient hours to work on the time consuming major
cases (e.g. class actions) from which the poor are supposed
to stand the greatest chance.of taking away'significant
benefits. Others suggested that the burdensome and rou-
tinized caseloads may increase attorney turnover and burn-
out with corresponding effects on the quality of the Legal
9 7 C. R. Silver, "Imminent Failure of Legal Services
for the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseloads," Journal of
Urban Law 46 (1968):217.
9 8L. D. Clark, "Legal Services Programs--the Case-
load Problem, or How to Avoid Becoming the New Welfare
Department," Journal of Urban Law 47 (1969-1970):797; in
a later article, Handler, Hollingsworth, and Erlanger,
(p. 62), showed the dimensions of the caseload problem
when they reported that Legal Services lawyers handle
approximately 400 cases a year while the average private
practitioner carries a yearly caseload in the neighbor-
hood of 50-100 cases.
68
Services staff and thus on the overall impact of the
program. 9 9
The poverty law literature of the 1960s and early
1970s discussed other problems that also raised skepticism
about the potential effectiveness of the Legal Services
Program and similar efforts in the battle against poverty.
Several articles saw the problem of political interference
and political attacks as seriously handicapping the Legal
Services Program and thus a call went up for the program to
be ensconced in a politically neutral and quasi-independent
corporation.10 0 'Other articles meanwhile discussed still
additional problems that were largely political in nature
and that caused some skeptical brows to be lifted regarding
the future of Legal Services. There was, for example, the
thorny issue of who would be declared eligible for the aid
rendered by the program.101 Certain observers of Legal
99For an interesting article on this point, written
after the 1960s-early 1970s period with which I am primarily
concerned, see J. Katz, "Lawyers for the Poor in Transition:
Involvement, Reform and the Turnover Problem in the Legal
Services Program," Law and Society Review 12 (1978):275.
1 00 Comment, "Legal Services Corporation: Curtail-
ing Political Interference," Yale Law Journal; J. B. Falk
and S. Pollack, "Political Interference With Publicly Funded
Lawyers: The CLRA Controversy and the Future of Legal Ser-
vices," Hastings Law Journal 24 (1973):599; Senator J. B.
Pearson, "To Protect the Rights," Kansas Law Review.
l0lA. K. Pye and R. F. Garraty, Jr., pp. 864-865,
p. 872, pp. 880-885; Note, "Neighborhood Law Offices: The
New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor," Harvard Law
Review 80 (1967):846.
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Services contended that if the income eligibility cutoff
point drastically limited who could receive aid such that
only the desperately poor qualified, then the program
obviously would not have any impact among the millions of
moderately (but not desperately) poor people in America who
also needed legal assistance. On the other hand, other
observers replied: that a liberal eligibility cutoff point
would likely bring in some clients seeking free aid who had
previously paid inexpensive private lawyers to handle their
legal matters; that such inexpensive lawyers would bristle
with indignation at the prospect of losing clients to the
Legal Services Program; and that, if sufficient inroads
were made by Legal Services into the livelihoods of inex-
pensive lawyers, these inexpensive lawyers might, as a group,
be moved not only to politically oppose any liberal eligi-
bility standards the program tried to install but also to
even challenge Legal Services' very existence. And there was
the related issue regarding how, once eligibility standards
were determined, the actual services would be delivered.10 2
1 0 2 Note, "Neighborhood Law Offices: The New
Wave," Harvard Law Review, p. 848; S. J. Brakel, "Free
Legal Services for the Poor--Staffed Office versus
Judicare: The Client's Evaluation," Wisconsin Law
Review (1973):532; G. F. Cole, "Staff Attorney vs.
Jud icare: A Cost Analysis," Journal of Urban Law 50
(1973):705.
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Some argued that the establishment of staff offices, such
as those utilized by traditional legal aid programs, would
be the ideal mode of operation for the newly created Legal
Services offices in that lawyers working in staff offices
develop an expertise in the problems of the poor who are
their exclusive clients. It was further argued that devel-
opment of such-expertise in Legal Services lawyers would
-be essential to the program's ability to provide effective
service. The argument continued that no such expertise
would develop and could be drawn upon by poor people if,
rather than adopting the staff office delivery model, Legal
Services deployed any of the so-called private plans, such
as judicare and voucher arrangements, in which private law-
yers are compensated by Legal Services for counsel given to
indigents. It was maintained that under such private plans
a large number of private lawyers typically provide counsel
to only an occasional indigent as well as to their regular
flow of middle class customers and thus these private law-
yers see too few indigents to acquire an expertise in their
problems. But, meanwhile, the advocates of the private
plans discerned other advantages in such plans. For exam-
ple, these private plans were said to give a poor person
the freedom to choose any private attorney participating
in the plan while in staff office programs poor people are
required to acdept the services of whichever staff lawyers
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are assigned to their cases. Furthermore, the proponents
of the private plans contended that, for legislators, pri-
vate plans represent a politically appealing alternative
in that such plans allow legislators to provide those con-
stituents who are private lawyers with an additional source
of income. Hence, the proponents of the private plans con-
cluded that the features of such plans would not undermine,
as some claimed, but rather would enhance the chances for
Legal Services' survival and success.
Besides the matter of selecting an'appropriate plan
to deliver services, still other essentially political pro-
blems were discussed in the literature and were sufficiently
troublesome to prompt some skepticism about the possible
effectiveness and future of the antipoverty movement in.
Legal Services. Thus there was the political issue of how
much federal control was to be exercised over local legal
aid projects funded by the Legal Services Program.1 0 3 Some
contended that a good deal of federal control was necessary
to prevent conservative local bar associations from cap-
turing the local Legal Services projects and then under-
mining any reform goals the local projects were considering.
These same individuals further contended that establishing
federal dominance was an uphill battle and thus saw a
10 3 Note, "Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave,"
Harvard Law Review, p. 833.
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rather bleak future for Legal Services. Others, however,
felt to the contrary that local rather than federal control
was essential in that local control ensured local backing
for a project and, according to the argument, without such
local backing no project could survive. There was also a
political problem regarding whether, and in what way, indi-
gents should participate in the governance of the individ-
ual legal aid projects operated at the local level.10 4 One
side argued that such participation was indispensable if
local projects were to be responsive and accountable to
the true needs of each individual poor person and to the
needs of the community of poor people as a whole. Without
such responsiveness and accountability, the success of the
Legal Services Program, it was argued, would be in doubt.
The other side maintained, however, that such participa-
tion in governance by indigents constituted a breach of the
traditional ethical principle that lay intermediaries shall
not control attorneys. Various additional ethical problems
were also discussed in the poverty law literature of the
1960s and early 1970s including issues involving unautho-
rized practice of the law, impermissible advertising, and
solicitation. 1 0 5
1 04Note, "Competition in Legal Services Under the
War on Poverty," Stanford Law Review 19 (1967): 579.
1 05 Note, "Ethical Problems Raised by the Neighbor-
hood Law Office," Notre Dame Lawyer 41 (1966): 927; A. K.
Pye and R. F. Garraty, Jr., p. 873.
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Solicitation was a particularly sensitive issue
because, as the opponents and proponents of Legal Services
both well knew, without a client willing to come forward
to register a complaint there was little that Legal Ser-
vices attorneys could do. Some, such as Bellow and Clark,
went further and argued that even once you had a client
and a case you were unlikely to accomplish much unless
you supported the case and client with some form of poli-
tical and economic mobilization.10 6  A quote from Marian
W. Edelman underscores how she too was skeptical of legal
efforts that lacked political and economic backing:
The thing I understood after six months . . . was
that you could file all the suits you wanted to,
but unless you had a community base you weren't
going to get anywhere.21 0 7
Though some skepticism in the literature, such as
that reviewed above, focused on particular problems that
the poverty law effort would have to beat or on particular
needs that would have to be met, other skeptical comments
indicated a more broadly based doubt about the power of
law and lawyering for reform. Harold Rothwax, for example,
wrote that "ultimately law is not a solution to the pro-
blems of the poor; money is." 1 0 8 The head of a legal
1 0 6 See citations in footnote 63.
1 0 71bid.
1 0 8 Rothwax, p. 144.
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services office exhibited a similarly broad questioning
of the power of law and lawyering in remarks that are
reported by Finman:
The basic question I have is whether we are going
to do a meaningful job in breaking the poverty
cycle. . . . It seems like bringing up a popgun
to kill an elephant.109
Professor Galanter, in a sensible article, also raised
considerable doubt about the power of law and lawyering to
induce change. He noted that redistributive justice was
not likely to flow from rule change alone and emphasized
the need for several types of accompanying institutional
change. 11 0 Professor Hazard also seriously questioned the
likelihood that significant redistributive justice could
be achieved by lawyering. 1 1 1 Meanwhile, Lisle Carter showed
some general skepticism about the reform power of law when
he wrote that ". . . law, like other technical competencies,
can only do so much." 1 1 2 And Clark wrote questioningly
about the power of a lawsuit and looked with askance at
1 0 9 T. Finman, "OEO Legal Services Programs and the
Pursuit of Social Change: The Relationship Between Program
Ideology and Program Performance," Wisconsin Law Review
(1971): 1030.
1 10Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead:
Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change," Law and Society
Review 9 (1974): 95.
lllHazard, University of Chicago Law Review.
1 1 2 Lisle C. Carter, Jr., "Law and the Urban Crisis,"
U.C.L.A. Law Review 15 (1968): 1152.
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"laymen Lwho] expect the suit to adequately contain,
clearly define and promptly ameliorate deep rooted social
and economic conditions."11 3
We have sampled the skepticism that marked part
of the poverty law literature of the 1960s and early 1970s
and that perhaps should have lessened enthusiasm among
young people for vocations in poverty law. Some skepticism,
however, is also evident in the literature of reform move-
ments other than the poverty law movement. Thus, for exam-
ple, we can find a limited skepticism in portions of the
public interest law literature. Like its cousin in the pov-
erty law literature, skepticism in the public interest law
reform literature of the period revolved around an assort-
ment of problems that, it was contended, might confuse,
inhibit, or even block reform efforts. First of all, the
public interest law reform literature raised the problem of
defining "the public interest."11 4 It was argued in the
literature that the public interest law movement cannot be
effective unless it knows what the public interest is and
thus once known can work toward it. The problem, of course,
is that defining the public interest is a virtually
1 1 3Clark, Kansas Law Review, p. 470.
1 1 4 Comment, "The New Public Interest Lawyers,"
Yale Law Journal, p. 1119.
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impossible task. And another significant difficulty arises
if an attempt is made to try to solve the dilemma by desig-
nating the interests of one or two large groups, for example
consumer advocates or environmentalists, as constituting
the public interest. In essence, the problem then becomes
that in selecting one or several groups as representing the
public interest you have done so at the expense of other
groups which may mount a collateral attack on your reform
efforts. Thus public interest law firms of the period who
chose to provide their services to consumer and environ-
mental groups had to overcome a collateral attack that took
the form of an accusation by antipoverty groups that such
public interest firms were siphoning off precious resources.
from the poverty law reform movement.11 5 According to the
terms of this accusation, the resources available for all
law reform efforts at that time were greater than those
previously available but were, nonetheless, limited. Thus,
giving public interest law firms who counsel consumer and
environmental groups a slice of the finite pie reduced the
amount of resources available for work with indigents who,
so the argument went, needed the aid much more desperately
than the largely middle class consumers and environmentalists
who benefitted from the work of the public interest firms.
115Edgar S. Cahn and Jean C. Cahn, "Power to the
People or the Profession?--The Public Interest in Public
Interest Law," Yale Law Journal 79 (1970): 1005.
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Even without regard to the issue of depriving the poor of
resources, the question of whether public interest firms
would have sufficient resources for continued financial via-
bility was a big one in the literature,11 6 one that should
have modified enthusiasm about the future of the public
interest law reform movement.
Like certain public interest lawyers, there were
radicals too who saw problems that caused them to add a
full measure of skepticism or doubt to their estimations of
the power of law for change. Radical Ann Fagan Ginger, for
example, wrote:
I do believe that the law can be a tool for social
change, but we must recognize its limitations. Law
is an instrument for the exercise and the restraint
of power and defines power relationships. It does
not determine who has the power.ll 7
Similarly, another radical commentator showed his skepti-
cism about the amount and the worthwhileness of the kind
of change that law can effectuate when he wrote regarding
legal aid activities that:
The belief that sufficient funds for legal services
would considerably alter the economic status of the
poor ignores the harsh reality that legal assistance
cannot change the existing social,- economic, and
political relationships.1 8
ll6Comment, "The New Public Interest Lawyers," Yale
Law Journal, p. 1105; Rabin, p. 255; Berlin, Roisman, anT~
Kessler, George Washington Law Review.
1l 7Ann Fagan Ginger, "The Movement and the Lawyer,"
Guild Practitioner 26 (1967): 12.
11 8 Robert Lefcourt, ed., "Lawyers for the Poor Can't
Win," in Law Against People, p. 137.
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Some skepticism about the power of law as a tool
for change is apparent not only, as we have seen, in var-
ious parts of the law reform and radical literature, but
also as noted earlier, in the more general literature deal-
ing with the so-called "limits of law" and in the vastly
expanding literature on the impact of legal decisions. A
portion of the literature on the limits of law predates
the 1960s law reform movement but this fact only highlights
that such literature was available to law reformers of that
time and perhaps should have tempered their views on the
power of legal action. Roscoe Pound is among those who
wrote on the limits of law and lawyering. Though Pound saw
"in legal history . . . a continuously more efficacious
social engineering,"11 9 he was also aware that there were
"limits of effective legal action."1 20 Pound, in a warning
that perhaps all law reformers should heed, concluded that
the limitations of law "preclude complete securing through
law of all interests which ethical considerations or
social ideals indicate as proper to be secured." 12 1 Another
leading figure among legal commentators, Lon Fuller, also
reminds us of limits though, as we shall see in more
11 9Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922), p. 95.
1 20Roscoe Pound, "The Limits of Effective Legal
Action," in Law and Change in Modern America, eds.,J. B.
Grossman and Ii. H. Grossman (Pacific Palisades, Calif.:
Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 73.
121Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, 5 vols. (St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1959), 3:355.
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detail in a later chapter, he stressed the limits on the use
of adjudicatory mechanisms in our legal system.12 2
There were, in the 1960s and early 1970s, social
scientists, writing often in the so-called impact litera-
ture, 1 2 3 who also hastened to point out the limits of change
by legal action and who in particular appeared to be skepti-
cal about using judicial decisions to achieve reform. In
this impact literature, social scientists frequently described
a large discrepancy between the change that a court or other
legal institution ordered and the actual impact of the order.
A classic case would be Brown v. The Board of Education1 2 4
wherein the Supreme Court directed that school desegregation
proceed "with all deliberate speed" while, as is well known,
actual desegregation either was not forthcoming at all or
proceeded at a snail's pace. According to the impact lit-
erature, whether change in fact follows from a court's order
is governed by a panoply of factors including among others:
12 2 Fuller's comments in this regard have appeared in
several places, for example, see: Lon L. Fuller, "Collective
Bargaining and the Arbitrator," Wisconsin Law Review (1963):
3; Lon L. Fuller, "Some Unexplored Social Dimensions of the
Law," in The Path of the Law from 1967, ed. A. Sutherland
(Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 1968), p. 57; Lon L. Fuller,
"The Form and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review
92 (1978): 353.
1 23 See, e.g., Stephen Wasby, The Impact of the
United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives (Homewood,
Ill.: -Dorsey Press, 1970); Richard Johnson, The Dynamics
of Compliance (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
124347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294
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the clarity and persuasiveness of the court's order; the
amount and kind of change required by the order; the means
selected for enforcement and the character of the enforcers
of the court's order; the political environment (e.g. opin-
ions of local political elites) into which the court's order
is received; and the resources that the parties to the case
can muster to encourage compliance with the court's order.
Factors such as those listed were used to analyze and
explain why changes ordered by the courts in the school
prayer decisions1 2 5 and in numerous other cases have not
always become a reality.
In addition to those social.scientists writing about
the impact of particular court decisions, other social sci-
entists emphasized additional factors that reformers in the
1960s and early 1970s should have recognized as having the
potential to greatly impede reform through law and courts.
For example, there was the problem of judicial attitudes,
values, role perceptions, and bias.1 2 6 Thus, Professor
12 5K. Dolbeare and P. Hammond, The School Prayer
Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1971).
1 2 6See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt
Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947
(New York: Macmillan, 1948); J. Schmidhauser, "The Justices
of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait," Midwest
Journal of Political Science 3 (1959): 1; K. Vines, "Fed-
eral District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South,"
Journal of Public Law 26 (1964).
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Grossman wrote regarding the effect of the characteristics
of judges on social change:
That the personal values and background of the
individual justices constitute an important
variable is no longer open to question.12 7
Sociologist William Evan, meanwhile, argued that to cause
change in the face of resistance, the law's educatory func-
tion had to work smoothly. He delineated seven conditions
necessary to aid in the smooth operation of the law's edu-
catory function but concluded that these conditions are
rarely fulfilled at any one point.1 28 Austin Turk saw law
as a weapon of power but also saw that law was not all
powerful especially, for example, when it gets at a pro-
blem's symptoms rather than its causes.1 2 9 Finally, as we
come full circle back to the poverty law literature, poli-
tical scientist Samuel Krislov, pointed out, among other
things, that the timing of poverty law reform efforts could
affect their eventual outcome. 1 3 0
We have seen that a number of authors in the law
reform, social science, and other related literature, dis-
cussed various problems and constraints that confronted
1 2 7 Joel B. Grossman, "The Supreme Court and Social
Change," American Behavioral Scientist 13 (1970): 539.
1 2 8William Evan, "Law as an Instrument of Social
Change," in Aptlied Sociology, eds. A. W. Gouldner and
S. M. Miller (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 285.
1 2 9Austin Turk, "Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict,"
Social Problems 23 (1976): 276.
1 30Krislov, p. 211.
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law reform efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s and that
led these authors to develop a somewhat skeptical attitude
regarding the -hances of such efforts for success, an atti-
tude which, in turn, possibly should have influenced and, in
particular, discouraged young activists who were so excited
about becoming reform lawyers. Thus having reviewed the
skeptical portion of the literature and having, in an earlier
section of this chapter, reviewed the more optimistic por-
tion we are now almost in a position to make, as promised,
some overall observations about the law reform literature
of the 1960s and early 1970s. All that remains to be done
is to note and discuss, as we do below, how the skeptics
did not make much mention of the problem of unintended con-
sequences as a basis for their skepticism. Nor for that
matter, as we have repeatedly pointed out and as we shall
see, did anyone else much concern themselves with the pro-
blems for law reform presented by unintended consequences.
The Problem of Unintended Consequences
in the Law Reform Literature
The problem of unintended consequences was one given
perhaps& the least careful description and analysis among
those difficulties for the law reform movement that were
unearthed by the skeptics and that perhaps should have
decreased the great enthusiasm among young 1960s-1970s acti-
vists for lawyering as a career. I do not mean, however,
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that the issue of unintended consequences of legal action
was totally ignored in the law reform literature of the
period. In fact both the skeptics of law reform and even the
most persuasive of early supporters of law reform paid their
respects to the matter of unintended consequences. ~Among
those in the latter category were the articulate poverty
law leaders Jean and Edgar Cahn who showed their awareness
of the problem of unintended consequences when they wrote
that ". . . victory and vindication can be Pyrrhic . . ."131
and a similar awareness is evident in their comment that
"0 . . the cost of the remedy frequently exceeds its
worth."1 3 2 Another early poverty law supporter, Earl
Johnson, Jr., also showed his familiarity with the problem
of unintended consequences. Referring to economic oriented
legal action, he wrote, for example, that:
Dropped in the middle of a fluid market, a new rule
may generate unintended, even, counterproductive
economic ripples.1 3 3
Johnson, however, seems to have been largely responding to
the earlier insights of Professor Hazard on the issue of
unintended consequences.13 4 Public interest law advocates
1 31 Edgar S. Cahn and Jean C. Cahn, "The New Sover-
eign Immunity," Harvard Law Review 81 (1968): 958.
13 2 Cahn and Cahn, "What Price Justice," Notre Dame
Lawyer, p. 931; see also Cahn and Cahn, "War on Poverty,"
Yale Law Journal, pp. 1341-1342.
133Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice and Reform, p. 208.
1 34Hazard, p. 699.
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Halpern and Cunningham also seemed to be familiar with
unintended consequences. They pointed out that an unin-
tended effect of vigorous public interest representation
may be to exacerbate delays that already attend admini-
strative agency action or ". . . may even be to create
an unmanageable burden for (such administrative agen-
cies . . . bringCing] administrative process to a grind-
ing halt. . . ti135
As previously indicated, some recognition of the
problem of unintended consequences is evident not only in
vigorously pro-reform articles such as that by Halpern and
Cunningham or the Cahns' first piece but also in those
articles that seemed more skeptical of the reform power
of law. Rothwax, for example, who, as we have said, was
restrained or skeptical in his views about the potential
accomplishments of reform lawyering, evinced his concern
for the problem of unintended consequences when he wrote
that a lawsuit could be a "pyrrhic victory. 1 3 6 Clark,
another whose article regarding reform lawyering was some-
what restrained in tone, was also apparently aware of unin-
tended consequences as is suggested by his reference to
lawsuits that proved to be "illusory victories. 1 37 But
1 3 5 Halpern and Cunningham, p. 1114.
1 3 6 Roth~wax, p. 142.
1 3 7Clark, Kansas Law Review, p. 469.
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whether the author is one whose writings as a whole are
skeptical or are optimistic about the power of law for
reform, the treatment typically given to the problem of
unintended consequences is generally limited to a single
phrase, a sentence or a paragraph or two. Indeed, even if
we look beyond the literature of the 1960s and early 1970s
that specifically dealt with law reform and include all
law-related literature of any period, we find that appar-
ently there is very little of substance written on the
problem of unintended consequences of legal action.1 38
1 3 8 Apparently no work focuses exclusively, or
even predominantly, on the issue of unintended consequences
of legal action. The two most lengthy discussions of the
issue are quite general. They appear in Jeremy Bentham,
The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1945), which will be referred to in the
next chapter, and in, Harry W. Jones, The Efficacy of Law
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968),
this latter work being a printing of several brief lectures
by Professor Jones one of which dealt with unintended con-
sequences. Also useful are the references to and analyses
of unintended consequences in Donald L. Horowitz, Courts
and Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1977) and in Burton A. Weisbrod, Public Interest
Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
Brief discussions of unintended consequences that are, how-
ever, longer than a sentence or two can also be found in,
among other works,: Iredell Jenkins, Social Order and the
Limits of Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1980); Hazard, "Social Justice Through Civil Justice,"
University of Chicago Law Review; Sally Falk Moore, Law as
Process (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Lon L.
Fuller, Harvard Law Review; Alan M. Dershowitz, "Psychiatry
in the Legal Process: 'A Knife that Cuts Both Ways,'" in
The Path of the Law From 1967, ed. A. Sutherland, p. 71;
and Harry Brill, "The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance,"
The Public Interest, no. 31 (1973), p. 38.
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Concluding Remarks
Neglect of the problem of unintended consequences
in the law reform literature of the 1960s and early 1970s
is one of the reasons why it is safe to conclude that that
literature as a whole is exaggerated in nature. There are,
as becomes evident upon a moment's reflection, other rea-
sons for reaching the same conclusion, a conclusion that
apparently was reached by Professor Hazard at an earlier
date in regard to at least part of the same literature.13 9
The exaggerated nature of the literature of the period is
also obvious, as we have seen and hopefully is recalled,
in the statements of hyperbolic goals for law reform, in
the highly optimistic assessments of the power of lawyers
to potentially achieve those goals, in the similarly
optimistic early tallies of the actual accomplishments
of reform lawyers, and in the vituperative criticisms of
the law reform effort that veiled a likewise inflated
estimate among the critics of the power of reform lawyers
to fully meet their goals. True, there was, as we have
also seen, some skepticism about the reform power of law
and lawyering but the overall exaggerated optimism of the
1 3 9Geoffrey C. Hazard, "Law Reforming in the Anti-
Poverty Effort," University of Chicago Law Review 37 (1970):
244. Professor Hazard raises the question whether some of
the antipoverty law reform literature is "exaggerated" and
apparently answers in the affirmative.
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literature emerges only partially moderated by such skep-
ticism because of the overpowering force and eloquence
of th 3 optimism itself, because the skepticism was often
cushioned by an occasional hopeful remark about the future
of law reform,1 40 and because the skepticism only lightly
touched on the problem of unintended consequences. The
state of the literature of the period--a slight skepticism
ultimately swallowed up in an 'underlying and more profound
optimism about law reform--is perhaps typified by this
remark by Justice Brennan regarding reform efforts:
Lawyers obviously cannot do it all but their
potential contribution is great.141
That the literature of the 1960s and early 1970s
reflected an exaggerated optimism concerning the p6tential
of law and lawyering for reform is not an insignificant
conclusion. It embodies nothing less than the notion that
law reformers of that time apparently rejected outright the
view that law and lawyering are by nature conservative, a
1 40 For example, compare the skeptical and optimis-
tic comments made by the Cahns in an article that is quoted
in the text at footnote 94; also compare the skeptical com-
ment by Clark (quoted in the text at footnote 113) regarding
the use of legal action for reform with this additional com-
ment in which there seems to be a barely recognizable opti-
mism: "Hopefully, however, lawyers will increasingly devise
ways to make the legal process responsive to the demand that
gross injustices end . . ." (from Clark, Kansas Law Review,
p. 473).
1 4 lBrennan, p. 122.
88
view held, at least in regard. to lawyering, by, as we have
seen, as distinguished an observer as Tocqueville.1 42 Even
in more recent times a political scientist as noteworthy
as Hans Morgenthau has described, and apparently subscribes
to, the view of law and lawyering as conservative. Professor
Morgenthau writes that ". . . a given status quo is stabi-
lized and perpetuated in a legal system" and he adds that
courts are "agents of the status quo." 1 4 3 The rejection by
1960s law reformers of the idea of law and lawyering as
fundamentally conservative is not only suggested by the
overall exaggeratedly optimistic nature of the law reform
literature of the period but also by an explicit statement
to that effect by a leading law reformer, E. Clinton
Bamberger, who said that:
It is fallacious to think of lawyers as guardians of
tradition--rather we are the guardians and watchdogs
of orderly change. 1 4 4
Besides the fact that it represents an apparent
rejection of the idea that law and lawyering are by nature
conservative, there is another reason why it is not insignif-
icant to conclude, as we have, that the law reform literature
of the 1960s and early 1970s is exaggeratedly optimistic.
Such is also an important conclusion because it means that
1 4 2 See text at footnote 22.
1 43Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th
ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 418.
1 4 4Bamberger, quoted in A. K. Pye and R. F. Garraty,
Jr., p. 871.
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those young activists who we have seen were called into
the law reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s probably
had, as a result of the optimism spread by the literaturr
of the movement, excessively high hopes for law reform
efforts. And, unrealistically high hopes mean that, for
those holding such hopes, there would be a long and poten-
tially destructive fall to reality if, because of difficul-
ties such as those presented by unintended consequences,
reform efforts proved to be less than useful and perhaps
even counterproductive.
The stage for our study is set. In the 1960s and
early 1970s a call went up for reform through law and lawyer-
ing. Politicians, lawyers, and legal commentators sounded
the call. By their actions, politicians showed their belief
in reform through law. They enacted, with fury, an abundance
of laws which taken together were designed to reform a nation.
These laws attacked environmental, consumer, and racial pro-
blems to name just a few. Lawyers and legal commentators too
sounded the call to reform through law. They propogated a
literature--complete with theories of action--that exagger-
ated the power of law and lawyering and that invited use of
this alleged power for reform purposes. They also pressed for
increased job opportunities to practice law reform. The young
activists of the 1960s and early 1970s apparently heeded the
calls to refoi'm through law by becoming lawyers. These young
activists apparently entered the legal profession in search of
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a means to express their hope for a new, a better, a
reformed America.
This dissertation argues that the call to reform
that went up was seriously overstated. Law and lawyering, as
I have already acknowledged can be used to effectuate reform
and can succeed in accomplishing much that is worthwhile.
However, law and lawyering are also, it is argued, frequently
instruments out of control. They are instruments that can,
despite good intentions, cause as much misery as aid for those
on whose behalf they are used. It is submitted in this disser-
tation, therefore, that what awaited young activists entering
the legal profession in the 1960s and early 1970s were ves-
sels--law and lawyering--that sometimes are sturdy ships in
which to sail the seas of reform but which also at times are
mere rudderless dinghies about as likely to be swamped, taking
down crew and passengers, as to reach home port.
In that the conclusion is reached herein that law
reform techniques are sometimes instruments out of control--a
conclusion I attempt to support in the next four chapters--one
perhaps may suspect that this author is an opponent of law
reform and of the goals that the law reform movement of the
1960s and early 1970s set out to achieve. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Among the wide range of clients
and interests that lawyers can represent I personally find
no work that is more ennobling to an individual lawyer or
to the legal profession as' a whole than to represent indi-
gents, victims of discrimination, defrauded consumers, or
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those who seek to protect the beauty of our environment.
The desire to represent such clients and such interests
which flourished in the 1960s and early 1970s was, it is
suggested, a glorious moment in the history of the legal
profession. It was a moment when the profession finally
responded seriously to Charles Evan Hughes who many years
earlier had admonished that the profession had an obliga-
tion to ensure that "no man shall suffer in the enforcement
of his legal rights for want of a skilled protector, able,
fearless, and incorruptible. It was I think also a
moment that itself reflected a hopeful time in America when
Americans toyed with the idea of moving to a new plane of
existence in which materialism and self-interest took a
back seat to a concern for the welfare of each of our fellow
citizens. The hope of that time has since been snuffed cut
in the present era as we seemingly regress as a country to a
preoccupation with materialism, self-interest and with, not
the welfare of our fellow citizens, but the building of the
means of their potential annihilation by nuclear war. Is
it not just such self-interest or self-centeredness, per-
haps in maintaining our jobs and our personal causes, that
would lead law reformers to hold onto law reform even if it
is as harmful as it is helpful to those we want to aid?
1 45Quoted in Norman Dorsen, "The Role of the Lawyer
in America's Ghetto Society," Texas Law Review 49 (1970):
66.
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Just as the law reform movement raised, as noted earlier,
the expectations of young activists about what they could
accomplish through the legal system, so too the law reform
movement raised the expectations of the poor and of the
movement's other intended beneficiaries. The true aide-de-
camp of the Reagan anti-law-reform forces is not the indi-
vidual who may- point out that in some cases reform efforts
hurt as much as help intended beneficiaries rather it is the
individual who silently acquiesces to such a tragedy and
thereby permits the supposed beneficiaries to continue to
have unrealistic expectations regarding the reform power of
law and lawyering. If law reform techniques are not working,
we serve the poor and others who are supposed to benefit from
law reform by admitting its failures and urging the intended
beneficiaries to seek means other than law reform to redress
the all too obviously legitimate claims they have against
society. Moreover, to allow the intended beneficiaries of
law reform to continue to hold a blind faith in the legal
system regardless of that system's actual performance is to
undermine trust in the system in the long run.
My quarrel then is not with the goals of law reform
but with the capacity of the legal system to reach those
goals and with the effects, in terms of increased disillu-
sionment among the poor, young activists, and other supporters
of law reform, of ignoring the inadequacies of the legal sys-
tem if indeed it is not achieving as much as is often thought.
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k-.y aim is to create a better fit between the concept of law
reform action and the reality of its accomplishments. I
hope, by emphasizing herein the not infrequent discrepancy
between the well-intentioned goals and the actually nega-
tive effects of law reform, that law reformers will become
more sensitive to the problem of unintended consequences
and devise means, if possible, to eradicate the problem or
lessen its impact.
Yet it would be misleading to suggest that my
primary motive for undertaking the present study is this
hope that any law reformers who review the study will
become newly sensitized to the problem of unintended con-
sequences and thus be prompted to come up with strategies to
undercut such potential consequences. However fervently I
may wish that law reformers will be able to take such correc-
tive action I am not, as we shall see, particularly sanguine
about their chances. Rather, my primary reason for carrying
out this study must be based other than in the hope that it
will prompt law reformers into recognizing and eventually
overcoming unintended consequences. I believe the actual
motivation for the study rests in my own understanding of
my duty as a member of the two groups to which this work
is primarily addressed: the legal profession and social
science students of law reform. Under Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility it is the duty of a member
of the legal profession to set forth to his or her clients
alternative courses of action and the probable consequences
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of each. 1 4 6 In order in the future to fulfill this duty
to describe to law reform clients the potential consequences
of legal action, I feel compelled to learn more about the
problem of unintended consequences and, hence, I undertake
this study. I am similarly moved by my duty as a student
of law reform. Such a student, like any student, has a
duty to search for truth. One of the questions of truth,
the answer to which students of law reform must seek, is
whether law reform efforts cause more harm than good. Con-
fronting the truth on this issue may be painful for those
of us who have been committed to law reform but the pain
does not free us from the duty to find the truth. Though I
will have some general Comments to make on the issue of
whether law reform efforts cause more harm than good, it
would, of course, be sophomoric to even suggest that this
study will state the ultimate truth on this issue or any
other issue. Rather, we will have to set our sights on
something short of ultimate truth. What I have in mind is
complexity; I hope to highlight that a particular phenom-
enon seems to be more complex than our search for truth
has previously led us to admit. In short, this disserta-
tion hopes to show that the relationship between law and
1 4 6EC 7-8, Annotated Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1979), p. 290.
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reform is apparently more seriously complicated by the
problem of unintended consequences than has been fully
acknowledged to date.
PART TWO
THE CHALLENGE FOR ANY LAW REFORM MOVEMENT: THE
PROBLEM OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXTS OTHER
THAN LAW REFORM AND A DISCUSSION OF PERTINENT
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In chapter one an attempt was made to show that the
law reform movement of the 1960s and early 1970s attracted
hopeful young activists and in the process disregarded the
problem of unintended consequences. Chapter one also sug-
gested that this disregard of unintended consequences may
be having serious, and potentially disillusioning, ramifica-
tions for such young activists and for their clients. In
chapters three and four we will carefully examine the specific
types of unintended consequences that may be troubling the law
reform movement and similar reform efforts. Before doing so,
however, we take time to clear up an erroneous impression
that may have developed. Our focus to this point, and
indeed throughout the dissertation, on unintended conse-
quences in the context of law reform may have inadvertently
and incorrectly suggested that unintended consequences are
a serious problem only in regard to that context. In order
to make plain that the problem of unintended consequences
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is a problem in many contexts, we use the first part of
chapter two to show some of the different situations in
which unintended consequences have been observed. We make
such a showing by reviewing the comments that scholars have
made about unintended consequences, comments that reflect
the situations in which unintended consequences have been
detected. Moreover, reviewing the comments of scholars
regarding unintended consequences will not only enable us
to see that unintended consequences area problem in numer-
ous contexts other than law reform, it will also enable us
to see that quite a variety of noteworthy scholars have
been engaged in making comments about unintended consequences.
And still further, examining the comments made by scholars
regarding unintended consequences also allows us to intro-
duce some conceptual distinctions that are implicit in the
scholars' comments and that must be raised in any serious
consideration of the idea of unintended consequences. We
later return, in the last half of chapter two, to these con-
ceptual distinctions and give them, and several related
conceptual and methodological matters, a thorough analysis
and discussion.
Unintended Consequences in Contexts
Other Than Law Reform
Down through history many keen minds have wrestled
with the problem of unintended consequences. Indeed,
Robert Merton, writing in 1936, remarked that the problem
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"has been treated by virtually every substantial contribu-
tor to the long history of social thought." 1 We shall find,
as becomes obvious below, that the eminent individuals who
have grappled with the problem of unintended consequences
have done so in many contexts including in relation to
political, economic, religious, and other types of action.
We shall even find, as also becomes obvious below, that not
only highly respected students and theorists of political,
economic, and other types of action, but also prominent
individuals involved in the creative arts, including
esteemed literary figures, have pondered the problem of
unintended consequences.
As suggested above, economic activity is one of the
contexts in which the problem of unintended consequences
has been noted. Though, of course, better known for their
observations on religious and moral matters, the authors of
the Bible have commented on certain economic activities that
may trigger unintended consequences. Thus in Proverbs they
tell us that the economic practice of pursuing wealth through
oppression of the poor may lead to a paradoxical and no doubt
unintended end:
He who oppresses the poor to increase his own
wealth . . . will only come to want.2
lRobert C. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences
of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review,
1 (1936): 894.
2 Proverbs 22:16
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Much more in the mainstream of economic writers is Karl
Marx who, too, saw that economic activities can produce
unintended ccnsequences. For example, a key Marxian prin-
ciple is that pursuit of capitalism unintentionally involves
pursuit of capitalism's own demise. This notion that capi-
talistic activity contains the seeds of its own destruction
is evident in Marx's observation in 1867 that ". . . capi-
talist production begets, with the inexorability of a law
of Nature, its own negation."3
Marx knew not only that certain economic actions
have the unintended consequence of destroying themselves,
he also knew that economic actions can have unintended
spillover or side effects even as the primary action itself
continues to exist and be carried out. Thus Marx writes
that division of labor, longer working hours, use of
machinery, use of child labor, and other economic moves
intended to increase productivity all have spillover
effects for the main body of adult workers, effects which
iarx must have seen were undesigned:
. . within the capitalist system all methods for
raising the social productiveness of labor are brought
about at the cost of the individual labourer; all means
for the development of production transform themselves
into means of domination over, and exploitation of the
producers; they mutilate the labourer into a machine,
destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it
3Karl Marx, "Capital," in The Marx-Engels Reader,
Second Edition', ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1978), p. 438.
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into a hated toil, they estrange from him the intel-
lectual potentialities of the labour-process in the
same proportion as science is incorporated in it as
an independent power; they distort the conditions
under which he works, subject him during the labour-
process to a despotism the more hateful for its mean-
ness; they transform his life-time into working-time,
and drag his wife and ghild beneath the wheels of the
Juggernaut of capital.
Like Marx, another noteworthy observer of economic
activities, Max Weber, understood that such activities
could generate unexpected and unintended consequences.
Writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, Weber
notes that attempts to improve worker efficiency by increas-
ing the wage paid per unit produced by each worker may have
the ironic and unintended effect of actually decreasing the
speed at which workers carry out their duties. Thus Weber
writes:
. . . the attempt has again and again been made, by
increasing piece-rates of the workmen, thereby giving
them an opportunity to earn what is for them a very
big wage, to interest them in increasing their own
efficiency. But a peculiar difficulty has been met
with surprising frequency: raising the piece-rates
has often had the result that not more but less has
been accomplished in the same time, because the worker
reacted to the increase not by increasing but by
decreasing the amount of his work. 5
And Weber further notes that unintended results can be
engendered by the reverse strategy of lowering rather than
raising wage rates in order to make it necessary for workers
4Ibid., p. 430.
5Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York! Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 59.
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to work more efficiently if they are to earn the same
amount of pay per day as they did before the rates were
lowered. In this connection, Weber states:
Another obvious possibility, to return to our
example, since the appeal to the acquisitive instinct
through higher wage-rates failed, would have been to
try the opposite policy, to force the worker by reduc-
tion of his high wage-rates to work harder to earn the
same amount than he did before. . . .
But the effectiveness of this apparently so effi-
cient method has its limits. . . . Low wages fail even
from a purely business point of view wherever it is a
question of producing goods which require any sort of
skilled labour, or the use of expensive machinery which
is easily damaged, or in general wherever any great
amount of sharp attention or initiative is required.
Here low wages do not pay, and their effect is the
opposite of what was intended. For not only is a
developed sense of responsibility absolutely indis-
pensable, but in general also an attitude which, at
least during working hours, is freed from continual
calculations of how the customary wage may be earned
with the maximum of comfort and a minimum of exertion.6
Though she commented on many other features of soci-
ety, as may also be said of Weber and Marx, Hannah Arendt is
another who perceived unintended consequences as following
from particular economic policies. Thus she envisioned the
policy of seeking a job for everyone as unintentionally
defeating itself. She wrote:
The modern age has carried with it a theoretical glori-
fication of labor and has resulted in a factual trans-
formation of the whole of society into a laboring
society. The fulfillment of the wish, therefore, like
6 Ibid, pp. 60-62.
103
the fulfillment of wishes in fairy tales, comes at a
moment when it can only be self-defeating. It is a
society of laborers which is about to be liberated from
the fetters of labor. . . .7
At the outset of chapter 2 we indicated that this
chapter would show,.among other things, that the problem of
unintended consequences is a problem in many contexts besides
law reform. We have seen that several noteworthy individuals
have commented on the damage the problem of unintended con-
sequences can do in the context of economic activities.
Similarly, we find that prominent students of religious
activities have also viewed unintended consequences as a
significant problem. Turning again to Max Weber, we see
that he was one such student. For example, Weber'.s remark
about a particular religious movement--the Reformation--makes
it evident that he understood that such movements can unleash
unintended consequences that are likely to be annoying to
those who initiated the movements. Thus in this regard
Weber wrote:
We shall have to admit that the cultural consequences
of the Reformation were to a great extent, perhaps in
the particular aspects with which we are dealing pre-
dominantlyunforeseen and even unwished for results of
the labour of the reformers. 8 .
7Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 4-5. Arendt's
views in this regard are also quoted in Philip B. Kurland,
"Ruminations on the Quality of Equality," Brigham Young
University Law Review (1979): 7.
8Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 90.
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Unintended consequences are a problem not only for
religious activity, and economic activity, but also for
political activity as well. For example, writing in about
1513, Machiavelli directs attention to the unintended conse-
quences in which a variety of political actions can become
entangled. Thus Machiavelli tells us that taking up arms
to change masters can unintentionally make matters worse for
those who initiate the change:
. . Men willingly change masters, believing to
better themselves, and this belief makes them take
up arms against their master, but in this they
deceive themselves, because eventually with ex e-
rience they see that things have gotten worse.
Another political move that Machiavelli indicates can have
unintended effects is the use of mercenary troops. As an
example, Machiavelli writes of an occasion on which such
troops ironically turned against those who had hired them:
The Milanese, after the death of Philip-, hired
Francesco Storza to fight against the Venetians;
once he had overthrown the enemy at Carvaggio,
he joined forces with them in order to oppress
the Milanese, his masters. 1 0
And Machiavelli also writes of the prince whose reign is
ironically and unintentionally ended because of the prince's
generosity. According to Machiavelli, the prince who as a
matter of policy is generous, creates a need, unintentionally,
9Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, A Bilingual Edition,
trans. and ed. Mark Musa (NewYork: St. Martin's Press,
1964), p. 9.
10Ibid., p. 103.
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for burdensome taxes to finance his generosity. Such taxes,
in turn, displease the people and, so the argument goes,
leads to the prince's downfall.ll
Machiavelli gives other examples of political actions
that precipitate unintended consequences.12 In fact, a state-
ment he wrote regarding corrective actions that paradoxically
result in raising new problems, which is just another way of
referring to the problem of unintended consequences, makes
it evident that Machiavelli viewed unintended consequences
as a problem for much political activity:
Nor let any state ever believe that it can always
adopt safe policies, rather let it think that they will
all be uncertain; for this is what we find to be the
order of things: that we never try to escape one dif-
ficulty without running into another; but prudence con-
sists in knowing how to recognize the nature of the
difficulties and how to choose the least bad as good.1 3
Besides Machiavelli, Max Weber also saw, as he did
for economic and religious activities, that political activ-
ity often leads to unintended consequences. In Politics as
a Vocation, Weber states that:
The final result of political action often, no, even
regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often
even paradoxical relation to its original meaning.
This is fundamental to all history. . *14
llIbid., p. 131.
12See, for example, pages 19 and 137 of The Prince.
1 3 Ibid., p. 191.
1 4Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 117.
106
Weber gives as an example the "actions" of the "syndicalist"
which seek to improve the lot of the syndicalist's own class
but which actually ". . . result in increasing the oppor-
tunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his
class and obstructing its ascent. . . .15
In more recent times, Brandeis too wrote of appar-
ently unintended results that can arise in the context of
political action. Thus in a case involving government
wiretapping, Brandeis argues that well-intentioned efforts
can go astray thereby having negative effects for personal
liberty:
. . Experience should teach us to be most on guard
to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent. Men born of freedom are naturally alert
to.repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insid-
ious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.1 6
Noteworthy scholars have observed unintended conse-
quences not only in relation to political, economic, and
religious behavior but also in regard to law-related activ-
ity. Though, as we argued in chapter 1, the literature of
the 1960s-1970s law reform movement greatly neglected the
problem of unintended consequences, a not insignificant
15Ibid., pp. 120-121.
16Quoted in Alan M. Dershowitz, "Psychiatry in the
Legal Process: 'A Knife that Cuts Both Ways,'" in The Path
of the Law From 1967, ed. A. Sutherland (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Law School, 1968), p. 83.
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number of scholars have at other points in history commented
generally on the unintended consequences that sometimes fol-
low legal action. In admittivng that there have been a fair
number of very general comments about and references to law-
related unintended consequences, we do not- intend to contra-
dict, and indeed we here reaffirm, our earlier stated position
that there has apparently been very little extended or thor-
ough writing about law-related unintended consequences.
Among those who have made broad comments that seem
to touch on the unintended effects that legal action can
sometimes produce is no less a figure than Aristotle.
Aristotle wrote of how changing the laws can have an impact
upon the way citizens look at their government, an impact
which he probably felt was unintended:
But while . . . arguments go to show that in some
cases, and at some times law ought to be changed, there
is another point of view from which it would appear
that change is a matter which needs great caution.
When we reflect that the improvement likely to be
effected may be small, and that it is a bad thing to
accustom men to abrogate laws lightheartedly, it
becomes clear that there are some defects, both in
legislation and in government which had better be left
untouched. The benefit of change will be less than
the loss which is likely to result if men fall into
the habit of disobeying the government.1 7
The renowned English legal historian, F. W. Maitland,
is another who has commented on the unintended and undesirable
ends that can result from law-related activity. Referring to
.
1 7Aristotle, "Politics," in The Politics of Aristotle,
ed. Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 73.
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English law and the English legal system, and writing in
1906, Maitland states that:
Some of our ideas seem to be antiquated, some of our
machinery seems to me cumbrous and rusty, some of our
weapons, I would liken to blunderbusses, apt to go
off at the wrong end. 1 8
Perhaps moreso than any other scholar to date,
Jeremy Bentham also wrote about the unintended consequences
that at times accompany legal action. Bentham, of course,
was a man fascinated by the consequences of action in
general. This fascination regarding the consequences of
action is, for example, evident because of his interest in
the concept of utility. Interest in the concept of utility
means interest in consequences in that, as one student of
Bentham has written, the idea of "utility . . . takes into
account the circumstances and consequences of the measures
contemplated."1 9 In applying the concept of utility,
Bentham would, therefore, evaluate actions in terms of
their good and bad consequences:
The general tendency of an act is more or less pernicious
according to the sum total of its consequences: that is
according to the difference between the suTi of such as
are good, and the sum of such as are evil.
18F. W. Maitland, Collected Papers, 3 vols., ed. H.A. L.
Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University-Press, 1911), 3: 485,486.
1 9Nancy L. Rosenblum, Bentham's Theory of the Modern
State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 64.
2 0 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and 'Legislation, (New York: Hafner Publishing
Company, 1948), p. 70.
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Bentham apparently used this same technique to evaluate the
actions of lawyers and he especially liked to underscore
the bad consequences their actions produced. The very low
regard in which the efforts of lawyers were held by him is
perhaps obvious in this remark:
The professional services lawyers do perform and for
which they are rewarded have consequences that are
demonstrably public disservices. 21
Bentham knew more, however, than that actions,
including those of lawyers, had good and bad consequences.
He knew too that such consequences could be unintended. For
example, that Bentham was conscious of the problem of unin-
tended consequences seems implicit in this statement of his:
It is also to be observed, that into the account of
the consequences of the act, are to be taken not such
only as might have ensued, were intention out of the
question, but such also as depend upon the connexion
there may between these first-mentioned and the
intention.
And that Bentham recognized that unintended consequences
could trouble law-related activity seems evident because, in
discussing legislation, he distinguishes between legisla-
tion's ". . . eventual end, which is a matter of chance
Cand) . . . the intended end, which is a matter of design." 2 3
2 1 Rosenblum, Bentham's Theory, p. 122.
22 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, p. 71.
2 3 Jeremy Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 113.
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Furthermore, Bentham understood the point--a point
about which we will have more to say later--that consequences
that flow from a law can be not only unintended but also at
the same time beneficial and beneficial from more than one
perspective. Hence Bentham states:
Whether a party on whom it is the intention of the
law to confer a benefit, shall really enjoy that or
any other benefit, may depend indeed upon the event.
It may design to benefit without benefiting him: it
may benefit him without designing it: it may design
to benefit one man and eventually benefit another.2 4
Just as Bentham saw that a law's unintended conse-
quences could be beneficial so too he clearly saw that a
law's unintended consequences could be harmful. He referred
to these harmful unintended consequences, even apparently
if they were extremely harmful, as the "mischief" a law can
cause. 2 5 For example, in describing the "mischief" caused
by usury laws Bentham gives an example of a law that appar-
ently had seriously deleterious effects--effects, inciden-
tally, which he could not but helped to have seen were
unintended. These effects included, according to Bentham,
not only depriving individuals of loan monies that were
desperately needed but also forcing such individuals to get
the funds they required by selling their personal effects
2 4Bentham, The Limits of Jurisrrudence Defined, p.
140.
25Jeremy Bentham, Collected Works, ed. John Bowring,
vol. 2: (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 418.
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at terms more unfavorable than even the high interest rates
they might have had. to pay if there were no usury laws.
Quoting Bentham's writings directly, he puts his view of the
impact of usury laws this way:
. . . There are no ways in which those laws can do any
good. But there are several in which they cannot but
do mischief.
The first I shall mention is that of precluding so
many people altogether from getting the money they
stand in need of, to answer their respective exigen-
cies . . ..
A second mischief is that of reniering the terms so
much the worse, to a multitude of those whose circum-
stances exempt them from being precluded altogether from
getting the money they have occasion for. . . . Those
who cannot borrow may get what they want, so long as
they have anything to sell. But while, out of loving-
kindness or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes
a man from borrowing upon terms which it deems disad-
vantageous, it does not preclude a man from borrowing
upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does
not preclude him from selling, upon any term, howsoever.
disadvantageous. Everybody knows that forced sales are
attended with a loss: and to this loss, what would be
deemed a most extravagant interest bears in general no
proportion. When a man's moveables are taken in execu-
tion, they are, I believe, pretty well sold, if, after*
all expenses paid, the produce amounts to two-thirds of
what it would cost to replace them. In this.way, the
providence and loving-kindness of the law costs him
33 percent and no more, supposing, what is seldom the
case, that no more of the effects are taken than what
is barely necessary to make up the money due.2 6
Finally, Bentham, who we again point out referred
to unintended consequences as "mischief," was apparently not
too optimistic at times about overcoming the problems raised
2 6 Bentham, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 9.
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by a law's mischief and part of this lack of optimism
apparently followed from Bentham's belief that some such
mischief/unintended consequences caused damage of which we
probably never even become aware:
. . A law, how beneficial soever it may be upon
the whole may, over and above the mischief it does
by restraint it lays liberty, do a deal of mischief
which is seen but can not be helped, as well as a
good eal which perhaps can be neither helped nor
seen. 7
Looking beyond Aristotle, Maitland, and Bentham to
scholars of more recent times, we find that there are others
who have commented on the unintended consequences of law-
related activity though none who, apparently, have done so
as extensively as Bentham. Max Weber, for example, as he
had in the case of political, economic, and religious action,
noted that legal action-could produce unintended effects.
Weber's familiarity with the unintended consequences that
sometimes trouble a law is readily seen in a statement that
also suggests how those consequences might come about:
In an economy based on all embracing interdependence
in the market the possible and unintended repercussions
of a legal measure must to a large extent escape the
foresight of the legislator simply because they depend
upon private interested parties. It is those private
interested parties who are in a position to distort the
intended meaning of a legal norm to the point of turn-
ing it in o its very opposite, as has often happened in
the past. 8
2 7Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined, p. 146.
2 8 Max Weber, On Law In Economy and Society, ed. Max
Rheinstein, trans. Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 38; Also cited in Sally
Falk Moore, Law as Process, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978).
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Another, even more modern scholar, Paul Freund, also is
apparently highly familiar with the unintended consequences
of legal action. This familiarity is suggested by Professor
Freund's comment that:
Great developments in the law are often the unforeseen
consequences, the implications of more immediate and
narrow concerns. 2 9
A number of other individuals have also commented in recent
years on the unintended consequences that sometimes follow
hand in hand with law-related activity. Most such individ-
uals, we reiterate, have commented very generally.30 An
exception is Gary T. Marx. Professor Marx has undertaken
a thorough analysis of social control efforts by law enforce-
ment agents and reached the not unimportant conclusion that
such efforts can, ironically and sometimes unintentionally,
contribute to law breaking.31
In addition to students of law-related activity,
such as Weber, Freund and G. T. Marx, and students of eco-
nomic, political, and religious behavior, such as those we
reviewed earlier, there have also been literary figures and
individuals involved in other creative arts who have noted
2 9 Paul Freund, "The Challenge of the Law," Tulane
Law Review 40 (1966): 482.
3 0 The least general, relatively speaking, and most
useful comments are found in works listed in footnote #138
in chapter 1.
3 1 Gary'T. Marx, "Ironies of Social Control: Authori-
ties as Contributors to Deviance Through Escalation, Non-
Enforcement, and Covert Facilitation," Social Problems 28
(1981).
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the phenomenon of unintended consequences. For example,
the eighteenth century Scottish poet Robert Burns is in
essence commenting or the problem of unintended consequences
in his famous lines, set forth below, that inspired the
theme and title of Steinbeck's novel Of Mice and Men:32
The best laid schemes of Mice and Men
Gang aft agley i.e. Go oft awry) ,And leave us nought but grief and pain,
For promised joy!33
And another significant literary figure, William Wordsworth,
seems to be both commenting about laws with effects that
are unintended and pointing our a source of such effects
when he writes that:
. . Law, in conformity with theories of political
economy which, whether right or wrong in the abstract,
have proved a scourge to tens of thousands, by the
abruptness with which they have been carried into
practice.34
Even in the cinematic arts we find references to the pro-
blem of unintended consequences. Just such a reference is
made in the Humphrey Bogart movie Key Largo by Bogart's
co-star Lionel Barrymore who played the character called
32John Steinbeck, Of Mice and Men, (New York:
Covici, Friede, 1937).
3 3Robert Burns, "To a Mouse," in Poems and Songs,
ed. James Kinsley (London: Oxford University Press, 1969),
p. 102.
3 4 William Wordsworth, Selected Poetry and Prose,
(New York: Signet Classic, 1970), p. 444.
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Mr. Temple. Commenting on the sad irony that the Indians
who came to his hotel for protection ended up losing their
lives there, Mr. Temple says:
It seems we can't do anything but harm those people
when we go to help them.
Looking back over all.of those whose comments about
unintended consequences we have reviewed thus far, we can
see that most made their comments in reference to a certain
kind of action--legal, political, economic, or religious.
Other students of unintended consequences, however, have,
in some of their writings, made observations about unin-
tended consequences not tied to any specific kind of action.
For example, Robert Merton, writing in an article mentioned
earlier, and apparently not referring to any particular
type of action, identifies several common factors that he
suggests help transform actions in such a way that they
give rise to unintended consequences. These common factors
that, according to Merton, aid in turning actions to unin-
tended ends include: error, ignorance, concern with acting
immediately, values, and the actions themselves. Thus, to
consider one such factor,.Merton contends that unintended
consequences can arise from "error" such as the error of
designing courses of action that attend "to only one or
some of the pertinent aspects of the situation which influ-
ence the outcome of the action." And, to consider one more
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of the factors he mentions, Merton also argues that unin-
tended consequences can be brought on when we need to act
expeditiously and in fact do so even though we have not
had time to acquire complete information about the situation
at hand.35
Like Merton, Sam Sieber is another who has made
some observations about unintended consequences that are
not confined to those consequences that flow from a particu-
lar kind of action. Looking at a variety of actions or
interventions, Sieber identifies seven "conversion mecha-
nisms" that have affected those actions such that they
resulted in unintended reverse effects. Sieber labels
these mechanisms as: functional disruption, exploration,
goal displacement, provocation, classification, overcommit-
ment, and placation. Time and space permit us to review
only a few of these so-called conversion mechanisms. Prov-
ocation, for example, refers to a number of situations
including that in which an intervention unintentionally
provokes a hostile reaction such as reassertion, with
renewed vigor, of a course of conduct sought to be con-
trolled by the initial intervention or action. Goal dis-
placement, meanwhile, may be understood as describing,
among other things, the situation where an instrumental
35Merton, pp. 898-904.
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value has unintentionally ended up becoming a terminal
value.36
I have emphasized that, in some of their writings,
Sieber and Merton have attempted to develop an overall
perspective on the problem of unintended consequences that
is not wedded to unintended consequences that have been
produced by a single type of action. In emphasizing this
point my sole purpose has been to contrast these writings
by Merton and Sieber with other comments about unintended
consequences that are linked to a single kind of action.
I have not meant to imply that either Merton or Sieber is
oblivious to the advantages that can derive from studying
unintended consequences in relation to a particular type
of action. Indeed, Merton, for example, has explicitly
acknowledged these advantages--advantages about which we
will have more to say at a later point.37
Our review in the foregoing pages of some of the
comments that have been made down through the years about
unintended consequences allows us to make several points.
First, it permits us to point out that unintended conse-
quences have been observed in many contexts and that, there-
fore, despite our focus in the present study on unintended
consequences and law reform no one reading this study
3 6Sam D. Sieber, Fatal Remedies, (New York: Plenum
Press, 1981).-
37Merton, p. 904.
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should erroneously believe that unintended consequences
are a problem only in the law reform context. Second, our
review of gome of the comments that have been made about
unintended consequences also allows us to emphasize, as I
have done repeatedly, that unintended consequences are a
problem that has fascinated many astute thinkers. And if
the problem of unintended consequences has in the past been
fascinating to great thinkers in the different contexts in
which they have looked at it, then we suggest, enticingly
we hope, that it may be fascinating in the law reform con-
text in which we will soon examine it more closely in this
dissertation. Finally, our review of comments about unin-
tended consequences allows us to point out, relatively easily,
that there are various conceptual issues that complicate con-
sideration of the problem of unintended consequences. One
such issue, for example, can be readily seen by quickly
referring back to our look at Bentham's comments about unin-
tended consequences. As will be recalled, Bentham dJistin-
guished between, on the one hand, laws that are intended to
benefit a person in a particular way but end up benefiting
him or her in unexpected ways and, on the other hand, laws
that are not intended to benefit a person but which do so
nevertheless. This distinction raises the conceptual issue
regarding whose perspective to adopt in identifying and
assessing the 'unintended benefits of a law. Are the unin-
tended benefits of a law those that accrue in unexpected
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ways to individuals who were supposed to benefit from the
law in one particular way or should the term "unintended
benefits of a law" be used more expansively to refer to the
unintended benefits that accrue to any person however tenu-
ous those benefits might be and regardless whether that per-
son was supposed to be affected by the law in the first
place? Our review of scholars' comments about unintended
consequences allows us to point up other possibly trouble-
some conceptual issues as well. Thus, to take one more
example, we can readily see a potentially complicating con-
ceptual issue by simply recalling that in the comments we
reviewed some scholars referred to "unforeseen" conseauences
while in this dissertation we have more often used the term
"unintended" consequences. The question arises, therefore,
whether there is any important difference between unforeseen
and unintended consequences and, if not, just what is the
relationship between the intentions that underlie an act
and the foreseeability of its consequences. These kinds of
conceptual issues, which are easily discerned by recalling
some of the scholars' comments we reviewed, must be fully
aired if we are to proceed in an intelligible manner.
Accordingly, the second half of chapter 2, which begins
immediately below, is devoted to a careful discussion of
the relevant conceptual matters, and related methodological
problems, that' arise in working with the notion of unin-
tended consequences.
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Conceptual Issues
Though in chapter one we gave a preliminary defini-
tion to the term "unintended consequences" and though our
general understanding of that term may have been added to
by our review, in the preceding pages of this chapter, of
scholars' comments about unintended consequences, we still
need further clarification of the term in order to effec-
tively deal with it in the remainder of this dissertation.
The first conceptual issue we take up, therefore, is the
matter of providing a more precise definition of "unintended
consequences."
Defining "unintended consequences" is a difficult
undertaking in that such consequences appear in so many
forms and in so many situations. However, from this point
on in this study of unintended consequences in the context
of law reform, the term "unintended consequences" may be
understood to refer to the undesigned and unanticipated
effects, including side effects, that flow from a law or
from a use of the legal process. This definition, as seems
true of most definitions, could perhaps stand even further
clarification. Some illumination may be provided by point-
ing out that, although it may fall within the apparent
reach of the phrase, I do not in referring in the defini-
tion of unintended consequences to "undesigned and unantici-
pated effects" mean to include the situation where the effect
of a law or of a use of the legal process is mere failure to
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accomplish what was desired. Though such failures may be
undesigned and in a certain sense unanticipated they are
of no interest to me in the present study. Relatedly, it
should be noted, though it may be obvious, that I have
meant to exclude from our definition of unintended conse-
quences, as I believe the definition's literal terms do,
the situation-which might be called the "ordinary success."
By crdinary success I mean those instances in which a law
or a use of the legal process achieves what was hoped for
and has no other accompanying effects of any import. Such
successes generally are designed and anticipated and there-
fore fall beyond the purview of the definition of unintended
consequences I have drawn. But while it is not within the
definition of unintended consequences, the ordinary or
"typical" success is of interest in this work. As I have
already indicated, I discuss, in future chapters, the fea-
tures of the typical piece of successful legal action and
attempt to show how the absence of such features can result
in the production of unintended consequences by a legal
action.
Having underscored that typical or ordinary successes
and simple failures are kinds of results or effects of legal
action that we have not meant to include in our definition
of unintended consequences, it is important, on the other
hand, to clarify those results or effects that are within
our definition of unintended consequences and that are,
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therefore, the subject of this study. The definition
itself, of course, provides the best indication of the types
of effects that fall within its boundaries and that are,
thus, a matter of interest. It bears repeating therefore
that the definition refers to "undesigned and unanticipated
effects." The definition does not, however, indicate just
from whose perspective these effects can be said to be
undesigned and unanticipated. This problem can be recti-
fied by pointing out that the effects of a law or of a use
of the legal process that interest us here are those that
are undesigned and unanticipated from the perspective of
the individuals who proposed the law in question or who
triggered the use of the legal process in question. Of
course being able to say that the effects of a law or of a
use of the legal process are undesigned and unanticipated
from this perspective requires that we know the original
intentions of those who proposed that law or who started
up that use of the legal process and that we also know
their original estimations of the likely effects of their
actions. In the next section of this chapter we will set
out how one can go about trying to determine the original
intentions that are behind particular actions and what we
write there will apply also to efforts to determine the
original estimates of an action's likely effects.
Movin-g beyond the general point that they are
undesigned and unanticipated from the perspective of those
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who initiated the action, the effects of legal action that
interest us in this work can also be more specifically
described as being either: (1) regressive outcomes,
(2) results that are beneficial in an unexpectedly exag-
gerated way, or (3) side effects.38 Each of these types
of effects, which may appear alone or in combination with
each other, requires some elucidation. To begin with, in
referring to regressive outcomes I mean the situation in
which a law or a use of the legal process unexpectedly exac-
erbates a particular problem that the law or the use of the
legal process was supposed to ameliorate. Next, in refer-
ring to exaggeratedly beneficial outcomes I mean the situa-
tion in which a law or the legal process is used to correct a
problem and is significantly more successful than was planned.
Finally, by side effects I mean the situation in which a law
or the legal process is used to attack a specific problem
and, regardless of its impact on that problem, its use pro-
duces significant new problems or benefits that were neither
supposed to come about nor were otherwise expected and that
are only marginally, if at all, related to the original pro-
blem under attack. And, furthermore, as I use it, the term
side effects means new problems and benefits that fall into
the lap of almost anyone even those individuals who were
3 8 Though "regressive outcome" is a common phrase,
I should acknowledge that it is used repeatedly in Sieber's
book Fatal Remedies and my reading of the book may have led
me to use the term here.
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not supposed to be affected in the first place in any way
by the law or by the use of the legal process that is creat-
ing the new problems or benefits.
At this juncture, two somewhat digressive observa-
tions should be made regarding the kinds of effects--regres-
sive outcomes, exaggeratedly beneficial outcomes, and side
effects--that interest us in the present study. First of
all, it may seem, -especially considering the broad reach
we have given to the term "side effects," that we have cast
our nets too widely and thus are attempting to study a bit
more than is feasible. In this connection, it should be
noted, however, that I will not attempt to discuss in the
remainder of this work all possible regressive outcomes,
exaggeratedly beneficial outcomes, and side effects that
can arise from a law or from use of the legal process but
rather I shall discuss only those of such outcomes and
effects that are most common and troublesome. Second,
though I have in this chapter referred to the effects of
legal action that interest me by the terms "regressive
outcomes," "exaggeratedly beneficial outcomes," and "side
effects," I shall not repeatedly use this same terminology
in succeeding chapters. I have introduced and drawn dis-
tinctions between these terms because they are the terms
which best describe the very general categories of unin-
tended consequences studied in this work. In future chap-
ters, however, the effects or consequences of the legal
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actions we examine are described by terms that separate
such effects into what could be called more specific sub-
categories of the general rcategories described in this
chapter.
Putting behind us the issue of what kinds of effects
or outcomes fall under our previously stated definition of
unintended consequences, there is one other aspect of the
definition that also requires explanation. That definition,
it will be recalled, made reference to effects of a "law"
or of the use of the "legal process." We have not yet delin-
eated exactly what we have in mind when we use the terms
"law" and "legal process." However, we can remedy this
situation quickly. Though volumes have been written in
efforts to define "law," we attempt no extended and esoteric
discussion here for any such an attempt would be outside the
scope of this work. Instead, we simply but directly state
that for our purposes the term "law" is used in the sense it
is most commonly understood: that is, to refer to a legis-
lative enactment. The specific kinds of legislative enact-
ments that are the subject of concern are spelled out in
the next section of the present chapter.
Just as an extended and pedantic discussion of the
definition of "law" would be outside the boundaries of this
study, so too would we be going far afield if we attempted
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any lengthy discussion of the definition of "legal process."
Rather than undertake such a lengthy discussion on the defi-
nition of "legal process," we also give it a common meaning.
We use it to refer to the legislative, administrative, and
judicial processes with which most of us in this country
are familiar. Furthermore, we are particularly interested
in this work in one of these processes, the judicial process,
and in how its use, in the form of litigation, sometimes pro-
duces unintended consequences.
In the foregoing discussion I have tried to explain
precisely what will be meant when, in the remaining parts of
this dissertation, we refer to the term "unintended conse-
quences." Our effort in this regard having been completed,
we can now turn to other, and related, conceptual issues.
For example, there is a conceptual issue regarding why gen-
eral references are made in this dissertation to the "problem
of unintended consequences" even though, as indicated earlier,
some unintended consequences can be beneficial. It is true,
and indeed we again emphasize, that unintended consequences
can be beneficial; however, the expression "the problem of
unintended consequences" is appropriate nonetheless. This
is so because at the point at which legal action is initiated
it is unclear to the relevant actors whether any unintended
consequences that may follow from the action in question will
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be harmful or beneficial and thus these possible unintended
consequences are a problem in that they represent an uncer-
tainty about the outcome of action that the actors must heed
and for which they must prepare themselves in the event the
outcome or consequences are negative.
Still another conceptual issue, one we briefly
referred to earlier, involves the distinction between
"unforeseen consequences" and "unintended consequences"
as we have defined the latter term. Generally, unintended
consequences are unforeseen. However, it is, of course,
possible for an unintended consequence to be foreseen.
Take the situation where legal action may have effects that,
for example, legislators or litigants can foresee as pos-
sible but which they indicate they hope will not happen
and which they suggest are not likely to happen. In such
cases, if the legislators or litigants proceed with the
actions in question and the undesired consequences occur
to everyone's apparent surprise, we would still designate
these consequences, despite their foreseeability, as.unin-
tended. Of course we might have some doubts that the con-
sequences were actually unintended and we might try to
gather evidence to the contrary. But without such evidence
indicating that the legislators' or litigants' true inten-
tions were to reach and not, as they said publicly, to
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avoid the consequences at issue, then those consequences,
again notwithstanding being foreseeable, would remain unin-
tended under the terms of our definition.
There is a final insight, one drawn from an article
by Richard Vernon, that should be mentioned regarding the
foreseeability of unintended consequences. 3 9 The degree of
foreseeability seems to be the touchstone we use in deter-
mining whether to excuse someone for having created a harm-
ful but unintended consequence. When the harmful but
unintended consequence is one that should easily have been
foreseen as likely to arise from the action being taken,
we tend to be less than willing to excuse the fact that
that consequence is causing us some inconvenience or trouble.
On the other hand, when the harmful but unintended conse-
quence is one that could not have been easily foreseen, we
tend to shrug it off as one of those imponderable occurences
that seem to plague us all from time to time.
Methodological Issues and Problems
Besides the various conceptual issues discussed
above, studying unintended consequences also involves a
number of knotty methodological issues and problems. Of
these methodological issues and problems, the first to be
reviewed here is the problem, briefly mentioned earlier,
39 Rich-ard Vernon, "Unintended Consequences," Political
Theory 7 (Feb., 1979): 57.
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of determining the true intents or purposes of the actors
whose actions have produced apparently unintended conse-
quences. Being able to determine such intents or purposes
is, as we also mentioned earlier, both important in the
study of unintended consequences and not always an easy
task. Determining the true intents that lie behind actions
that release what are suspected to be unintended conse-
quences is important for the quite obvious and simple rea-
son that it can be said with some certainty that such
consequences are unintended only if we know, or can readily
surmise, the true intents of those who initiated the actions.
More complicated are the reasons why determining these true
intents is not always an easy undertaking.
First of all, determining the true intents or pur-
poses that underlie an action can be a tough task because
in some instances there are no available sources of evidence
of true intents except the bare fact that the action itself
was carried out. In such instances, there are no available
documents or other tangible pieces of evidence that indi-
cate the purpose of the action in question nor are there
any actors who were involved in the action who are willing
to discuss why they took the action. Relevant documents
may be unavailable because, to take two examples, they have
been inadvertently destroyed or because they have been
classified as confidential. And actors involved in an
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action may have many grounds 'or being unwilling to discuss
the action including the desire to avoid any embarrassing
admission that the action has produced undesired and unin-
tended consequences. Secondly, in other instances, deter-
mining the true intents behind an action can be difficult
not because the actors involved in the action are uncooper-
ative and unwilling to talk nor because the evidence is oth-
erwise inaccessible or insufficient but instead because the
existing and freely available evidence, perhaps coming from
several different sources, indicates that the actors who took
the action had multiple intents or purposes that in retrospect
appear, and that may even have actually been at the time of
the action, either confusing or contradictory. It can be a
great challenge just to sort through and arrange in some com-
prehensible order this evidence of an action's multiple and
conflicting purposes that is coming from several sources.
There is no ready means to completely eliminate
these difficulties that can be involved in determining the
true intentions upon which actions are founded. However,
these difficulties may not, in our study, be as troublesome
as may at first seem. Merton states that the problem of
determining intents or purposes is ". . . significantly
reduced in cases of organized group action . . ." and,
furthermore, he concludes that such "formally organized"
group actions apparently ". . . afford a better opportunity
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for sociological analysis . . ." of the problem of unin-
tended consequences. 40 Mertont s reference to formally
organized group actions would seem to include the two tynes
of action that concern us in this work: legislation and
litigation. Legislation clearly appears to be formally
organized group action: it is organized, as reflected in
its elaborate rules of procedure, and it is also group
activity both in the sense that it derives authority from
a group (i.e. the members of society) and in the sense that
it is carried out on a day to day basis by a group of indi-
viduals (i.e. legislators). Much of the same can be said
about litigation: it is highly and formally organized, as
is suggested by its rules of evidence and procedure-, and it
is group action which in this case is used to resolve dis-
putes between two or more individuals. Therefore, if Merton
is correct that determining the true intents behind an action
is less problematic than usual in the case of formally orga-
nized group action and if, as it certainly appears, litiga-
tion and legislation are the kind of formally organized
group action to which Merton makes reference, then we should
not be confronted with insurmountable problems in deter-
mining the true intents at the bottom of each of the parti-
cular examples of litigation and legislation that we study
in'this work.
40Merton, pp. 896-897.
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The question arises, however, regarding just why
it is easier to determine the true intents behind formally
organized group action than it is to determine the intents
behind other types of action. Merton argues that identi-
fying the true intents that lie behind an action is less
difficult than usual ". . . in cases of organized group
action since the circumstance of organized action custom-
arily demands explicit . . . statements of goal and pro-
cedure." 41 As Merton suggests, organized group action does
appear to usually include statements of goal and procedure.
For example, the organized group actions in which we have
an interest here--litigation and legislation--involve, as
already mentioned, explicitly stated and intricate rules of
procedure such as, to name a few, the rules in litigation
on how an appeal can be taken or the rules in legislation
on how to present a bill for consideration. Litigation and
legislation also entail explicit statements of goals: in
the form of pleadings in the case of litigation and in the
form of the preambles that are typically a part of each
piece of legislation. In addition, not only does it appear-
that Merton is on the mark in suggesting that formally
organized group actions, including, we have argued, litiga-
tion and legislation, involve statements of goal and pro-
cedure but also it appears that he is on target in suggesting
41Merton, p. 897.
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that it is easier, as compared to the case for other types
of action, to determine the true intents or purposes behind
formally organized group actions because such organized
group actions require these statements of goal and procedure.
Thus, for example, the statements of goal and procedure that
are usually required in formally organized group action make
it easier, than it is in other cases, to determine the true
intents or purposes behind formally organized group action
simply because the statements serve as readily available
sources of evidence of the true intents or purposes. Fur-
thermore, in some instances, a formally organized group
action's statement of goals (as distinct from its statement
of procedure) is not just.an available source of evidence of
the action's true purposes but a conclusive one that makes it
extremely easy for an investigator to determine those true
purposes. This happens where the statement of goals is
complete and accurate for in that case it becomes just what
the investigator is looking for: a list of true purposes
behind the action. On the other hand, when a formally
organized group action's statement of goals seems, upon
analysis, to be incomplete or inaccurate, then the action's
statement of procedure becomes a particularly useful source
of evidence. In this circumstance, rather than rely on the
action's apparently misleading statement of goals, an inves-
tigator attempting to ascertain the true intentions or
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purposes behind the action can use the statement of pro-
cedure to examine how each step of the procedure in the
action has been shaped and a determination of the shape of
each step of the procedure will, in turn, give the inves-
tigator what he or she wants--some accurate impressions of
actual purposes that the procedure, and thus the action,
were designed to accomplish.
Going back once more to formally organized group
action that involves a statement of goals that is accurate
and complete rather than one that is misleading, note that
this accurate and complete statement of goals is an impor-
tant source of evidence to our hypothetical investigator
not only because it gives the investigator conclusive evi-
dence of the action's true purposes but also because it
helps the investigator to recognize the previously mentioned
situation where an action is based on multiple intents or
purposes that conflict with each other. When in evaluating
an action an investigator can look to one particular place
and find an accurate and complete statement of an action's
goals or purposes, it is a relatively simple matter to
analyze that statement so that conflicts in the goals stated
there can be detected. At least it is a simple matter in
comparison to the case where the investigator must cull
through evidence from numerous sources in search of possible
conflicts in an action's purposes. And, as an aside, also
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note that when an investigator has an accurate and complete
statement of an action's goals not only is it easier for
him or her to recognize conflicting goals bec.use he or she
has the explicit list or statement of those goals to look
to, but also it seems less likely that goals or purposes
that conflict with each other will be listed in the first
place. Actions requiring explicit statements of goals or
purposes in essence require those who would take such actions
to think through and write down their goals or purposes and
this process of thinking through their purposes should cause
the prospective actors to become aware of and eliminate any
conflicting purposes they might have.
But, as still a further aside, let us for the
moment assume the worst: that an investigator trying to
nail down an action's true intents or purposes concludes
that the action is indeed based on multiple goals or pur-
poses that are in conflict. We have yet to say what this
means if the investigator is also trying to determine
whether the consequences produced by the action in ques-
tion are unintended. Our answer in this regard depends
upon the nature of the action's conflicting goals or pur-
poses. First, let us suppose that the available evidence
indicates that the multiple and conflicting goals or pur-
poses that the action is based upon are, in the eyes of those
taking the action, goals or purposes that are of equal
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importance. And still further, let us also suppose that
at least one of these multiple goals or purposes that are
of equal importance to the actors makes the action's con-
sequences seem sought after or intended and another goal
or purpose makes the consequences seem unsought after or
unintended. In these circumstances, an investigator who
is trying to definitively ascertain whether the conse-
quences of the action are unintended can reach only one
correct conclusion: that he or she is stymied and can
neither say that the action's consequences are intended
nor that they are unintended.
However, if we slightly vary our assumptions about
the nature of an action's multiple and conflicting purposes,
we can see that that action can be effectively analyzed by
an investigator who is attempting to 'decide if the conse-
quences triggered by the action are unintended. Let us
assume not that an action is based on multiple and conflict-
ing purposes of equal importance but instead that it is
based on multiple and conflicting purposes one of which is
predominant in its importance and the others of which are
of subordinate importance. In these circumstances, the
investigator can accurately judge whether the action's
consequences are unintended by comparing them to the action's
predominant purpose and, if the consequences are unintended
in light of th-at purpose, the investigator can then look to
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the action's subordinate purposes that conflict with the
predominant purpose and consider whether those subordinate
purposes are factors that helped give rise to the unintended
consequences.
Leaving this complicated issue regarding how, in
dealing with actions based on multiple and conflicting
intents, one decides whether the consequences of such
actions are unintended, we can now return to our previously
initiated discussion about the statements of goal and pro-
cedure that are often a part of formally organized group
actions. We have argued, as Merton seems to have done
previously, that these statements of goal and procedure
that are included in formally organized group actions typi-
cally serve as very useful sources of evidence to an inves-
tigator who is trying to determine the true purposes of
those actions. We have also argued, therefore, that the
matter of determining the true intents or purposes behind
an action is easier for an investigator in the case of
formally organized group actions,.like litigation and legis-
lation, that count explicit statements of goal and procedure
among their features, than it is for other actions. Too
much, however, can be made of this point. in other words,
we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that even for
actions that require statements of goal and procedure there
can be problems insofar as determining the true purposes of
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those actions is concerned. In admitting this, what, in
particular, we have in mind is legislative action for
although legislative action, as we have repeatedly noted,
usually involves a statement of goal and procedure, there
are nonetheless several identifiable pitfalls that make it
quite a challenge to determine the true intents or purposes
behind each case of such action. The two most important of
these pitfalls are discussed immediately below.
One of the pitfalls that we will have to avoid in
determining the true intents or purposes behind particular
legislative enactments has to do with the previously men-
tioned situation involving sabotage. At many stages during
the course of its life, efforts may be made to sabotage a
piece of legislation. Bardach emphasizes that the imple-
mentation stage that follows adoption of a law is one time
when attempts are made to undermine a law:
-Indeed, interests opposed to the goals of the mandate
might have stayed quiet during the adoption contest
precisely because they counted on subsequent oppor-
tunities to achieve more decisive, and less public ed,
victories during the struggle over implementation.
Sabotage may take one of many forms during implementation
of a law. Thus, to take a familiar example, an administra-
tor charged with implementing or enforcing a loosely worded
law may have sufficient discretion and power under that law
42Eugene Bardach, The Imolementation Game: What
HaDoens After-a Bill Becomes a Law, (Cambridge, Iass:
M.I.T. Press, 1977), p. 85.
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to in effect sabotage it by designing enforcement goals
and procedures for the law which are inconsistent with or
perhaps even in contradiction of the goals and procedures
explicitly stated in the law's original language. And, as
we have said, it is not only during the enforcement or
implementation stage that sabotage of a law can be tried.
After a law's-enactment and initial implementation, changes
in the law may be proposed on the ground that the changes
are in the public interest even though the real purpose of
the changes is to subvert the law in question. Aristotle
seems to have had something like this situation in mind,
apparently on a larger scale, when he wrote:
. . Changes which are really subversive of the laws,
or of-the constitution, may be proposed on the plea
that they tend to the common good.43
However, whether the effort to sabotage a law comes during
the law's initial implementation or during subsequent
attempts to change the law by amendment, the pitfall to be
avoided is the same insofar as we are concerned in this
study. Specifically, the pitfall to be avoided is this: we
must not, in determining the true intents or purposes behind
laws that have been sabotaged, fail to distinguish between
the intents or purposes of the original proponents of the
law and the intents or purposes of the saboteurs. If we do
fail to make and underscore that distinction and then proceed
4 3 Aristotle, "Politics," p. 72.
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to make the claim that any adverse consequences produced
by a sabotaged law are unintended we in effect open ourselves
to the criticism that the adverse consequences of the law
are not really unintended because they were intended by the
saboteurs. To put it another way, we can safely say that
adverse consequences that arise from a sabotaged law are
unintended only if we separate out the intents or purposes
of the initial proponents of the law and use these intents
or purposes as the standard against which to test the
intentionality of the law's consequences.
Being careful to distinguish between the intents of
the original proponents of a piece of legislation and the
intents of the legislation's saboteurs is not the only pit-
fall that seems particularly troublesome in the specific
situation where one is trying to determine the true intents
or purposes upon which legislative action is founded. A
pitfall also arises when legislative action is largely sym-
bolic. By symbolic legislation I mean a law that actually
has very little force even though it is engulfed in rhetoric
claiming it will thoroughly redress a particular problem and
that is actually designed to dissipate the concerns of those
interested in the problem by lulling them into thinking that,
because a law of some kind has been passed, the problem in
question has been corrected. Symbolic laws differ from
sabotaged laws in that while symbolic laws are never concerned
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with making more than cosmetic changes, sabotaged laws
originally set out to achieve significant change but are
thrown off their course by the sabotage. The pitfall to
be avoided in the case of symbolic laws is failure to cut
through the rhetoric and see that a symbolic law's true
purpose is not to correct a problem but to defuse the ener-
gies of those concerned with the problem. And if we fail
to see this, we may mistakenly.categorize any actual defusing
of concern over a problem as an unintended rather than as an
intended effect of the law in question. Of course the issue
arises regarding just how one can knife through rhetoric to
see that a law really is nothing more than an attempt to
symbolically reassure a group of citizens that a problem is
being treated when in fact that problem is not being treated.
However, we can offer no foolproof guidelines on how to
detect symbolic laws. All we can say is that one must care-
fully weigh the available evidence, including the strength
of the procedures involved in a statute and the level of
funding a statute receives, and using this evidence make the
best effort possible to determine whether the true intent
or purpose behind the statute is merely to make a largely
symbolic stab at solving a problem.
This closes our discussion of the methodological
problem of finding the true intents or purposes behind an
action. To re-capitulate, we have tried to make the following
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points: (1) that being able to identify the true intents or
purposes underlying an action is essential if we are going
to be able to say whether or not the action's consequences
are intented or unintended; (2) that in general determining
the true intents or purposes behind an action is a difficult
problem though perhaps not an insoluble one in the case of
formally organized group action because such action typically
includes, among its characteristics, an explicit statement of
goal and procedure; (3) that these statements of goal and pro-
cedure are useful sources of evidence that can reveal a for-
mally organized group action's true purposes and that can
help one recognize the situation where an action is based on
multiple and conflicting purposes; (4) that legislation and
litigation are formally organized group action that involve
explicit statement of goal and procedure and that, therefore,
we should not be faced with insuperable problems when it
comes to determining the true purpose behind each of the
examples of legislation and litigation that we examine in
the present work; (5) and finally that while the problem of
determining true intents or purposes behind an action is not
insuperable in the case of legislative action some pitfalls
remain in this connection particularly if the legislative
action is largely symbolic or has been sabotaged.
In addition to the problem of determining the
true intent or purpose behind an action, there are other
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methodological problems that must be overcome in studying
the unintended consequences of action. These other meth-
odological problems can he discussed more succinctly than
the problem of determining an action's true purpose but
this should not be taken to imply that they are any less
troubling to efforts to systematically study unintended
consequences. Among these other methodological problems
is the problem of causation. By "the problem of causation"
I mean this: in designating the consequences of an action
as unintended one must make sure that the consequences in
question have in fact been caused by the action in question
and not by some intervening force such as an entirely dif-
ferent action or combination of different actions. Further-
more, it should be apparent that this problem of accurately
linking an action with its consequences is greatly accen-
tuated when the action takes place in an uncontrolled and
confusingly complicated context in which many intervening
outside forces are at work. In such a context, it becomes
difficult to tell which of the consequences that can be
observed are attributable to the action in question and
which are the by-product of forces intervening in the con-
text. On the other hand, if an action's context is highly
structured, much studied, and well understood rather than
uncontrolled and confusingly complicated, then it is more
likely that w'e will be able to distinguish between the
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consequences produced by the particular action of interest
and those consequences produced by intervening forces. The
contexts in which litigation and legislation take place are
highly structured, much studied, and, as we shall see, fairly
well understood. It should, therefore, be possible in the
present work to differentiate between consequences produced
by legislative action and litigation and those produced by
other forces intervening in the contexts in which legisla-
tion and litigation take place. In other words, the pro-
blem of causation in this work should be less troublesome
than would be the case if we were studying actions that
take place in contexts not as well understood as the con-
texts of legislative action and litigation.
Besides the problem of causation and the problem
of determining the true purposes behind actions, a third
methodological problem in the study of unintended conse-
quences is the problem of identifying consequences. Before
you can say that something is a consequence that is unin-
tended you must first know that it is in fact a consequence.
Identifying consequences, however, can be a problem because
it is at times difficult to distinguish between consequences
and action. For example, when an action is designed to
take place in phases unless an individual has full know-
ledge of the phasing plan it is easy for him or her to
mistakenly label later phases not as phases of the overall
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action but as consequences that were triggered by earlier
phases. And note that this problem of confusing actions
and consequences can be particularly acute in the case of
legislation since a consequence of legislating a new law
may be that it is used in unexpected ways. Hence, in this
instance an action--use of a law in an unexpected way--becomes
a consequence of the law. There is no easy remedy to the pro-
blem of confusing actions and consequences. One must simply
be alert to the possibility and try to avoid it.
Nor is there any easy remedy to a fourth methodolog-
ical problem that can become involved in the study of unin-
tended consequences. This fourth methodological problem is
inability to verify the existence.of previously observed
consequences because those consequences are the product of
complicated factors that have since changed, thus causing
the consequences themselves to change or even disappear
before verification could be accomplished. Should such a
verification problem arise it is a serious matter for any
student of the consequences of action in that if a student
is unable, in subsequent studies, to verify the existence of
consequences observed in an earlier study, then doubts may
be raised whether the student ever observed the consequences
in the first place. Furthermore, we emphasize the dangers
of this problem here because the law-related consequences
in which we have an interest in this work are the -kind of
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consequences that can be difficult to verify. This is true
because such law-related consequences are not infrequently
the by-product of a complicated interaction between a legal
action and almost daily changing social, economic, and poli-
tical conditions. These conditions may be expected to have
changed by the time verification is attempted and, when they
do change, they typically produce, as a result of their
interaction with the legal action in question, new conse-
quences that wipe out the originally observed consequences
thus making verification of those originally observed con-
sequences impossible. But, despite the fact that the veri-
fication problem is a real threat in relation to the kind
of law-related consequences in which we have an interest in
the present study, there is, as.already stated, no ready
solution to the problem. Rather, this verification problem
is simply one of the hazards that must be risked when one
enters the study of law-related consequences.
Keeping the four above described methodological pro-
blems in-mind, though not again explicitly discussing them,
I will in the next two chapters set forth what I believe are
specific examples of law reform related unintended conse-
quences. Before moving on to our review of these examples,
however, I would like to specify the kind of examples that
they are and I would like to make some comments on the
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sources of the examples, the quality of evidence that
supports them, and on the fact that they are presented
as part of twc typologies which will be drawn.
It will be noticed that the kind of examples of
unintended consequences to be examined in this work are
examples that thus far have been described as "law reform
related." I have yet to say, however, what exactly is
meant, in the present context, by "law reform related."
Roughly speaking, when I use that term to refer to examples
of unintended consequences I mean that those examples are
based upon legal activity (i.e. legislation or litigation)
that has sought reform of a politically liberal nature in
one of the following fields: poverty law; race or age
discrimination; women's rights; and worker, consumer, and
environmental protection. Further note, however, that
while most of the examples of unintended consequences dis-
cussed in the remainder of this work are drawn from legal
activities in the fields just listed, I do not hesitate to
refer, where necessary to-make some point, to examples which
depict unintended consequences that have been produced by
legal activities in fields other than those listed including
fields that have little or no relation to any type of law
reform.
We have turned to three sources to find our examples
of the kind of law reform related unintended consequences
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that we have just specified. First, some examples have
been gathered from discussions and interviews with Boston
and Cambridge area law reform lawyers. Second, other
examples of the kind of law reform related unintended con-
sequences that interest us have been drawn from my own
approximately five years of experience as a trial lawyer
engaged in litigating minimum wage and discrimination suits
for the United States Department of Labor. Third, still
other relevant examples of law reform related unintended
consequences have been taken from the legal and social
science literature. Though, as repeatedly mentioned, this
literature contains very few extended analyses of the pro-
blem of law reform related unintended consequences, it does
contain a sprinkling of examples of such consequences.
The examples of law reform related unintended con-
sequences that come from the three aforementioned sources
are supported by evidence of varying quality, depending
upon the example. In some of the examples, the evidence
of an unintended consequence is convincing but in the case
of other examples a measure of faith is required before one
can agree that the unintended consequence does in fact exist.
This state of affairs, however, is not inconsistent with
the present study's essential purpose. Our study seeks
only to generally sketch and explore the major types of
unintended consequences that may be troubling law reform
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efforts. The study does not seek to provide definitive
and exhaustive evidence of each such consequence. Pro-
viding definitive and exhaustive evidence of law reform
related unintended consequences is an extremely time con-
suming task that is out of place in an initial and explor-
atory study such as ours and that must, therefore, await
future studies. In other words, insofar as law-related
unintended consequences are concerned, it can be said,
to quote Holmes, "that at this time we need education in
the obvious more than investigation of the obscure." 4 4
Finally, note that our examples of law reform
related unintended consequences are presented in the course
of drawing two typologies. One of the- typologies is a
typology of the unintended consequences that can arise
from legislation and the other is a typology of unintended
consequences that can be triggered by litigation. The
potential for overlap between these two typologies is
acknowledged here and will be discussed in the next chapter.
The decision to use typologies is based on their
perceived value as analytical tools. In essence, a typology
is an abstract constuct that seeks to extract and di'splay
important or idiosyncratic features of certain phenomena.
4 4Cliver W. Holmes, Collected Papers (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1921), pp. 292,293.
150
In so doing, the typology makes these key features of the
phenomena more accessible for intense scrutiny by students
of the phenomenn and, hopefully, this intense scrutiny, in
turn, leads to understanding. If our own typologies work
in this way, we will then come to a better understanding of
the phenomena of law reform related unintended consequences.
CHAPTER III
LEGISLATION AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The heavy reliance of the 1960s-1970s law reform
movement on the use of legislative enactments (i.e. laws)
to address social problems has already been described in
an earlier chapter. The present chapter is an attempt to
draw a typology of the unintended consequences that can
arise when the law is used for such social reform purposes.
Ten types of unintended consequences of this sort are set
forth. The discussion of each type includes a description
of the type, examples of it, and, where necessary, some
observations on how each type differs from the other types
presented. The chapter then closes with a discussion that
shows how unintended consequences can arise from legisla-
tion when the legislation lacks one or more of the typical
features of successful legislation.
Legislation and Unintended Consequences: A Typology
Type One: Laws and Shifted Costs or Burdens
In the type one situation the unintended effect of
a law is that the costs or burdens imposed by that law on
a particular party or segment of society end up being
shifted, in whole or in part, so that the law's costs or
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burdens come to rest on some other party or segment of
society.
An example of this type one situation is the mini-
mum wage law which was first enacted in 1938 but which was
also significantly expanded in the 1960s War on Poverty
era that is of interest in this work.1 In an attempt to
ensure that no worker earns an indecently low wage, the
minimum wage law imposes wage levels on employers that can
be higher than the wage levels that would result from the
free play of the market economic system. However, an
unintended effect of the law has apparently been that,
depending upon market conditions, some employers are able
to shift at least part of the cost or burden of the law
to the shoulders of marginal workers such as teenagers.2
Rather than allow total wage payments to go up because of
the higher rates dictated by the minimum wage law, some
employers seem instead to be able to keep total wage pay-
ments down by paying the minimum wage but also employing
a smaller number of marginal teenage workers. Thus while
some employees may, under the minimum wage law, enjoy
higher wages than the market would bear on its own, the
129 U.S.C. 201 et seq.
2 For a brief discussion of the relationship of
market conditions and the minimum wage law see Robert L.
Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, The Economic Problem,
5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1978), pp. 272-273.
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cost or burden of such higher wages has been shifted by
the employer to the marginal teenage employees whose jobs
are sacrificed to finance the higher rates of the other
employees.
The occurrence of this shifting of burdens from
employers to teenagers who lose their jobs is now fairly
well established. The bipartisan Minimum Wage Study Com-
mission reported in. 1981 that:
A review of teenage employment and unemployment
time-series studies completed by 1979 . . . found
that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
would reduce teenage employment between 0.5 and 3.0
percent with most studies finding 1.0 to 2.5 percent
reductions. The latter translates into a loss of
80,000 to 200,000 jobs from a base of 8 million.
Commission staff attempted to update the stud-
ies through the fourth quarter of 1979 to explore the
-sensitivity of the estimates to differences in the
variables held constant in estimating the minimum
wage effects and to analyze other more technical
issues. . . . In general, the updated estimates were
quite consistently in the lower range of estimates
suggested in the earlier literature. The staff
estimated that a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage would reduce teenage employment about 1 percent.
Other staff estimates with alternative models were
quite regularly in the 0.5 to 1.5 percent range. 3
This shifting of part of the minimum wage law's
burdens or costs to marginal teenage employees whose jobs
are sacrificed to support the higher than market wage rate
mandated by the law is clearly a shifting of burdens or
3Report of the Minimum Wage Study Commission,
vol. 1, p. 38.
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costs that is unintended as is evident from the below
discussed legislative history of the original law and of
its amendments. And that this shifting of burdens to
teenagers is an unintended event is no less clear despite
the fact that down through the years the minimum wage law's
detractors have warned that increased teenage unemployment
and other adverse effects would be the by-products of the
law. An example of those who opposed the law and who
raised the spectre of the supposedly negative consequences
it would produce is Senator Vandenberg who noted in the
debate in 1937 on the original law that:
I emphatically concur, as I am sure all other
Senators will concur, in the notably humane
objective the Senator from Alabama voiced and to
which this bill is addressed. But, Mr. President,
good intentions and high motives alone are not
enough. Practical legislators must ask themselves
practical questions in respect to a practical
matter of this nature. To begin with, will the
bill do what it purports to do? Then, in the
attempt to do what it purports to do, will it not
create more problems than it solves? 4
Meanwhile, Representative McClellan, also speaking in the
debate on the original law, made clear that among the pro-
blems that it was feared the minimum wage law would create
4u.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Vandenberg speak-
ing against S,. 2475, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 28 July 1937,
Congressional Record 81:7720.
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was increased unemployment: "I want to help labor, but
what we are asked to do here will, in fact, create more
unemployment. It the law) will do more harm than good." 5
In later years, as attempts were made to increase
the amount and expand the reach of the minimum wage law,
its detractors again and again argued that the law trig-
gered negative effects. In debate on amendments in the
1960s Representative Martin contended: "Who suffers most
when the minimum wage is raised? The very people whom the
higher wage is intended to help--Negroes, Puerto Ricans,
unskilled workers and teenagers." 6 Similarly, in debate
over amendments proposed in the 1970s, Senator Buckley was
referring to the minimum wage law's negative employment
effects on low income workers when he said: ". . . as so
often happens when we try to repeal the laws of economics
by Federal decree, the intended beneficiary becomes the
victim. "7
If, as is true, the scope of the law and the amount
of the minimum wage it set continued to be increased despite
5U.S. Congress, House, Representative McClellan
speaking against S. 2475, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., 17
December 1937, Congressional Record 82:1813.
6U.S. Congress, House, Representative Martin
speaking against H.R. 13712, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 May
1966, Congressional Record 112:11270.
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Buckley speaking
against S. 2747, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 28 March 1974,
Congressional Record 120:8768.
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admonitions by the law's opponents regarding the law's
negative consequences, then one might reasonably ask how
can such negative consequences be said to be -unintended
and not intended. It will be recalled, from chapter two,
that whether the effects of a law are to be classified as
intended or unintended is to be determined from the per-
spective of the proponents of the law. When the conse-
quence of a law is undesigned and unexpected from the
point of view of its proponents, then that consequence is
unintended for purposes of this study even if the law's
opponents may have foreseen and warned against the conse-
quence in question. Insofar as the minimum wage law is
concerned, it is clear from their comments during the
debate over the law that its original proponents never
designed the law to produce negative effects. For example,
consider these 1937 comments by Congressman Bradley, a
minimum wage law proponent:
Mr. Chairman, we have been subjected to a barrage
of propaganda from the opponents of this measure
who seek to instill fear, who seek to intimidate
Members of Congress by saying that if this bill
passes it will disrupt industry and will create
further unemployment. I do not think we have any
need to worry about disturbing industry or increas-
ing unemployment. The only disturbance that will
be caused by a bill which seeks to correct intol-
erable conditions will be a disturbance of the
nefarious practices some people seek to perpetuate
through low wages and substandard wages throughout
the United States. 8
8 U.S. Congress, House, Representative Bradley
speaking for S. 2475, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 December
1937, Congressional Record 82:1686.
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And, in regard to the particular problem of teenage
unemployment, it is also clear that the supporters of the
minimum wage law never designed the law to produce such a
problem nor did they expect that problem as an unintended
side effect of the law. As late as the mid-1970s we find
backers of the minimum wage law making statements stead-
fastly denying that the law increased teenage unemployment.
For example, Senator Williams, a long time supporter of
minimum wage legislation, argued in July of 1973 that:
experience following previous raises in the minimum
wage does not show any connection between minimum wage
levels and youth unemployment."9 Furthermore, the view
in the mid-1970s that the minimum wage law did not increase
teenage unemployment was not restricted to just one or two
staunch supporters of the law but rather was apparently
common among those who favored and backed the law. Such
a view as to the lack of effect of the law on teenage
unemployment was apparently held by enough members of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which con-
siders amendments to the law, to justify the following
statement in a June 1972 report by the Committee: "The
9U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Legislative History of The Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, by the Subcommittee on Labor,
94th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1976) 1:923.
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Committee was also unconvinced that an increase in the
minimum wage rate would result in aggravating youth unem-
ployment.nlO Thus, in later years, supporters of the
minimum wage law must have looked on with a mixture of
bewilderment and irony as the empirical evidence that the
law increased teenage unemployment began to gather, cul-
minating in the 1981 report to that effect issued by the
bipartisan Minimum Wage Study Commission.
The minimum wage law is not the only law the unin-
tended effect of which is that its burdens or costs are
shifted to some unsuspecting party or group in society.
Consider, for example, housing codes designed to compel
landlords to use a portion of their profits to maintain or
upgrade the housing they lease. Though it is intensely
debated, there are those who argue that the costs imposed
on landlords by such housing codes are costs that landlords
meet not by reducing their profits but instead by shifting
the costs to unsuspecting tenants. 1 1 As Professor Ackerman
10 U.S., Congress, Senate, Senate Committee Report,
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1972, S. Rept. 92-842 to Accompany S. 1861,
92 Cong., 2nd sess., 8 June 1972, p. 39.
llNeil K. Komesar, "Return to Slumville: A Critique
of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the
Poor," Yale Law Journal 82 (1973):1175; Bruce Ackerman, "Reg-
ulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Hous-
ing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Distribution Policy,"
Yale Law Journal 80 no. 6 (May 1971):1093.
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has indicated, the supporters of this line of thinking
fear:
. . . that landlords who are required to improve
their properties to code standards will simply pass
on the added costs to their tenants by increasing
rents or that they (i.e. landlords) will -abandon
the properties entire y, thereby depriving tenants
of even sub-code accommodations.1 2
There is some evidence to support this contention
that the true costs of housing codes are shifted by land-
lords to tenants whose rents are raised or whose buildings
are abandoned as a consequence. Professor Grigsby has
observed the latter phenomena--code induced abandonment.
"In Philadelphia, for example, code enforcement has lit-
erally wiped out entire blocks where the intent of the
City has been just the opposite--to revivify them.n?1 3 He
concluded that when housing market conditions are as unfa-
vorable as they were in Philadelphia when his observations
were made ". . . it is clear that code-enforcement programs
are frequently not simply ineffectual but actually per-
verse in their impact on housing quality and neighborhood
environment. . . .14 And insofar as whether landlords
shift the costs of code compliance to tenants by raising
rents, Professor Hirsch has gathered evidence indicating
12Ackerman, p. 1095.
1 3William G. Grigsby, "Economic Aspects of Housing
Code Enforcement," The Urban Lawyer 3 no. 4 (1971):535.
1bid., p. 536.
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that where the code enforcement law in question has a
receivership remedy "its (i.e. the receivership remedy)
presence was found to be associated with a statistically
significant increase in rental expenditures. . .*.15
Like housing codes, reni control laws are also
alleged by some to purport to impose costs on landlords
when in fact those costs end up being shifted to tenants.1 6
In this case, the argument is that the burdens imposed by
rent control laws designed to put a ceiling on landlord
profits are burdens that the landlord shifts to tenants
when the landlord, notwithstanding the rent ceilings,
keeps his profits high by cutting building maintenance and
the expenditures associated therewith. Whether under a
rent control law a landlord reduces building maintenance
and thus shifts the burden of the law to the shoulders of
tenants may in actuality be determined by the stringency
of the rent controls enacted. 1 7
15Werner Z. Hirsch, "Habitability Laws and The
Welfare of Indigent Tenants," Review of Economics and
Statistics 63 no. 2 (May 1981):274.
1 6 See references in "Rethinking Rent Control:
An Analysis of 'Fair Return,'" Rutgers Law Journal 12
no. 3 (Spring 1981):625.
1 7 John I. Gilderbloom, "Moderate Rent Control:
Its Impact on the Quality and Quantity of the Housing
Stock," Urban Affairs Quarterly 17 no. 2 (December 1981):
123-148.
161
Type Two: Laws and Their Long Run Transformations
As mentioned earlier, though there can be some
overlap between each type and though types may appear in
combination with each other, basically each type set forth
in this dissertation highlights a distinctive and unintended
characteristic that a law can display. Thus, as we have
seen, the distinctive feature in a type one situation is
that the costs or burdens imposed by a law and intended for
one party can end up being shifted to some other party.
In the type two situation, the distinctive and unintended
feature of some laws that we focus on is the long run
transformation that can occur insofar as the use and meaning
of those laws are concerned. As far back as Bentham, it
has been observed that laws can undergo such unintended
long run transformations. "This irrevocable law, whether
good or bad at the moment of its enactment, is found at some
succeeding period to be productive of mischief--uncompensated
mischief--to any amount."1 8
Professor Freund, meanwhile, has noted such a long
run transformation in relation to Magna Carta:
When we celebrated this year the 750th anniversary
of Magna Carta, we are not commemorating a covenant
between a reluctant king and the chief barons of the
realm over their special privileges and prerogatives,
18Jeremy Bentham, Collected Works, ed. John Bowring,
vol. 2: (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 403.
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we were celebrating what Magna Carta had become by
extension, a charter of liberties of the citizen
against even a representative government. 1 9
Our own Fourteenth Amendment has undergone also,
some would argue, rather dramatic long run transformations
in regard to its meaning and the ends to which it is put
to use. Consider, for example, the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment was enacted over one hundred years ago and
long before the system of compulsory education was well
established and thus was never intended, at the time of its
adoption, to be used to authorize desegregation of public
schools as was done in Brown vs. Board of Education. 20
Type Three: Laws That Augment Rather Than
Regulate Power: The Capture Phenomenon
An unintended effect of some laws is that they
augment rather than regulate the power of a group or entity
in society because that group or entity is able to capture,
and use for its own advantage, the enforcement mechanism
set up a part of these laws. Upon capturing the enforce-
ment mechanism designed to regulate them, one of the ways
that the regulated can use that mechanism to their own
1 9 Paul A. Freund, "The Challenge of the Law,"
Tulane Law Review 40 (1966):475.
20Brown vs. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Brown vs. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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advantage is by turning it against their opponents and
competitors. In a very real sense then, the burden or
impact of the laws in this type three situation can be
described as having been shifted to some unsuspecting
group. It will be recalled that such a shifting of the
impact or burden of a law is also a feature of the laws in
the type one situation. But what differentiates the type
one and the type three situations is, as we shall see, the
capture phenomenon exhibited by the latter.
One kind of enforcement mechanism that is set up
by some laws and that is often said to end up captured is
the administrative agency:
The tendency of administrative agencies to become
the captives of those they ostensibly regulate has
long been noticed. ... .21
Few dimensions of public administration have been
more thoroughly explored or deplored during the
past twenty years than the capture of regulatory
agencies by special interests that then use the
system as a cartel for their own benefit. 2 2
Most administrative agencies have been charged with being
captured including the CAB, the ICC, the FDA and the FTC. 2 3
2lJames 0. Freedman, "Crisis and Legitimacy in the
Administrative Process," Stanford Law Review 27 (1975):
1055.
2 2James V. DeLong, "Informal Rulemaking and The
Integration of Law and Policy," Virginia Law Review 65
(1979):278.
2 3Mark Green and Ralph Nader, "Economic Regulation
vs. Competiti-on: Uncle Sam the Monoply Man," Yale Law
Journal 82 (1973):871; Freedman, p. 1041.
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host recently, there have been highly publicized charges
that President Reagan has permitted EPA and OSHA to become
captives of the business community they regulate. 2 4
The evidence is sometimes quite convincing that a
captured agency has been used by the intended regulatees
who capture it to achieve significant benefits. Consider,
for example, the ICC which is frequently alleged to be a
captive of the railroad industry that the ICC is supposed
to regulate. Green and Nader point out that the actions
of the captured ICC show a distinct pattern in favor of the
railroads in regard to mergers: "The ICC has approved
thirty of thirty-four major railroad mergers it has con-
sidered.n 2 5 Similarly, at least prior to the recent deregu-
lation of the airline industry, the CAB demonstrated a clear
inclination toward conducting its regulatory activities in
a manner that aided its alleged captors--the major airline
companies. Specifically, as Green and Nader also point out,
the CAB sheltered these established airline companies from
any new, and perhaps stiff, competition by excluding poten-
tial competitors from the interstate air service market:
The CAB has not certified a new trunk carrier
since immediately after its creation in 1938.(By contrast) . . . within the confines of
2 4 New York Times, 5 September 1983, p. 9; Phila-
delphia Inquirer, 26 July 1981, p. 6-A.
2 5 Green and Nader, p. 880.
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California, where CAB jurisdiction does not
extend, sixteen intrastate carriers entered
the market between 1946 and 1965.26
Administrative agencies are not the only type of
enforcement mechanism that laws establish and that can be
captured and used for advantage by those supposed to be
the subject of the laws' regulation. For example, Carlin et
al cite a small claims court that "in the view of its foun-
ders" was established as a mechanism by which "the poor
plaintiff. . . would be able to pursue his legal rights and
remedies" against small businesses and others. Carlin et
al report:
The data indicate, however, that the court has
been captured by business interests who find it
a useful tool in the collection of debts against
the poor. A recent study of the Oakland-Piedmont
Small Claims Court showed that two out of three
users were either business firms (jewelry and
department stores, mail order houses, finance
companies) or, to a lesser extent local govern-
ment agencies (principally the County of Alameda
with claims for hospital services rendered and
for unpaid taxes.) Most (85 percent) of these
organization plaintiffs filed several claims at
a time, and most were frequent users of the
court. It is, thus, principally the business
community, not the poor, that reaps the advan-
tage of . . . (the small claims court) .27
There are, of course, critics of the capture con-
cept. In regard to administrative agencies and other
2 6 Green and Nader, p. 879.
2 7Jerome E. Carlin, Jan Howard, and Sheldon Messin-
ger, "Civil Justice and the Poor," Law and Society Review
1 no. 1 (November 1966):44.
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institutions established as mechanisms to enforce the terms
of certain laws and alleged to be captured, critics of the
capture concept typically admit that these agencies or
other institutions show in their behavior a pattern of bias
in favor of those supposed to be the subject of regulation
under the laws. The critics contend, however, that the
extent of the bias is overstated and does not reach the
level of near total domination alleged by the proponents
of the capture concept. The critics of the capture con-
cept also maintain that the laws creating agencies or
other institutions that show a bias in favor of the inter-
est groups to be regulated are not infrequently laws that
were purposely designed to establish agencies that coddle
and otherwise foster the growth of the regulated interest
groups. Therefore, the critics argue further, the bias
shown in favor of the regulated interests by these alleg-
edly captured agencies and institutions is a bias that is
intended rather than unintended as claimed by the disciples
of the capture concept. 2 8
These disputes between the proponents of the cap-
ture concept and their critics are not for us to resolve
here. Rather our more limited purpose is to highlight one
2 8 Louis L. Jaffe, "The Illusion of the Ideal Admin-
istration," Harvard Law Review 86 (1973):1183.
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significant fact to those individuals who are considering
the future use of the law as a means of reform. This fact
is that there Pre numerous observers who contend that,
contrary to the intention of the laws' enactors, the admin-
istrative agencies and other mechanisms created by some
laws to enforce the provisions of those laws end up cap-
tured and used to advantage by the interest groups the
laws seek to regulate. If so, these laws, ironically,
augment rather than curb the power exerted by these inter-
est groups.
Type Four: Self Inhibiting and Self Destructive Laws
A law can contain a provision that, from the per-
spective of the enactors of the provision, unintentionally
inhibits the law from fulfilling its primary goal. Consider,
for example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1968 (the ADEA).2 9 The ADEA's primary goal clearly is to
outlaw age discrimination in employment and to create a
legal remedy that enables those who suffer such discrimi-
nation to file in court for judicial relief. The ADEA,
however, also has a provision requiring that a concilia-
tion conference be held between the opposing parties
before any suit alleging age discrimination in employment
2929 U.S.C. 621 et seq.
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can be initiated.30 This conciliation requirement has
been designed by Congress as a means to encourage dis-
clission between workers and employers so that together
these groups can "find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."3 1 In reality,
unfortunately, the conciliation conference requirement
has become a significant procedural hurdle for those who
claim to be victims of employment related age discrimina-
tion. Courts have held that if the conciliation confer-
ence is not conducted with careful and exhaustive attention
to rigorous legal standards, then even meritorious claims
of age discrimination are barred from court.3 2 In short,
the conciliation confere-nce requirement is a procedural
nightmare that in effect has inhibited the ADEA in regard
to its ability to fulfill its principal goal of providing
victims of age discrimination with a swift and effective
means of seeking judicial relief.
There is no substantial evidence that this unfor-
tunate effect of the conciliation requirement is anything
but unintended. In other words, there does not seem to be
any basis for concluding that the conciliation conference
3029 U.S.C. 626(d).
3129 U.S.C. 621(b).
32Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corporation, 495 F2d
368 (1974).
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requirement was made a provision of the ADEA in order to
subvert deliberately the ADEA's primary goal though one
must wonder if this is not true given the damage caused
by the requirement. Rather than deliberate sabotage, the
problem seems to be one of competing goals. As indicated
above, Congress enacted the conciliation conference require-
ment in the hope that the discussions generated in concilia-
tion conferences would help employees and workers explore
and resolve the problems of an aging workforce. Unhappily,
this competing goal of giving employers and workers, through
conciliation conferences, a mechanism for. exploring age
discrimination problems has led instead to procedural entan-
glements that have crippled the ADEA.
Finally, it should be observed that the procedural
road block thrown up by the ADEA's conciliation require-
ment does not completely negate the potential effectiveness
of the ADEA it only limits that effectiveness. It is, how-
ever, entirely conceivable that legislators could uninten-
tionally include among a law's provisions one that completely
prevents that law from being effective. Such a law would
be properly referred to as self-destructive rather than
just self-inhibiting as is the ADEA.
Type Five: Laws With Unintended Combined and/or
Cumulative and/or Synergistic Effects
When,' as a result of general legislative activity
or specific reform efforts, a new law is 'enacted it is
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added to and becomes a part of the complex web of existing
law. In taking its place in the body of existing law, the
new law can combine with earlier laws to produce perplexing
and unintended effects. For example, when a new law pro-
hibiting an act involving no victim (e.g., a law against
smoking marijuana) is added to the main body of criminal
law an unintended combined effect is produced. Specifically,
it is often said that the enactment of so-called victimless
crime laws and the imposition on the police of the duty to
enforce such laws means, at least if there is no concomitant
increase in police resources, that the police must divert
resources from the enforcement of laws involving more ser-
ious crimes in order to enforce the new victimless crime
law. Thus, it may be said that one of tie combined effects
of victimless crime laws and laws involving more serious
crimes with victims is that some serious crimes, perhaps
even murders, go unresolved because police are utilizing
part of their scarce resources to enforce the victimless
crime laws.
The kind of combined effect described above which
is produced when a victimless crime law is added to the
main body of criminal law is not, it would seem, the only
type of unintended effect that can arise from the chemical
like reaction that takes place when new laws are added to
old laws. At' least as a matter of theory it would appear
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that the enactment of a new law that is similar to, but
does not replace, an existing law could cause a unique
type of unintended effect, something in the nature of an
unintended cumulative effect. For example, it would seem
that when a state adds a new law against sex discrimina-
tion to an existing federal law the two laws operating
together and reinforcing each other might be more effective
in combating sex discrimination than was hoped by the
enactors of either law. A kind of unintended cumulative
effect would have arisen from the addition of the state law
to the federal law.
In this example, the addition of the new state sex
discrimination law to an existing federal sex discrimina-
tion law, and the two laws operating in conjunction with
each other, could cause more than the moderate and unin-
tended increase in effectiveness of each law that I have
in mind when I write of an unintended cumulative effect.
The addition of the state sex discrimination law to the
federal sex discrimination law and the working of the two
together could cause an unintended explosion in the effec-
tiveness of each law. Such an explosion in the effective-
ness of each would be a type of unintended synergistic
effect in the sense that together the two laws would add
up to be much more effective anti-sex discrimination tools
than one would suppose would be the case when considering
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the two laws separately. And, as an aside, note that an
unintended synergistic effect can arise not only from the
melding of two laws but also from the melding of a single
law and private voluntary action. For example, the Voting
Rights Act and extensive private efforts to register voters
were far more successful together in enfranchising black
voters in the South in the 1960s than either the Voting
Rights Act or the private registration efforts was likely
to have been by itself. 3 3
Type Six: Laws With Unequal Impact
A law can have an unequal impact in the sense that
it has a more onerous effect on some individuals than it
does on others. This kind of unequal impact that I have
in mind in the type six situation is not produced because
of any action taken by those who are supposed to fall under
the reach of the law that has the unequal effect. Thus,
the unequal effect in type six cases is not, for example,
produced because the intended subjects of the law have
acted to shift the burden of the law to some unsuspecting
group as in the type one situation. Nor is the kind of
unequal effect that concerns us here produced because, as
in the type three situation, the intended subject of the
law in question captures the mechanism by which the law is
3 3Morroe Beqger, Equality by Statute, revised ed.,
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967),
p. 51.
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to be enforced. Rather, the unequal impact of laws in the
type six situation is an impact that arises even though the
subjects of the laws are entirely passive. The unequal
effect of a type six law is produced simply because the
subjects of these laws possess different material resources.
The unequal impact that particular laws can have
has long been the subject of derisive comment. For example
in 1792, Jeremy Bentham sarcastically described a law with
unequal impact:
I sow corn: partridges eat it, and if I attempt
to defend it against the partridges, I am fined
or sent to jail: all this, for fear a great man,
who is above sowing corn, should be in want of
partridges.34
Similarly, Anatole Francois Thibout, the 192.1 Nobel Prize
for literature winner, wrote with bitter irony that:
The law in its majestic equality forbids the
rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.35
More recent commentators too have noted the unequal
impact that a law can have. Carlin et al describe the
unequal effect of an American draft law:
The draft law illustrates de facto bias in the
law. . . . Poor persons are less likely to have
jobs which qualify them for deferment on occupa-
tional grounds, and they are less likely to be
34 Bentham, Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 234.
35 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, (1956), p. 23,
Justice Frankfurter quoting Thibout in this case.
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students [who are also entitled to deferments)
Moreover, they are less likely to know about the
legal status of conscientious objector and to e
articulate enough to qualify for that status.
Carlin et al also outline the unequal effect that
divorce laws in New York State had, at the time the
article was written, on the poor as compared to the
wealthy:
New York's highly restrictive divorce laws5 7
are presumably applicable to all classes in
society. In practice, however, they are more
likely to prevent the poor, than the rich,
from legally terminating their marriages,
because poor people lack the resources to
obtain out-of-state divorces. According to
O'Gorman a "migratory divorce" is one means
of evading the proscriptions of New York law,
but he says: "Since a migratory divorce is
usually more expensive than one secured locally,
this pattern of evasion is not equally open to
all New Yorkers. If the state laws are easily
avoided by financially independent residents,
they can be avoided by others only at some
sacrifice, and avoided not at all by those with
low income. In this sense, the laws impinge
differentially on the population. They are
more binding on some groups than others." As
a result the poor may resort to either a fraud-
ulent New York action5 9 or more commonly deser-
tion.37
5 7H. O'Gorman, lawyers and Matrimonial Cases (1963).
5 9 R. Wels, "New York: The Poor Man's Reno,"
Cornell Law Quarterly 35 (1950):306-26
Only the very cynical would contend the disastrous
effects the draft and divorce laws described above had on
the poor were effects that were intended by the makers of
3 6 Carlin et al, pp. 23-24.
3 7 Carlin et al, p. 22.
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those laws. On the other hand, it is now becoming fairly
well understood among legislators, and in society in gen-
eral, that laws affect different individuals in different
ways. Law reformers should never lose sight of this pro-
blem.
Type Seven: "Within the Letter But
Not the Spirit of the Law"
The written terms of a law sometimes apply in sit-
uations in which it was not originally contemplated that
those terms would apply. For example, in the 1970s I knew
of upwardly mobile graduate students receiving tuition
scholarships who while enrolled in school were able to
obtain food stamps by declaring themselves to be financially
independent of-their middle class parents and by further
declaring themselves to be without a source of income.
These students received food stamps apparently because their
applications qualified under the written terms, or letter,
of the food stamps law. The granting of such benefits to
graduate students seems, however, to fly in the face of the
underlying spirit of the food stamps law. Most would agree-
that the food stamps law is intended to aid the truly needy
and not those who, like graduate students, are only tempo-
rarily without funds and who, if they so desired, could
turn to their parents for aid.
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Laws creating entitlements, such as food stamp
laws, are not the only type of laws the terms of which
sometimes apply in situations not contemplated by the laws'
enactors thus creating curious results. Laws establishing
prohibitions also can apply in situations not foreseen by
the laws' creators. For example, the terms of laws pro-
hibiting the possession of marijuana apparently outlaw its
possession even for medicinal purposes such as relief from
the side effects of chemotherapy.38 However, such a pro-
hibition against possession of marijuana for medicinal use
seems unintended and beyond the underlying spirit of the
marijuana laws which is to regulate allegedly deviant use
of marijuana.
The kind of unintended effects described in this
type seven situation arise not due to any abuse of discre-
tion by those charged with enforcing the laws in question.
Rather such effects come about because, as we have seen,.
the terms of the laws, as properly read by their enforce-
ment agents, apply in situations not contemplated by the
enactors of the laws. This contrasts with the next two
types of unintended consequences reviewed. In these next
two types, the unintended consequences arise because law-
yers or enforcement agents use the laws in abusive or
otherwise improper ways.
3 8
"A Fix for Pain?" Newsweek, 91 (January 1978):
41.
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Type Eight: Abusive Uses to Which Laws Are Put by Lawyers
Lawyers sometimes use laws abusively. Obviously,
such uses are not intended by the enactors of the laws. 3 9
Probably the most common abuse of the law by lawyers is
the filing of frivolous lawsuits. It appears that typically
such a suit is filed in the hope that, rather than going to
the enormous expense in legal fees of defending the suit,
the opposing party will offer to pay in settlement a small
sum representing the nuisance value of the suit.
It is not only the prospect of obtaining nuisance
value settlement sums that cause lawyers to abuse the law
by filing frivolous suits. Such suits can also be filed
for a wide variety of other reasons including the simple
desire to harass a foe, to secure publicity for a cause,
or to achieve political or religious goals. For example,
a mixture of political and religious goals seems to under-
lie the filing of the much publicized and spurious Baby
Jane Doe case. In that case a lawyer, on his own initia-
tive, used the law to file a suit which sought to compel
3 9 Some may argue that the abuse of a law by lawyers,
such as the filing of a frivolous suit under that law, is
such a common and expecte'd practice that it cannot be said
to be an unintended effect of the law as I have defined the
term "unintended" in this work. However, whether an abuse
of a particular law is expected, and thus not "unintended"
for our purposes, depends upon the particular abuse in
question. For example, the Baby Jane Doe matter, which is
discussed at a later point in the text, seems to me a case
of a wholly unexpected abuse of a law and, therefore, a
case that can be said to be "unintended".
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the parents of Baby Jane Doe to provide Baby Jane with
surgery that might prolong her life despite her numerous
and serious birth defects. The highest court of the State
of New York held in the case that there was absolutely no
basis in the law for the suit brought against the parents.
The court's unusually strong language in its opinion indi-
cates the court's view that the law upon which the suit
had been based was abused. Specifically, the court wrote
that the suit was "distressing" and "offensive". 4 0
Type Nine: Unintended Discretionary Uses
by State Enforcement Agents
When, as described in type 8 above, private lawyers
abuse a law by using it to file a frivolous lawsuit, the
kind of laws usually involved are laws creating general
rights of action. Such laws enable any private citizen
aggrieved under those laws, or any lawyer on the aggrieved
citizen's behalf, to file suit. Other laws do not allow
any citizen, or his or her lawyer, to file suit to enforce
the laws' provisions but rather designate specific agents
as those who have the sole authority to initiate legal
action. Typically, the agents designated are agents of
the state. For example, agents of the state (i.e. the
40Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 60 N.Y. 2d. 208
(1984).
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police and public prosecutors) are generally the group
authorized to sue under and otherwise enforce our criminal
laws. No other group is given similar powers.
Not uncommonly state agents are given more than
the exclusive right to enforce a particular law. State
agents often are also given wide discretion in determining
how that law is to be enforced. In enforcing criminal
laws, for example, the police have discretion to decide
which incidents to investigate, how many re'sources to
devote to a particular investigation, and whether to pre-
sent the incident to the public prosecutor.
Just as private lawyers acting on behalf of them-
selves or on behalf of private citizens sometimes abuse
the law by instituting frivolous suits, similarly agents
of the state at times abuse the law by misusing the dis-
cretion the law bestows upon them. Such abuses by agents
of the state are well known. 4 1 We are all familiar with
incidents in which the police, acting under color of law,
brutalized a citizen or fabricated charges which neverthe-
less resulted in an unjust public prosecution against the
41 The comment made in footnote 39 also applies
here. Whether an abuse of a law is so common as to be
expected, and thus cannot be said to be unintended as that
term is defined herein, turns on the nature of the parti-
cular abuse in question. It seems unreasonable to contend
that a highly outrageous abuse of a law is expected and
thus not "unintended" within the meaning of that term as
used in this work.
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citizen. 4 2 But, as compared to the abusive suits filed by
private lawyers, what distinguishes these unintended uses
of the law by state agents and what makes them so much
more offensive is that they are brought in the name of the
state.
Not every use of a law by state agents that is an
unintended use from the perspective of the enactors of the
law is, however, wholly repugnant to the general public.
For example, Silbey and Bittner report that certain Massa-
chusetts law enforcement agents, despite having insufficient
or very limited evidence to prosecute under a particular
law, at times hint at their intention to nevertheless pro-
secute under that law in the hope of persuading the subject
of the prospective prosecution to come into compliance with
the terms of some entirely different law.43 Such use of the
particular law under which the threat of prosecution is
made probably is a use not intended by the law's enactors.
Yet, this use of the law no doubt strikes some of us as
something less than offensive.
42 Recently, there have even been reports that
police have abused citizens who, at the request of the
police, had been cooperating in police sting operations
direQted at individuals suspected of criminal activity.
New York Times, 6 December 1982, p. A18.
43 Susan Silbey and Egon Bittner, The Availability
of Law. (unpublished, 1981); Susan S. Silbey, "Case pro-
cessing: consumer protection in an attorney general's
office," Law and Society Review 15 no&. 3-4 (1980-81):849-
881.
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Type Ten: Reciprocal Immunities
In type ten the unintended effect produced by a
law is what Professor Friedman has called "reciprocal
immunities". 4 4 These reciprocal immunities arise when
threats of action under law are made against one another
by two parties each of whom is in violation of some
requirement enforceable by law. The result of this
exchange of threats is that neither party actually takes
legal action for fear that the other party's responsive
action will prove too damaging. For example, a standoff
with no actual filing of legal action could result between
a tenant with a roof leak in his apartment who threatens
to take action against the landlord under .the local hous-
ing code if that landlord makes good on his threats to
turn in the tenant for smoking marijuana in the apartment.
In this example it can be seen that the individuals who
have been deterred from taking action are the most likely
individuals to report a violation of the law (i.e. a ten-
ant is most likely to report a landlord's code violation
and a landlord is most likely to report drug violations
in his tenant's apartment). Both parties are now immune
(and hence the term "reciprocal immunities") in the sense
that each by his or her threat of legal action has deterred
the person most likely to report them for a violation of law.
44 Lawrence M. Friedman, "Legal Rules and The Process
of Social Change," Stanford Law Review 19 (1967):806.
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Furthermore, and more interestingly, note that
reciprocal immunities can arise even if no threat of legal
action is articulated--the prospect of such action can be
sufficient. Thus to return to our earlier example, the
tenant, without any threats passing between him and the
landlord, may overlook the leaking roof while implicitly
expecting that the landlord in return will close his eyes
to the drug violations that go on behind closed doors.
The mere prospect that the tenant could act on the code
violations may be sufficient cause to mollify the landlord
and thus deter him from reporting the drug violations.
And, the other side of the coin is that, the prospect that
the landlord might act on the drug violations deters the
tenant from reporting the code violations. Again, therefore,
the individuals most likely to report the relevant violations
have been deterred from acting and'a kind of reciprocal
immunity is created.
Such reciprocal immunities are not abstract con-
structs. Professor Moore has described an actual situation
in which such immunities have arisen between union repre-
sentatives and contractors in the garment industry both
of whom:
Regularly violate . . . legally enforceable
provisions of their union contracts. They
both recognize the business necessity of
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doing so and engage in re eated exchanges that
demonstrate mutual trust.45
Reformers who enact a law in pursuit of some noble end
should not be unmindful that that very law may be used as
leverage to make certain individuals relatively immune
from the proscriptions of some other, and perhaps equally
important, law.
Besides the above described ten types there are
additional types of unintended consequences that can be
triggered by legislation. For each of these additional
types of unintended consequences that are produced by
legislation there is a very similar type of unintended
consequence that can be unleashed by litigation. Rather
than review the additional legislation related types of
unintended consequences in the present chapter I have
chosen to review in the next chapter the similar types
produced by litigation. Discussion of both the additional
types of legislation produced unintended consequences and
their litigation counterparts would involve too much dupli-
cation to be acceptable.
"Typically Successful Legislation" and Legislation
Exhibiting Unintended Consequences
Delineation of the characteristics of each of the
above described examples of legislation exhibiting unintended
45 Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 62.
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consequences and careful comparison of the characteristics
of each example to the characteristics of a similar piece
of legislation not displaying unintended consequences
might reveal the aspects of the examples of legislation
exhibiting unintended consequences that cause such conse-
quences. Unfortunately, such a demanding study of each
previously described example of unintended consequences
is impracticable here and thus must await future efforts.
What is possible is to identify the attributes of the
typical piece of "successful legislation" and then to
discuss each such attribute in order to show how its
absence from any piece of legislation can contribute to
the appearance of unintended consequences such as those
described in our ten types. In identifying these attri-
butes of "successful legislation" that do not trigger
unintended consequences I will draw upon the observations
of distinguished observers of legislation as well as my
own views.
Appropriately Precise Language
Language often is imprecise inherently. Legisla-
tion is composed of language and thus the drafting of
precise legislation is a considerable challenge. Further-
more, the challenge of writing precise legislation is made
greater because legislation typically is intended to apply
in many situations. Ensuring that legislation covers all
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the necessary situations encourages the drafting of
legislation in broadly applicable rather than precise
terms. In ti-is connection, Aristotle has written ". . . it
is impossible for every rule to be written down precisely:
rules must be expressed in general terms. . . ." Aristotle
continues, in the same clause, however, by noting that
actions are concerned with particulars," thus remind-
ing us I believe that while legislation or other rules must
be written broadly enough to apply in many situations such
legislation or rules must also be drawn in sufficiently
narrow form to enable them to be applied effectively in
any one particular situation.46
These observations of Aristotle suggest that suc-
cessful legislation is legislation that is written in terms
that are balanced between being broad enough to cover all
relevant situations and yet sufficiently narrowly drawn to
allow the terms to be profitably applied in any particular
instance. Legislation that lacks the requisite level of
precision and that is thus drawn in overly broad and vague
terms is susceptible to being twisted to ends other than
those intended by the drafters of the legislation. For
example, the more broad and thus vague the terms of a
piece of legislation the more likely that over time those
4 6Aristotle, "Politics," in The Politics of Aristotle,
ed. Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 73.
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terms will be directed to unintended ends as in the type
two situation above or the more likely that the terms of the
legislation will be used in a way that is conceivably con-
sistent with the letter but not the spirit of the legisla-
tion as in type seven above. And, to take one more example,
the more imprecise the terms of the legislation the more
likely some unscrupulous lawyer may try to use a strained
interpretation of those terms to support some frivolous
lawsuit as in type eight.
Appropriately Limited Discretion
In Statesman, Plato writes that "the law cannot
comprehend exactly what is the noblest or most just, or
at once ordain what is best for all" and this is because of
"the difference of men and action, and the endless and
irregular movement of human things. . . ,"47 This limita-
tion of law--that how it should be applied in any one
instance is not always readily apparent--which Plato, and
many others, have observed suggests that successful legis-
lation is legislation in which appropriately limited dis-
cre.tion is granted to those charged with enforcing the law.
Discretion granted under an enactment to the enforcers of
the enactment enables those enforcers to do justice by
47 Quoted in Luis Kutner, "Commentary: A Trilogy on
Great Philosophers in the Law," Marquette Law Review 55 no. 2
(Spring 1972):260.
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applying the enactment in a flexible manner best suited
to the exigencies of any one of innumerable situations
that might arise.
On the other hand, discretion should not be unbri-
dled and, therefore, it is "appropriately limited" discre-
tion that is an attribute of successful legislation. If
the discretion granted to the enforcers of an enactment
is not circumscribed, then, compared to the case in which
their discretion is limited, the enforcers have a greater
opportunity to use their discretion to turn the enactment
toward unintended ends such as in the type nine situation
described above in which state law enforcement agents
abuse their discretion under law. Furthermore, if the
discretion granted under a law is not carefully limited
and if the mechanism by which that law is enforced is
captured by opponents of the law, then those opponents
can use that unbounded discretion and that captured mech-
anism to turn the law toward completely unintended ends
as is true in the capture situations described in type
three above.
An Effective Compromise
Typically, a piece of legislation is enacted as a
result of compromise among legislators.48 An attribute of
48 William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American
Legislative Process: Congress and the States, 2nd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp.
500-503.
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successful legislation is that it is legislatioh in regard
to which an effective compromise has been reached. By an
effective compromise, I mean a compromire that does not
undermine significantly the overall purpose of the legis-
lation as that purpose is envisioned by the proponents of
the legislation.
When legislators are unable to hammer out an effec-
tive compromise regarding how the legislation is to work,
they may be forced to enact broad and vaguely written legis-
lation the meaning of which is left undetermined. As dis-
cussed above, such imprecision in the language of legislation
can increase the chances that a problem with unintended con-
sequences will arise.
Furthermore, an effective compromise as I have
defined it may not be reached because the proponents of the
legislation, as part of the compromise ultimately forged,
may agree unwittingly to include in the legislation pro-
visions which are fashioned by the opponent's of the legis-
lation and which ultimately undercut the fundamental purpose
of the legislation intended by the proponents. In short,
proponents of legislation sometimes make mistakes by
agreeing to include in their legislation provisions which
they do not expect to damage the legislation but which in
fact do become damaging. As a result of including such
provisions in the legislation it becomes self-inhibiting
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or self-destructive not unlike the legislation described
in type four above.
Equal Effect
Besides embodying an effective legislative compro-
mise, being composed of appropriately precise language and
bestowing appropriately limited discretion upon its enforcers,
another characteristic of successful legislation is that it
has the same effect, relatively speaking, on each individual.
In order to ensure that a piece of legislation has an equal
impact on all, in the relative sense, it may be necessary to
design the legislation in a way that makes some adjustment
for differences in human wealth and skills. For example,
so that they do not deprive the poor of the funds needed to
purchase the basic necessities of life and otherwise affect
the poor in relatively the same way as they affect the rich,
tax laws are designed generally to have the poor pay a lower
percentage of their income as tax than is true for the more
wealthy.
When legislative enactments of general application
are not designed to account for differences in the resources
citizens possess, then unintended consequences may follow
from such enactments. This is true in the type one situa-
tion where we saw that the burdens of the minimum wage legis-
lation can be shifted to teenagers who bring fewer skills to
the job market and who thus are the first to have their
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jobs sacrificed to support the higher rates for some
workers dictated by the minimum wage legislation. Further-
more, type six above, entitled "Laws with Unequal Impact,"
provides additional examples of unintended consequences
produced by legislation that fails to accommodate for the
material and other differences among individuals in a
capitalistic society.
Able to Accommodate Changes in Society
A fifth quality of successful legislation as I
define it here is that such legislation is either unaffected
by changes in society or is capable of having its meaning
adjusted to accommodate such changes without disregarding
or betraying its fundamental terms and purpose. An enact-
ment outlawing the running of red traffic lights is an
example of successful legislation that largely is unaffected
by changes in society. Such laws are obeyed typically in
a country regardless whether its citizens experience changes
in political or social views.
If a legislative enactment, however, involves not
a simple uncontroversial command like the outlawing of run-
ning red lights but rather involves a more complex and con-
troversial matter, then that enactment, if it is to survive
and succeed, must have a seamless quality that enables its
meaning to adjust or grow by logical extension as prevailing
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political and social beliefs held in a society change and
grow. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is often said to be an enactment the meaning
of which is capable of such growth. For example, as
Americans became less tolerant of racial segregation the
United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education,
extended the reach and meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause so as to hold that it outlawed segregation in pub-
lic schools. 49 Such an application of the Equal Protection
Clause no doubt was never specifically contemplated by the
enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment given the fact that
the Amendment was adopted some one hundred years before a
public school system was even developed. Yet, as others
have argued at length, the language of the Equal Protection
Clause is highly flexible language that appears to have
been designed to be capable of having its meaning logically
extended as views in society change. 50 If this is indeed
true, then the result in Brown does not seem surprising.
Rather, the result appears to be a mid-twentieth century
extension of the Clause which extension is consistent with
the notion of fundamental equality that has always been
embodied in the Clause.
49 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
50 John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1980), p. 14; Raoul Berger, p. 99.
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When legislative enactments are not capable of
having their meanings adjust to changes in society without
forsaking their original basi- purpose or are not unaffected
by such changes, then, as society changes, such enactments
will suffer one of two fates. Either they are ignored and
thus become dead letter law or, because of the pressures
arising from the changes in society, their language is
twisted mercilessly toward ends that were not intended by
their enactors but which are consistent with the changes
in society. Enactments which are directed, as society
changes over'time, toward unintended ends are described
above in type two entitled "Laws and Their Long Run Trans-
formations."
Respect Engendering
It is not the police or other enforcement agents
but rather respect for the law in general that causes most
citizens to abide by the terms of a particular law. 5 1 To
successfully achieve its goal, a final attribute that an
enactment should have is that it should be capable of
commanding respect. It seems probable that, compared to
respected laws, laws which are not respected are more
likely to be put to unintended uses such as the abusive
uses of law by lawyers described in type eight above.or the
51Harrell R. Rcdgers, Jr. and Charles S. Bullock,
Law and Social Change: Civil Rights Laws and Their Conse-
quences (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1972), p. 183.
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abusive uses of law by state law enforcement officials
described in type 9 above. For example, is it not more
likely that an enforcement agent will attempt to abuse
his or her discretion in regard to the enforcement of
marijuana laws which generally command little respect
in the community than abuse his or her discretion in
regard to enforcement of much respected murder laws.
Abuse of the marijuana laws seems more probable because
in so doing the enforcement agent does not risk being
subjected to the moral outrage which might follow his
or her abuse of the murder law should that abuse be
discovered.
CHAPTER IV
LITIGATION AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
As is detailed in earlier chapters, litigation
has been a favorite tool of law reformers. This chapter
suggests that, in light of problems with unintended con-
sequences, litigation as a reform tool has been held in
too high regard by reformers. Seven types of unintended
consequences that can flow from litigation are presented
below. The discussion of each type includes a description
of the type, examples of it, and, where necessary, some
explanation of how the types differ from one another.
The chapter closes with a discussion that shows how unin-
tended consequences can arise from litigation when the
litigation lacks one or more of the typical attributes of
successful litigation.
Litigation and Unintended Consequences: A Typology
Type One: Cases Exacerbating a Problem
In the type one situation the plaintiff initiates
litigation in order to remedy a perceived problem but the
unintended effect of the litigation is that it ends up
aggravating the problem under attack. A case drawn from
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my own experience as a trial lawyer for the United States
Department of Labor provides an example of this type of
unintended consequence produced by litigation.
The case in question was based upon an investiga-
tion by field representatives of the Department of Labor.
The investigation showed that an Oklahoma City ambulance
company was failing to pay its employees the minimum wages
and overtime pay required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.1
Following the investigation, I instituted a suit in federal
district court against the ambulance company. In the suit,
the Department of Labor sought injunctive relief requiring
the ambulance company to pay minimum wages and overtime in
the future and ordering the company to pay back wages to
past and present employees. The back wages sought were in
an amount equal to the difference between the wages employ-
ees actually had been receiving and the wages they should
have received had they been paid the minimum wages and
overtime required by law. In short, the suit was intended
to raise wages, retrospectively and prospectively, for a
group of employees.
As a result of the investigation and suit, the
ambulance company did begin paying its current employees
the higher wages necessary to comply with the minimum wage
129 U.S.C. 201 et seq.
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and overtime provisions of the law. Not long after this
change, however, the ambulance company went bankrupt
because of the adde-d wage, expenses it had to shoulder.
Thus, through an investigation and suit which were intended
to raise wage levels for the employees of the ambulance
company, the Department of Labor managed to aggravate the
problem of low wages for those employees by forcing their
employer out of business and thereby leaving those employees
without wages of any kind. To make matters worse, most of
the employees who worked for the ambulance company were not
easily reemployed. Many were students or workers moonlight-
ing for extra income. These individuals found to their
liking the twenty-four hours on--twenty-four hours off
work schedule of the ambulance company under which part
of the time for which they were paid actually was spent
sleeping while they awaited infrequent night time emergency
calls for ambulance service.
Furthermore, the unintended effects of the case
were not limited to aggravating the low wage problem of
the ambulance company employees by causing the employees
to lose their jobs entirely when their employer went bank-
rupt. The ambulances that the company used were repossessed
by a bank and no similar service reopened. Thus, another
unintended consequence of the case was that, after the
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company that was the subject of the suit became defunct,
Oklahoma City was left with just one operating ambulance
service. At least one state senator suggested publicly
that the reduction in ambulance service that followed the
closing of the company in the suit presented a life threat-
ening situation for those who required ambulance service
in the Oklahoma City area.
Type Two: Cases Producing an Ambiguous Outcome
In the type two situation, the unintended effect
of the litigation is that while the plaintiff receives a
favorable decision on paper, as a practical matter the
litigation has a highly ambiguous outcome. A lawyer with
Greater Boston Legal Services described a case, entitled
Cornelius v. Minter,2 in which there arose this problem of
a cloud of ambiguity and confusion appearing regarding the
actual effects of an ostensibly successful suit.
In Cornelius, the named plaintiff and a class of
similarly situated individuals brought suit against the
State Commissioner of Public Welfare and the State Secre-
tary of the Office of Human Services alleging that these
defendants had failed to provide essential and supportive
welfare services with reasonable promptness in violation
1974).
2 Cornelius v. Minter, 395 F. Supp. 616 (D. Mass.,
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of the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
The facts in the case showed that plaintiff and the class
she represented were so-called "uncovered" welfare cases
in that no specific social workers were assigned to those
cases to process requests for welfare services while in
"covered" cases specific social workers were assigned.
The facts further showed that when an applicant's case was
covered the applicant generally received welfare services
for which he or she was eligible in as short a time as two
to three weeks while applicants, such as the plaintiff and
her class, whose cases were uncovered had to wait two to
six months to receive requested services.
In ruling on the case, the court found that defen-
dants' practices regarding uncovered cases violated the
requirement of the Social Security Act that services be
provided with "reasonable promptness". In fashioning its
relief, the court issued an order directing defendants to
reform their ways and setting up specific time require-
ments for delivery of welfare services. The court's order
also made an attempt to set up a mechanism to monitor
defendants' compliance with the time requirements by direct-
that certain data be made available showing the time periods
within which requests for services were being handled.
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When I discussed Cornelius with the attorney handling
the case, she indicated that, despite the court's attempt to
deal with the monitoring problem by requiring defendants to
produce certain data periodically, there has been doubt
regarding whether defendants have been complying with the
standards for "reasonable promptness" set out in the court's
order. Apparently for at least part of the time after the
order was issued, defendants were not technically able to
provide the information required by the court regarding the
promptness with which they handle requests for welfare ser-
vices. After juggling computer programs defendants were able
to come up with the data, but plaintiffs' attorney indicated
to me at the time that the data may be unreliable.
Furthermore, the confusion about the defendants'
compliance with the time limits set in the court's order
seems inescapable given the type of key defendant--a
large bureaucracy--involved in the case. To be effective,
an order to deliver services with reasonable promptness
must filter down into the lower levels of the bureau-
cracy to the workers who actually provide services. At
these lower levels the number of workers implementing
the order is great as are the number of everyday worker
actions or decisions that are affected by the order. Given
the large number of workers and the large number of their
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actions and decisions that are affected by the order,
monitoring compliance with the order becomes virtually
impossible. It simply is not possible to have someone
looking over each worker's shoulder to insure that he
or she complies with the order. Thus, in this situation,
the unintended effect of the litigation from the plain-
tiff's perspective is that while plaintiff has won the
case on paper, as a matter of fact there can be a cloud
of ambiguity as to whether the litigation actually has
had the desired result.
Similarly, Handler describes a case the consequences
of which apparently have been largely unclear. According
to Handler, the Wildnerness Society brought suit under the
National Environmental Policy Act against the Trans-Alaskan
lipeline Group, a collection of oil companies that had
been granted a license to construct the trans-Alaskan
oil pipeline. The court issued a temporary injunction
halting construction of the pipeline until the outcome of
the litigation was determine. During the litigation, the
parties negotiated various settlement stipulations. These
stipulations set detailed standards for the design, con-
struction and maintenance of the pipeline all of which
seemed to limit the potential for environmental damage.
The stipulations also required the Alyeska Pipeline Service
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Company, representing the oil companies, and certain state
and federal agencies, to take actions to ensure compliance
with the various agreements in the stipulations. 3
From the outset there were reports that the envi-
ronmental standards set by the stipulations were being
violated. Overall, however, it appears that the conse-
quences of the stipulations were frequently unclear or
wholly unknown. A General Accounting Office report deter-
mined that two-thirds of the pipeline construction activity
was not seen by the federal agencies charged with oversight
responsibilities pursuant to the stipulations. The envi-
ronmentalists themselves tried to determine whether there
was compliance with the stipulations but the environmental-
ists reportedly were refused access to and information
regarding the construction activity. As Handler writes,
the reformers "lacked the technical, professional, and
financial resources to follow-up" and ensure that the stip-
ulations were being implemented.4
The problem of unclear consequences in ostensibly
successful litigation, however, appears in this case not
only because of a lack of resources for oversight and a
3Joel F. Handler, Social Movements and the Legal
System, A Theory of Law Reform and Social Change (New York:
Academic Press, 1978), p. 43.
4Ibid.
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lack of cooperation among the parties; it appears also
because it seems to inhere in the complexity of the issues
involved in the suit. The stipulations of the parties
called for construction plans that were "technically
complex" and implementation of the plans required "discre-
tionary decisions" made at the "lower levels of bureau-
cracy." Just as it was virtually impossible for the
plaintiffs in the preceding case to monitor all of the
individuals affected by the court's order to provide wel-
fare services with reasonable promptness, in the present
case the great complexity and large number of discretionary
decisions entailed in construction of the pipeline made it
virtually impossible for the environmental reformers, what-
ever their resources, to have monitored the environmental
impact of all those discretionary decisions. And, of
course, the whole monitoring situation was made worse by
the fact that construction was taking place in the far away
and bitterly cold tundra. As a result of all of these
factors, there necessarily has been doubt about the actual
effects of the litigation.
Type Three: Cases Prompting Their Own
Reversal by the Legislature
In type three the unintended outcome of the litiga-
tion is that the court's ruling in the litigation prompts
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the legislature to reverse that ruling. This was the
fate of a ruling in a case, styled Robinson v. Pratt,
which was b1rought by the Elderly Unit of Greater Boston
Legal Services and which was described to me by the
Director and Senior Attorney of the Unit.5
In Robinson, plaintiff filed a class action
seeking to set aside the "transfer of assets" regulation
of the Massachusetts medical assistance program. This
regulation required the withholding of Medicaid assistance
from applicants who, at any time within one year immedi-
ately prior to the filing of an application, had made an
assignment or transfer of real or personal property for
the purpose of rendering himself or herself eligible for
such assistance. Plaintiffs claimed that in denying them
Medicaid assistance, the Massachusetts regulation violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs further claimed that the regulation unlawfully
created additional eligibility requirements not authorized
by the federal Medicaid statutory scheme under which the
Massachusetts program is funded and operated. The court
agreed with the latter claim and eventually issued an order
5Robinson v. Pratt, 497 F. Supp. 116 (D. Mass.,
1980).
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directing the federal government (i.e. the Secretary of
Health and Human Services) to take action to ensure that
the Massachusetts regulation would be taken out of operation.
The attorneys in the Elderly Unit report, however,
that the ruling in Robinson v. Pratt, perhaps in conjunc-
tion with the rulings in similar cases in two other states,
prompted Congress to reverse those rulings. Specifically,
Congress amended the federal Medicaid law so that it
authorized "transfer of assets" rules such as the rule
that had been in effect in Massachusetts. Furthermore,
while the Massachusetts rule had withheld Medicaid benefits
from any applicant who had transferred assets within a one
year period prior to the date of the Medicaid application,
the new rule adopted by Congress prohibited the awarding
of benefits to anyone who had transferred assets within
two years prior to the Medicaid application.
Like Robinson v. Pratt, other court rulings over
the years have had the unintended effect of triggering
their own reversals. As part of a somewhat broader study,
Dahl examined fifteen cases involving major policy decisions
in which the Supreme Court of the United States declared
legislation unconstitutional within four years of the date
each piece of legislation at issue had been adopted. Of
the rulings in these fifteen cases, ten rulings prompted
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their own reversal by Congressional action. Furthermore,
as Dahl reports, some of the battles between the Supreme
Court and Congress over particular rulings were extended
battles involving a series of reversals. For example, in
1918 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a child
labor law that Congress had enacted under its commerce
clause power. The ruling prompted Congress to pass imme-
diately a new child labor law this time based on the tax
power rather than the commerce clause power. The Supreme
Court set aside this new law in a 1922 case. This 1922
ruling triggered an attempt to pass a constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting child labor. The amendment failed but in
1938 a third child labor law was enacted by Congress and
this third edition withstood constitutional challenge. 6
In very recent times, various suits have uninten-
tionally prompted the Reagan Administration to try to undo
the rulings in those suits by legislative action. For
example, consider a suit brought by the Sierra Club in
connection with antipollution standards for coal-fired
power plants. In the case, the Sierra Club established
the precedent that, despite losing its case, a party could
recover attorneys fees from the Government if the suit for
6Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," Journal of
Public Law, 6 (1957) :275.
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which fees are sought aided in the interpretation and
development of federal law. The Reagan Administration
responded to this precedent by introducing legislation
that would prohibit a party who lost its case against the
Government from recovering attorneys fees from the Govern-
ment regardless whether the case helped clarify important
law.7
The rulings in various recently decided contro-
versial suits have also unintentionally triggered attempts
by Reagan opponents to reverse those rulings by means of
legislation. For instance, the Supreme Court's 1984 ruling
in Grove City College v. Bell has led to attempts by the
Reagan opposition to overturn that ruling by enactment of
the "Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985."8 In Grove
City College, the Supreme Court held that 1972 legislation
banning sex discrimination by educational institutions
receiving federal funds applies only to the specific pro-
gram receiving the funds, not to the entire institution.
Type Four: Cases of Evasive Noncompliance
In the type four situation the unintended effect
of litigation is that it triggers a pattern of evasive
7New York Times, 25 August 1982, p. A18.
83oston Globe, 25 January 1985, p. 3; Boston Globe,
28 September 1984, p. 3; Grove City College v. Bell, 104
S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
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noncompliance with the court's ruling by the losing party
so that the ruling is rendered almost useless to the pre-
vailing party. A good example of this problem is furnished
by a case I brought as an attorney for the U.S. Department
of Labor.
Because the tactics adopted to evade the court's
order show the individual involved in the case in such
an unflattering light, I will refrain from using his
name or the name of his companies even though the case
is published and a matter of public record. In this
case, a highly educated individual was charged in
1968 with failure to pay his employees, at what I will
call Company A, the minimum wages and overtime compen-
sation required by law. Company A was engaged in
the provision of extermination and janitorial ser-
vices and employed a large number of individuals in the
southern part of Texas. The court found that the individ-
ual in question, acting through Company A, indeed had not
paid his employees the wages required by law and issued an
injunction ordering payment of past wages due and requiring
Company A to pay minimum wages and overtime in the future
to its employees. Several years later, in 1975, the same
individual was again investigated and again found by the
Labor Department to be in violation of the minimum wage
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and overtime law. He apparently had attempted to evade
compliance with the law by dissolving Company A and creating
a new business, hereinafter referred to as Company B. Com-
pany B provided basically the same services as Company A
except that Company B added several new operations. Com-
pany B also paid its employees pursuant to a complicated
new scheme that attempted to pay janitors and exterminators
on a commission basis. Suit was filed against Company B
and the court decided the case in 1977. The court found
that the new pay scheme was a subterfuge to evade the mini-
mum wage law and issued an injunction against both the
individual and Company B and further ordered them to pay
wages due their employees. In 1980, after I left the
Department of Labor, the same individual and Company B
were again found in violation of the minimum wage law and
were again required to pay back wages to their employees.
This time the individual in question was also held in
contempt of court.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the individ-
ual involved continued over a twelve year period to cheat his
employees by depriving them of part of their wages until a
court ordered him to pay. In effect, therefore, by forming
a new corporation, designing new pay schemes and otherwise
taking seemingly evasive actions, this individual managed
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to render almost meaningless those parts of the courts'
orders that required him to pay promptly, each and every
work week, the minimum wage and overtime required by law.
The famous white primary cases are another example
of litigation the unintended effect of which is that it
does little more than trigger a pattern of evasive noncom-
pliance with a court ruling by the losing party such that
the ruling is rendered almost meaningless. In the white
primary cases, however, the evasive actions were taken by
a group of officials of the Texas Democratic Party and
others rather than by a single individual as in the pre-
vious example.
The first white primary case was Nixon v. Herndon
in which the Supreme Court held that a state law banning
blacks from the primaries violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 9 The protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, how-
ever, are available to individuals only in regard to actions
by the state. The State of Texas, therefore, attempted to
turn the primaries into private rather than state matters
by giving the state political parties the power to deter-
mine who should vote in primaries. Upon receiving this
power, the Texas Democratic Party's executive committee
immediately issued a rule which provided that only whites
9Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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could vote. Undaunted, the plaintiff in the first case,
Dr. A.L. Nixon, initiated the second white primary case,
entitled Nixon v. Condon.10 Again the Supreme Court found
that Dr. Nixon's exclusion from the primaries violated the
Constitution. The Court reasoned that, though the primary
was conducted by a private entity, the executive committee
of the Texas Democratic Party, that committee was so entan-
gled with the state that its actions constituted state
action and thus the protections of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment could be invoked to overturn the committee's rule
excluding blacks.
But the Texas Democratic Party too was unwilling
to give up. A few weeks after the 1932 decision in Nixon
v. Condon, the Texas Democratic Party called a convention
and, instead of relying on a rule of its executive committee,
which the Court had found to be entangled with the state,
the Party instead adopted a resolution of the entire con-
vention that likewise excluded blacks from the primaries.
Thus, once again Dr. Nixon could not vote in a primary. As
a result of the action taken at the convention, a third
white primary case was filed, this time by one William
Grovey, and the case was decided in 1936.11 It was, however,
1 ONixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)..
llGrovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1936).
211
for various reasons, even less successful than Dr. Nixon's
efforts, which you will recall, had begun some ten years
earlier. These white primary cases thus show how evasive
noncompliance with a court order by the losing party can
be the unintended outcome of litigation from the perspec-
tive of an ostensibly successful party such as Dr. Nixon.
Type Five: Cases of Late Relief
In type five the unintended effect of litiigation
is that a ruling favorable to a party is rendered meaning-
less though not, as in type four, because the ruling is
evaded by the losing party but simply because the ruling
comes so long after the events that gave rise to the liti-
gation.
A case I handled at the U.S. Department of Labor,
entitled Secretary of Labor v. Lincoln School District,
demonstrates this type of unintended effect. 12 In Lincoln
School District, the Labor Department filed suit on behalf
of four cafeteria workers claiming that the workers had
been discharged for exercising rights protected by federal
statute. The discharge by the defendant school district
had taken effect on May 13, 1975. After trial, the federal
12Secretarv of Labor v. Lincoln School District,
600 F. 2d 147 (8th Cir., 1979), cert. denied, 87 LC 7, 861.
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district court ruled that the women had been dismissed as
part of a planned reduction-in-force and not because they
had exercised federally protected rights. The Labor
Department appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. After arguments, the Eighth Circuit
ruled on June 7, 1979, that indeed the cafeteria workers'
discharge had been for exercising rights protected by fed-
eral law and that thus the workers were entitled to rein-
statement in their former jobs and to back pay. The four
cafeteria workers had asked the Labor Department to bring
suit primarily in the hope of getting their former jobs
back. When the reinstatement order was finally granted
more than four years had elapsed. By that time all of the
workers, as a matter of financial necessity, had obtained
other work and were no longer interested in going back to
the cafeteria. Thus, because the courts moved so slowly
in granting relief, by the time the relief was granted a
significant portion of it--the reinstatement--no longer
had much value to those who had initiated the suit.
Horowitz describes another case the unintended
effect of which apparently was that the relief granted
came so late after the case was initiated that that relief
virtually was meaningless. In this case described by
Horowitz, entitled North City Area-Wide Council v. Rcmney,
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an organization, however, was the party adversely affected
by the lateness of the relief rather than individuals such
as the cafeteria workers in the preceding case. 1 3 In North
City Area-Wide Council, plaintiff brought suit to define
the meaning of the "citizen participation" requirement of
the Model Cities program and to secure an order designating
it as the sole citizen participation organization for the
north Philadelphia Model Cities program. Several trips to
the courts of appeal were made and thus some three years
elapsed before plaintiff, the Area-Wide Council, got the
relief it was after. By this time the Council itself was
in shambles. While the suit was pending, one of defendant's
regional field officers had lured several of the Council's
members into a rival group that had begun assuming an active
role in the Model Cities program. Thus, the Council obtained
the relief it wanted but, because the courts had granted that
relief in such an untimely manner, by the time the relief
was secured the Council had fallen apart and lacked the
strength to use the relief in any worthwhile manner.
A well publicized ongoing case brought by miners in
McArthur, Ohio seems to be developing along lines similar to
the North City Area-Wide Council case. In the miners' suit,
1 3Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 68.
214
the miners claim that their employer's unfair electioneer-
ing practices impeded efforts to organize a union. Just
as in the North City Area-Wide Council case the Council
had to wait a long period for a favorable ruling, so too
the miners, several years after initiating their case, are
continuing to wait for a final ruling. And, just as the
unintended effect of the litigation in the North City Area-
Wide Council case was that the Council could not use the
favorable ruling in the litigation to the Council's advan-
tage because the ruling came so late that by the time it
was issued the Council had fallen apart, so too it appears
that the miners' litigation will come to the same end.
According to newspaper accounts, the union, at this late
date after it instituted litigation, "has no strength" and
thus if it receives a favorable decision in its litigation
the decision apparently will be useless to the union
because it lacks the wherewithal to use such a decision
advantageously. 1 4
Type Six: Cases that Precipitate Threats of
Violence or Actual Violence
In the type six situation the unintended effect of
litigation is that it triggers violence or threats of violence
by the losing party in the litigation.
14 New York Times, 27 July 1984, p. A8.
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No lengthy discussion of examples of this type of
unintended outcome of litigation is necessary. We are all
familiar with much publicized instances of litigation that
produce violence such as the Boston desegregation suit.
The problem, however, does not appear to be limited to a
few highly visible cases. Discussions with other lawyers
and my own experience suggest that threats and violence
are not an infrequent part of litigation. Nor is the pro-
blem limited to suits of wide concern such as a suit to
desegregate the entire school system of a large city.
For example, the lawyers at the Boston Housing Authority
(BHA) who are involved in instituting legal proceedings
to evict individual drug dealing or otherwise lawbreaking
tenants from public housing units, report that these legal
proceedings sometimes result in numerous threats of vio-
lence by the tenant against BHA officials. Threats of
violence also were made by several of the individual
employers who were defendants in otherwise routine mini-
mum wage cases that I brought on behalf of the Department
of Labor.
It is extremely distressing that threats of vio-
lence and actual violence at times are the unintended
effect of litigation. The threats and the violence are,
of course, themselves distressing. For example, many
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Americans were appalled to watch on television as innocent
children suffered injuries in the violence resulting from
the Boston desegregation suit. The threats and violence
that sometimes are precipitated by litigation are distress-
ing also because they signal that a fellow citizen has
chosen to abandon one of the processes that must be relied
upon by all if we are to be a truly civilized society--the
process of resolving disputes without recourse to violence.
Finally, the violence or threats that at times are the
unintended outcome of litigation are distressing because
of what they encourage. Enduring threats of violence or
actual violence is a high price for an individual to pay
for vindication in our courts of his or her rights. When
such a price is extracted from those who seek justice
through the courts, we encourage those individuals to
themselves cast aside the courts and to take up violence
as the means to achieve their ends.
Type Seven: Cases Producing a Domino Effect
in the type seVen situation the unintended outcome
of the litigation is that the ruling in the litigation not
only prompts the subject of the litigation to comply with
the law or to take some action but also prompts other
entities, not a party to the suit, to comply with that
law or to take that action. Thus in this situation a
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plaintiff might file suit against Company One with the
sole purpose of obtaining a court ruling requiring Com-
pany One to comply with Law A. But the unintended conse-
quence of the suit is that Companies Two, Three, and Four,
who are not parties to the suit, upon observing the out-
come of the suit, begin to comply with Law A.
This type seven situation should be distinguished
from the so-called test case. Unlike in the type seven
situation, in a test case the party initiating the suit
actually intends that the ruling in the suit result in
compliance with a particular law not only by the party
defending the suit but also by other similarly suited non-
party entities against whom a suit of the same kind could
be brought.
My experience at the Labor Department provides an
example of the type seven situation. While at the Labor
Department, I initiated a suit against Exxon Corporation
alleging that Exxon had forced nine individuals to retire
early because of their age in violation of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act. 1 5 For a period of more than
a year, the litigation was contested hotly with considerable
discovery being undertaken by each side. As the case pro-
ceeded, the Labor Department obtained a successful result
1529 U.S.C. 621 et seq.
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in an age discrimination case which was wholly unrelated
to the Exxon suit and which took place in a different
state than the Exxon suit. This other case had been
brought by the Labor Department against Sandia Corporation
for the purpose of obtaining a court ruling setting aside
a Sandia Corporation reduction in force which the Labor
Department contended was implemented in an age discrimina-
tory manner. Upon learning of the Sandia case, an attor-
ney for Exxon took what in my experience is the unusual
step of visiting the court where the Sandia case had been
heard.in order to review the pleadings in the case. Exxon
lawyers, after reviewing the Sandia case pleadings, appar-
ently were impressed by the extent of the effort made by
the Labor Department in the Sandia case for shortly after
the review of those pleadings Exxon.lawyers began-serious
settlement discussions in the Exxon case for the first
time. These settlement discussions resulted in Exxon
agreeing to pay $375,000.00 in lost wages to the nine
individuals on whose behalf the Labor Department had ini-
tiated the Exxon suit. Though the Sandia age discrimina-
tion case was not expected or designed by Labor Department
lawyers to affect the Exxon age discrimination case in any
manner, I believe that an unintended outcome of the Sandia
case was that it had a kind of domino effect on Exxon in
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the sense that the Labor Department's impressive work in
the Sandia case helped persuade Exxon to give up its battle
with the Labor Department and to come into compliance with
the age discrimination law by agreeing to settle the Exxon
case by paying lost wages to the affected employees.
"Typically Successful" Litigation vs. Litigation
±,roducing Unintended Consequences
Drawing upon my own observations and upon the
observations of distinguished observers of litigation, I
set out below various characteristics of the "typical"
piece of successful litigation. These characteristics of
successful litigation are identified and discussed in order
to show how the absence in a piece of litigation of one
such characteristic can contribute to the appearance of
unintended consequences of the types described above.
Attention to Consequences As Well As Rights
Many have observed that lawyers and judges have a
tendency in their work to focus on rights rather than con-
sequences.1 6 Lawyers, by training, are rights oriented.
Lawyers analyze problems in terms of the rights of clients.
Lawyers focus on securing those rights while typically
1 6 Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Law-
yers, Public Policy and Political Change (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974), chap. 10.
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giving little consideration to any side effect that might
arise in the process. Judges behave in a similar manner.
In reaching a decision in a case, judges primarily focus
on the rights of the respective parties. Only secondarily,
if at all, do judges pause to consider the consequences of
their decisions.
A way of highlighting the preoccupation of lawyers
with rights is to compare the analytical frameworks lawyers
bring to their work with the frameworks employed by other
professionals. 1 7 For example, one of the intellectual
techniques that a wide range of professional social scien-
tists now use is the cost-benefit method of analysis. Sim-
ply stated, under the cost-benefit method, the social
scientist piles up the potential costs of a course of
action, including negative consequences, on one side of
the scale and the potential benefits, including positive
spillover effects, on the other side. Intervention by
means of the course of action under consideration is jus-
tified only if, overall, the scales are tipped to the
benefit side. Lawyers attempt no such balancing act.
They madly dash ahead seeking to secure rights without
pausing to consider the wide range of potential consequences.18
1 7Horowitz, chaps. 2 and 7.
18 Ibid.
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The preoccupation with rights shown by lawyers
and judges is not at all very surprising given that in
the American system of justice the outcome of litigation
is supposed to be determined by the respective rights
of the parties. Successful litigation, however, is liti-
gation in which attention is given, as appropriate, to
consequences as well as rights, particularly in connection
with the remedy stage of the litigation. This giving
attention to consequences can mean various things for the
prevailing party in the litigation and for his or her law-
yer. For example, it can mean that prior to filing the
litigation they pondered the potentially resource exhaust-
ing effects of engaging in the litigation process and,
therefore, as necessary, planned action to bolster resources.
Or, to take another example, giving attention to consequences
can mean that the prevailing party and his or her lawyer
have pondered the possible effects, including unintended
effects, that might arise from a remedial order securing
the rights of the prevailing party and thus, as necessary,
the prevailing party and his or her lawyer have devised a
scheme to monitor the effects of the order. And, insofar
as judges are concerned, giving attention to consequences
primarily means that once a judge, by analyzing the rights
of the respective parties, has determined who should prevail
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in the litigation, the judge considers the possible effects
of constructing the remedial order in favor of the prevail-
ing party in one way as opposed to another.
If the lawyers, parties and judges engaged in liti-
gation do not give attention to consequences as well as
rights, unintended effects can arise from the litigation.
For example, in the ambulance company minimum wage case
which was discussed above in type one, the individual who
initially registered with the Labor Department the under-
lying minimum wage complaint that resulted in the suit
against the ambulance company did not give much attention
to the potential range of consequences of securing the
minimum wage rights of the employees of the ambulance
company in question. Nor did the Labor Department lawyers
who filed the case give much attention to the potential
consequences of the case. As a result, legal action was
initiated that unintentionally exacerbated rather than
aided the problems of those employees. Specifically, as
indicated previously, the employees low wages temporarily
were raised to the minimum in response to the suit but
ultimately fell to zero when the employees lost their jobs.
The jobs were lost because the employer had to close the
business and file for bankruptcy due to the employer's
inability to meet the higher wage expenses dictated by the
suit.
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Sufficient Resources to Monitor Consequences
For litigation to be successful it is not enough
to give attention to the potential unintended corsequences
of the litigation and to plan to monitor those consequences.
Rather, for the litigation to be successful typically there
also must be sufficient resources to actually implement a
monitoring plan.1 9 The kind of monitoring resources needed
in any particular case depends upon the circumstances. For
example, if the case simply involves an order directing A
to make a one-time payment to B of $1,000.00, then no sig-
nificant monitoring resources are required. B himself or
herself knows whether he or she has received the $1,000.00
payment. The only resource required to insure compliance
with the order is sufficient funds to pay a lawyer to
force A back into court if A does not make the payment
promptly to B. By comparison, greater resources and
expenses can be required for monitoring in some cases.
Thus, for example, in a school desegregation case it is
useful to have the services of a statistician who can
track whether the racial mix of students is increasing in
the school system following an order to desegregate.
Unintended consequences can result from litigation
if there are insufficient resources to monitor the effects
1 9Handler, p. 25.
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of the litigation and to call those effects to the atten-
tion of the court. For example, if there are insufficient
resources to monitor the outcome of litigation, an unin-
tended result can be that the litigation does little more
than trigger a pattern of evasive noncompliance with the
order such as the evasive noncompliance demonstrated in
the Company A and Company B minimum wage case and in the
white primary cases described in type four above.
A Party That Actually Can Be Monitored
Besides the attention that the prevailing parties
give to the consequences of the litigation and the avail-
ability of sufficient resources to implement a plan to
monitor those consequences, a third characteristic of suc-
cessful litigation is that typically the party that is
required to take some action pursuant to the court's order
in the litigation is a party that actually can be monitored
by the prevailing party in the litigation.2 0 If the party
compelled by the court's order to take action is made up
of the numerous employees of a large bureaucracy, then
ordinarily that party cannot be monitored by the prevailing
party even if the prevailing party has considerable
resources available for monitoring. This is so because,
20 Handler, p. 18.
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as previously discussed, it is wholly impractical to have
an individual looking over the shoulder of each of the
numerous employees of a large bureaucracy for the purpose
of trying to determine if each such employee is complying
with the court's order. Attempts to overcome the problems
associated with monitoring a party made up of the employees
of a large bureaucracy usually consist of requiring the
employees to file reports showing that certain actions
have been taken. Such reports, however, are fabricated
easily.
Unintended consequences can result from litigation
in which the party required to take action under the court's
order in the litigation is a party not susceptible to moni-
toring because that party is made up of the numerous workers
of a large bureaucracy. For example, in type two above,
we saw litigation involving the employees of a large bureau-
cracy in which an unintended effect of the litigation was
that a cloud of ambiguity had arisen regarding whether the
employees were carrying out the court's order in the case
requiring that the employees provide welfare services with
reasonable promptness.
A Kind of Action That Can Be Monitored
In successful litigation, not only is the party
compelled by the court to take some action typically a
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party of the type that can be monitored by the prevailing
party in the case, but also the kind of action taken under
the order is action of the type that can be monitored
effectively.21 If the action which must be taken under
the court order is a long term course of conduct entailing
numerous and regular discretionary decisions, then moni-
toring of such action by the prevailing party virtually is
impossible. This is true even if ample resources for moni-
toring are available to the prevailing party and even if
the party that is to be monitored is a single individual
rather than the numerous employees of a large bureaucracy.
Monitoring action involving even a single individual regu-
larly making numerous discretionary decisions usually is
impossible because monitoring such action requires having
someone participate daily in each discretionary decision
and over the long term this is not practical.
Unintended consequences can result from litigation
in which the action required to be taken under the court's
order in the litigation is action not monitored readily
because that action entails numerous and regular discre-
tionary decisions. For example, in type two above, we
saw that the unintended effect of an environmental protec-
tion case apparently was that considerable ambiguity arose
21 Ibid.
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regarding whether all reasonable measures to protect the
environment were attempted by the parties, who pursuant
to a court sanctioned agreement, were required to institute
environmental safeguards in constructing the Alaskan oil
pipeline. This apparent ambiguity, concerning whether all
reasonable environmental protection measures.were taken,
arose because so many not easily monitored discretionary
decisions, it turned out, were involved in the actions to
protect the environment required of particular parties
under the agreement.
Sufficient Resources to Withstand
the Hardships of Litigation
As already indicated above, for litigation to
be successful sufficient resources for mo.nitoring the
consequences of the litigation must be available to the
prevailing party. In addition, if the litigation is to
be successful the prevailing party must have sufficient
resources to withstand the hardships imposed by the
litigation process itself.
The burdens the litigation process places on the
litigants are well known. Ambrose Bierce perhaps best
imparted a sense of these burdens when he wrote that a
prospective litigant is a "person about to give up his
skin for the hope of retaining his bones." 2 2  Chief among
2 2Ambrose Bierce, The Enlarged Devil's Dictionary,
ed. Ernest J. Hopkins (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967),
p. 182.
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the specific hardships that litigants must endure is
doing without the relief sought in the case for the
several years it typically takes for litigation to come
to a conclusion. What is necessary to be able to sur-
vive without the relief sought in a case depends, of
course, on the nature of the relief itself. For example,
if the -relief sought is compensation in the form of a
sum of money, then in order to survive until this relief
arrives a litigant might need sufficient resources (e.g.
collateral) to borrow funds for the interim. Besides
having to survive, during the pendency of litigation,
without the relief sought in the case, another hardship
litigants must endure is the day-to-day expense that is
part of litigation. Though some very poor litigants can
obtain free legal assistance, most litigants must bear
the expenses associated with litigation at least until
those expenses are recovered, if at all, from the losing
party in the case. These litigation expenses typically
include attorneys fees, court filing fees, court transcript
and court reporter fees, witness fees and fees for investi-
gative and/or expert assistance. 23
Unintended consequences can result from litigation
in which a party has insufficient resources to withstand
2 3
.Boston Globe, 24 January 1983, p. 16.
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the burdens imposed by the litigation process itself.
Consider, for example, the Area-Wide Council case that
was discussed in type five above. It will be recalled
that the relief the Council sought in court was designa-
tion of the Council as the sole Model Cities citizen
participation group for North Philadelphia. The liti-
gation, however, dragged on and, therefore, the relief
sought was not immediately forthcoming. This denial of
the desired relief during the pendency of the protracted
litigation was a burden imposed by the litigation that
the Council could not shoulder. Without the designation
as a Model Cities citizen participation group, the Council
was unable to maintain the interest of its members and
thus the membership declined. Because the Council lacked
the resources to maintain its organizational strength in
face of a burden--in this case denial of the relief sought
during the pendency of the litigation--that is imposed
by the litigation process, the unintended effect of the
Council's case was that when the relief finally was
granted after years of litigation the Council lacked
the strength to use the relief in any advantageous manner.
No Predonimant Polycentric Elements
In his work, Professor Fuller discusses what he
calls "the polycentric situation" and the uneven results
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that can arise when action is taken in such a situa-
tion:
We may visualize this kind of situation by
thinking of a spider web. A pull on one
strand will distribute tensions after a
complicated pattern throughout the web as
a whole. Doubling the original pull will,
in all likelihood, not simply double each
of the resulting tensions but will rather
create a different complicated pattern of
tensions. This would certainly occur, for
example, if the doubled pull caused one or
more of the weaker strands to snap. This is
a "polycentric" situation because it is "many
centered"--each crossing of strands is a dis-
tinct center for distributing tensions.24
Fuller goes on to point out that "there are poly-
centric elements in almost all problems submitted to liti-
gation." He also implies that successful litigation is
litigation in which "the 'polycentric' elements" of the
problem submitted to litigation are not "so significant
and predominant that the proper limits of adjudication
have been reached." Fuller gives a hypothetical example of
litigation which probably would not be successful because
it involves a problem in which the polycentric elements
of the problem predominate:
Suppose, again it were decided to assign
players on a football team to their posi-
tions by a process of adjudication. I
assume that we would agree that this is
also an unwise application of adjudication.
24 Lon L. Fuller, "The Form and Limits of Adjudica-
tion," Harvard Law Review 92 (1978):395.
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It is not merely a matter of eleven differ-
ent men being possibly affected; each shift
of any one player might have a different set
of repercussions on the remaining players:
putting Jones in as quarterback would have
one set of carryover effects, putting him
in as left end, another. Here, again, we
are dealing with a situation of interacting
points of influence and therefore with a
polycentric problem beyond the proper limits
of adjudication.2 5
When the polycentric elements of the problem sub-
mitted to litigation are predominant, then not only is it
likely, as Fuller suggests, that the litigation will be
unsuccessful but also unintended consequences can result
from the litigation. For example, the earlier discussed
ambulance case that ended with unintended effects involved
a wage problem with predominant polycentric elements. The
ambulance company was a marginal business with little
operating reserve. Wage levels necessarily were tied
inextricably to other financial expenses that the ambu-
lance company faced including overhead expenses associated
with operating a business that had to provide service on
a twenty-four hour basis and expenses for payment of the
notes on the ambulances themselves. Because only very
limited reserve funds were available to meet unexpected
expenses, an increase in one category of expense meant a
corresponding decrease in payment on other financial
2 5 Ibid.
232
obligations. Thus, when the minimum wage suit forced
higher wage payments this had the unintended effect of
causing the ccmpany to reduce payments for other expenses
and the reduction in these other payments resulted, as
we have already discussed, in ambulances being repossessed
and eventually in the company being compelled to close its
doors in bankruptcy.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, THE
JUDICIARY AND LAW REFORM
This work suggests future research questions which
are described briefly below. Also following is a discus-
sion of the implications of this work for various theoret-
ical debates, the judiciary and law reform.
Questions for Future Research
As stated at the outset, this dissertation is
exploratory in nature. It seeks to make a preliminary
exploration of a subject that has not received much
attention. As part of this exploration, the subject of
law-related unintended consequences has been introduced,
methodological and conceptual issues in the study of
law-related unintended consequences have been examined
and different types of law-related unintended consequences
have been identified. From this groundwork completed in
the present study, new research projects can be launched.
Among the questions for future research that are logical
outgrowths of this dissertation are those questions
listed below.
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How Frequently Do Unintended Consequences Arise
In Connection With Legal Action and Are the
Unintended Consequences That Arise More
Often Negative Or Positive Consequences
Some writers have suggested that unintended conse-
quences arise frequently in the context of legal action.
For example, in regard to legal action in the form of legis-
lation Sally Falk Moore has written:
liuch legislation today either does not achieve
what it purports to set out to do, or when it
does achieve specified goals, also spins off
many side-effects that were not anticipated.
(Italics mine.)l
Such comments suggesting that unintended consequences com-
monly appear in connection with legal action are not backed
by any firm data. The necessary data could be compiled, how-
ever, by studying a sizeable representative sample of cases of
legal action. From an examination of a representative sample
of such cases, it would be possible to determine the percentage
of those cases in which unintended consequences had appeared.
Related to the question of how frequently law-related
unintended consequences arise is the question of whether those
that do arise are more frequently negative or positive conse-
quences from the perspective of those who initiated the action
producing the unintended consequences. Again, various indi-
viduals have opined on the subject. For example, Professor
Jones, in connection with law-related unintended consequences,
lSally Falk Moore, Law as Process (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 7.
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has written that: "My guess is that unintended consequences
are more likely to be negative rather than positive." 2 In
addition to indicating how frequently unintended consequences
arise in legal action, a study of a representative sample of
cases of legal action also could confirm or rebut the opin-
ions that have been ventured regarding whether unintended
consequences of legal action are more often positive or nega-
tive consequences.
What Causes Unintended Consequences
In Connection With Legal Action
Besides research that focused on the above questions,
other research for the future that would be a logical exten-
sion of the present work is research that attempts a more
careful examination of the question of what causes law-
related unintended consequences. As discussed in chapter 2,
determining what causes legal action to produce unintended
consequences is problematic. In this dissertation, I have
taken a first pass at the causation problem. I have dis-
cussed how the absence in legal action (i.e., legislation and
litigation) of particular attributes of typically successful
legal action can lead to unintended consequences. Thus, for
example, we saw that having sufficient resources for moni-
toring the outcome of litigation is an attribute of success-
ful litigation and that the absence of such monitoring
resources can'lead to unintended consequences.
2Harry W. Jones, The Efficacy of Law (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1968), p.. 42.
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More extensive studies of the causes of unintended
consequences of legal action than that undertaken in this work
clearly are possible and warranted. A potentially effective
approach is a comparative study of a particular example of
legal action that produced unintended consequences and of a
particular example of otherwise similar legal action that pro-
duced no unintended consequences. By comparing the features
of a legal action that produced unintended consequences to the
features of a legal action that did not produce any such con-
sequences, it may be possible to single out, in the action
that produced unintended consequences, those features of that
action which actually caused the unintended consequences.
Which Groups In Society Benefit Overall From the
Unintended Consequences of Legal Action
Which group, if any, benefits most from the unin-
tended consequences of legal action is a third question for
future research that follows naturally from a preliminary
study of unintended consequences such as the present work.
Do the rich or poor, the liberals or conservatives, blacks
or whites benefit most? The present study has implied that
those who seek. reform through legal action are not likely
to benefit from the unintended consequences of such action
but rather that the supporters of the status quo are likely
to benefit. Indeed, this has been my own experience and
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my experience has been confirmed informally in my conver-
sations with other lawyers. Nevertheless, data from a
study of a representative sample of cases of legal action
should be compiled in order to determine just who, if
anyone, benefits overall from the unintended consequences
of legal action.
Do Unintended Consequences Arise More Often In
Connection With Legal Action Involving One-Kind
Of Issue Rather Than Another Kind Of Issue
Still another future research question that logi-
cally arises out of the present work is whether unintended
consequences appear more often in connection with legal
action involving one type of issue as opposed to other
types of issues. For example, do unintended consequences
arise more often when the legal action involves housing
issues, or consumer issues, or civil rights issues? Once
again, a study of a representative sample of all types
of legal action might produce the data needed.
Implications For Specific Legal
Studies and Theories
In addition to suggesting future research questions
such as those outlined above, this work has implications
for specific fields of academic study relating to law and
legal institutions. For example, the basic premise of
this work--that legal action can result in unintended con-
sequences--has implications for the earlier mentioned
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emerging field of study known as judicial impact analysis.3
In seeking to determine the impact of judicial decisions,
practitioners of judicial impact analysis have focused on
whether judicial pronouncements actually are obeyed. Thus
Dolbeare and Hammond conducted an analysis of whether, in
a particular midwestern city, the local school system
implemented the U.S. Supreme Court's ban against prayer
in public schools. 4 The present work suggests, however,
that if practitioners of judicial impact analysis desire to
determine comprehensively the actual impact of judicial pro-
nouncements those practitioners must look beyond the issue
of whether the pronouncements are obeyed. These practi-
tioners must also begin to assess the impact of the untow-
ard effects that can arise even when the pronouncements are
obeyed.
Besides its implications for specific fields of
law-related study such as judicial impact analysis, this
work has implications for various theoretical debates
regarding the role that courts and judges should play in
society. One such debate primarily centers on whether
3 See, e.g., Stephen Wasby, The Impact of the
United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives (Homewood,
Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1970); Richard Johnson, The Dvnamics
of Comoliance (Evanston: Northwesterm University Press,
1967).
4 Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, The
School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Prac-
tice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
239
courts and judges should play an activist role in society,
meaning that they would intervene freely in issues of
public policy, or whether a more restrained role should
be assumed.5 Given, as shown in this dissertation, that
legal action can result in unintended consequences, the
widespread use of legal action to intervene in public
policy matters may no longer be a tenable suggestion.
Thus, the proponents of an activist role for courts may
want to reassess the pro-activist position.
Like the judicial activist-judicial restraint
debate, another theoretical debate regarding the role of
courts in society for which the present work has implica-
tions is the debate over the method of analysis that
courts should utilize in interpreting the Constitution.6
Some favor a strict constructionist approach in which
courts rely heavily on a narrow and consistent reading
of the Constitution itself to decide significant issues
5See, James B. Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law
Review 7 (1893): 129; Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962); C.L.
Black, The People and the Court (New York: MacMillan,
1960).
6Two major works that summarize and participate
in the debate are Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); and John Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(Cambridge, Pvass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
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in the development of legal doctrine. Others argue that
courts should have a free hand to read the language of
the Constitution broadly and, as conditions in society
change, to reinterpret that language perhaps even in a
manner inconsistent with earlier interpretations. In
light of the unintended consequences that this work has
shown can arise from legal action, the strict construc-
tionist approach seems a less acceptable alternative. As
Professor Fuller has written, courts must have the freedom
to reshape and clarify legal doctrines as the unforeseen
consequences of those doctrines become known.7 Courts are
less able to refine their doctrines, and in the process
eliminate the unintended effects of those doctrines, if,
as required by the strict constructionist approach, courts
must explain each doctrinal modification solely in terms
of narrow and logically consistent readings of the unchang-
ing language of the Constitution.
Implications For the Judiciary
While the present work has implications, as dis-
cussed above, for theoretical debates concerning the role
of courts in society, this work also has practical impli-
cations for judges in regard to their everyday duties as
7Lon L. Fuller, "The Form and Limits of Adjudica-
tion," Harvard Law Review 92 (1978): 398.
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decision makers. In view of the showing in this work
that unintended consequences can follow from legal action,
judges would be wise to begin to more carefully consider
whether the decisions they render daily are likely to
result in unintended consequences. Of course, as
Frankfurter has written, estimating in advance the con-
sequences of their decisions is among the most onerous
tasks judges face and it is a task to which they are not.
particularly well-suited:
A judge ... . should be compounded of the
faculties that are demanded of the historian
and the philosopher and the prophet. The
last demand upon him--to make some forecast
of the consequences of his action--is perhaps
the heaviest. To pierce the curtain of the
future, to give shape and visage to mysteries
still in the womb of time, is the gift of
imagination. It requires poetic sensibil-
ities with which judges are rarely endowed
and which their education does not normally
develop.8
Though estimating whether unintended consequences
might possibly arise from their decisions is not likely
to be easy for judges, the means for proceeding with such
an undertaking are not wholly unclear. For example, in
this work I have suggested that unintended consequences
can result from litigation if that litigation is missing
one of the features of typically successful litigation.
.
8Felix Frankfurter, Of Law and Men; Papers and
Addresses, 1939-1956, 1st ed., Edited by Philip Elman
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), p. 35.
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Judges can make an effort to determine the absence of
such features in any litigation and compensate accordingly.
Thus, if in rendering a decision a judge determines that,
unlike in typically successful litigation, the prevailing
party in a case has insufficient resources for monitoring
compliance with the decision, then the judge might attempt
to compensate by utilizing some of his or her own limited
monitoring resources. These limited monitoring resources
include the power of the judge to appoint a master to
oversee compliance with a decision.
Judges have compelling reasons to minimize the
unintended consequences that result from judicial decisions.
The principal duty of any judge is, of course, to do jus-
tice. If a judge determines that justice requires that
his or her decision in a case produce a certain outcome
but instead the decision produces an unintended outcome,
then justice is not achieved. Therefore, to do justice
consistently, judges must eliminate or at least minimize
the problem of unintended consequences. Another reason
for judges to minimize the unintended consequences pro-
duced by judicial decisions is because when such conse-
quences result from judicial decisions judges are apt to
be less respected and this can have ominous ramifications
for society. Judges are likely to be less respected when
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their decisions trigger unintended consequences because
in that situation judges are viewed as not able to control
the judicial system. As judges lose respect, individuals
are less inclined to submit their disputes to judges and
instead may resort to less orderly means of resolving
differences.
Implications For Law Reform
Besides the above described implications for the
judiciary, the present work also has implications for law
reform. By its showing of unintended consequences that
can flow from legal action, this work indicates that the
problem of unintended consequence's is a serious short-
coming in the use of legal action as a means of reform.
Specifically, this work shows that when legal action is
used as a means to pursue reform goals, the legal action
not only may be unsuccessful it also may produce wholly
unexpected, undesigned and undesired ends.
Given this showing that the problem of unintended
consequences is a flaw in the use of law as a means of
reform, politicians and lawyers should refrain from making
grandiose claims, such as those made in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, regarding the power of law as a reform tool.
Although such claims may prompt individuals to lend their
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support to reform efforts, the claims, in the long run,
may do more harm than good. Overstated claims about the
reform power of legal action may lead to serious disillu-
sionment among those individuals influenced by the claims,
and abandonment of reform efforts by those individuals,
when they discover that legal action not only serves as
a reform tool but also produces unintended effects that
can be uncontrollably destructive.
Furthermore, the showing in this dissertation
that the problem of unintended consequences is a flaw in
the use of law as a reform tool, suggests not only that
politicians and lawyers should temper their claims regard-
ing the reform power of legal action, but also that poli-
ticians and lawyers actually should limit their efforts
to use legal action for reform purposes. Politicians and
lawyers should no longer attempt to solve every social
problem by legal action be it litigation or legislation.
As already discussed above, it is important for judges to
act cautiously in connection with litigation that lacks
one of the features of successful litigation. Similarly,
it is important that lawyers and politicians show restraint
in using legal action (i.e. legislation or litigation) as a
reform tool in situations where one of the features of typ-
ically successful legal action is absent. Extraordinary
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restraint by politicians and lawyers is required in such
situations because, as already discussed in this disserta-
tion, the absence in legal action of one of the attributes
of typically successful legal action can lead to unintended
consequences.
A New Burden and a New Challenge For
Those Who Heeded the Call To Reform
Many of the law reformers of today who began their
law reform efforts in response to the call to reform of
the late 1960s and.early 1970s have had to endure various
burdens such as low pay and heavy work loads. Now these
law reformers must face a new burden. This burden is the
knowledge that each time they institute legal action for
reform purposes unintended consequences that create a
host of problems may be triggered. Furthermore, the bur-
den of this knowledge is likely to weigh down those who
responded to the 1960s-1970s call to law reform in that
these individuals took up law reform thinking it was a
means to achieve noble ends. With the realization that
law reform efforts unintentionally can cause problems
rather than alleviate them, these law reformers may aban-
don their law reform activities in dismay.
As already indicated above, in view of the problem
of unintended consequences, politicians and lawyers should
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be more circumspect in their use of legal action for
reform purposes particularly where not all the elements
of successful legal action are present. This warning
applies as well to those who heeded the 1960s-1970s call to
law reform. But neither these law reformers whose activi-
ties date from the 1960s, nor anyone else, should consider
the warning to be more circumspect in the use of law reform
as a suggestion that law reform efforts should be forsaken
completely. Rather than abandoning law reform because of
the problem of unintended consequences, those who responded
to the 1960s-1970s call to reform should bring the same
creative energies to the challenge of controlling law-
related unintended consequences as these individuals
brought to law reform in the first place.
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